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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON REFERRAL PROGRAMS AND PREFERENCE ESTIMATION
Yupeng Chen
Raghuram Iyengar
In this dissertation, we study referral programs and preference estimation in two essays.
In the first essay, we propose that a firm can enhance the effectiveness of its referral program by promoting better matching between referred customers and the firm. We develop
three treatments aimed at promoting better matching, including (1) offering current customers a gift before inviting them to refer friends, (2) notifying current customers about
the value that they have received from the firm before inviting them to refer friends, and
(3) rewarding referring customers based on the value of their referred customers. We test
these three treatments by conducting two field experiments in collaboration with a Chinese
online financial services firm. We find that all three treatments substantially enhanced the
effectiveness of the focal referral program, measured for each current customer as the total
value of his referred customers. We also find that the enhancement was primarily driven by
the acquisition of higher-value new customers rather than the acquisition of more new customers. In addition, we investigate customer heterogeneity in treatment effects and explore
the mechanisms through which these treatments impacted customer referrals. In the second
essay, we develop a new model for effective modeling of consumer heterogeneity in choicebased conjoint estimation. Assuming that most variations in consumers’ partworth vectors
are along a small number of orthogonal directions, we propose that shrinking the individuallevel partworth vectors toward a low-dimensional affine subspace that is also inferred from
data can be an effective approach to pooling information across consumers and modeling
consumer heterogeneity. We develop a low-dimension learning model to implement this
information pooling mechanism that builds on recent advances in rank minimization and
machine learning. We evaluate the empirical performance of the low-dimension learning
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model using both simulation experiments and field choice-based conjoint data sets. We find
that the low-dimension learning model overall outperforms multiple benchmark models in
terms of both parameter recovery and predictive accuracy. While addressing two different
marketing topics, both essays share a common theme - careful modeling of consumer heterogeneity plays a key role in understanding consumer behavior and developing effective
marketing strategies.
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CHAPTER 1 : Introduction
Customer referral programs have been widely adopted by firms for new customer acquisition
and have fueled the phenomenal growth of many companies, including Dropbox, Uber, and
Airbnb. In the case of Dropbox, for instance, its referral program was largely responsible
for the growth of its user base from 100,000 registered users in September 2008 to more
than 4 million in January 2010. Referral programs provide firms an attractive method to
acquire new customers, as they are cost-effective to run and provide access to prospective
customers whom traditional marketing programs may not effectively reach (Berman, 2016),
and are able to acquire higher-value new customers compared to other channels (Schmitt
et al., 2011). Given the prominent role of referral programs in firms’ customer acquisition
practice, both researchers and managers are keen on answering the following question: How
can firms enhance the effectiveness of their referral programs?
Conjoint analysis, and choice-based conjoint (CBC) in particular, has been the most popular
method used by both researchers and practitioners to assess how consumers with heterogeneous preferences value different product or service attributes (Wittink and Cattin, 1989;
Green and Srinivasan, 1990; Huber, 2004). The understanding of consumers’ heterogeneous
preferences plays a central role in a variety of marketing decisions, such as pricing, targeted
promotions, differentiated product offerings, and market segmentation (Allenby and Rossi,
1998). One significant challenge facing conjoint researchers is that in most applications
the amount of information elicited from each consumer is limited. To address the scarcity
of information from each consumer and obtain accurate estimation of consumers’ heterogeneous preferences, we need to answer the following question: How to pool information
across consumers and model consumer heterogeneity?
In this dissertation, we aim to answer these two questions with substantial marketing implications in two essays. In the first essay (Chapter 2), we propose that a firm can increase
the total value of new customers acquired through its referral program by promoting better

1

matching between these new customers and the firm. Better matching can be promoted by
two different processes: Motivating active matching, in which the firm motivates current
customers to exert greater effort to screen their friends and refer good matches, or facilitating passive matching, in which the firm induces a higher proportion of high-value current
customers to refer their friends who, by homophily, are more likely to be good matches than
friends of low-value current customers. We propose three treatments aimed at promoting
better matching: (1) offering current customers a gift before inviting them to refer friends,
(2) notifying current customers about the value that they have received from the firm before
inviting them to refer friends, and (3) rewarding referring customers based on the value of
their referred customers.
We empirically test the three proposed treatments by conducting two field experiments in
collaboration with a Chinese online financial services firm. Using data from the experiments,
we find that all three treatments substantially increased the total value of referred customers,
which validates their capacity in enhancing the effectiveness of the referral program. We
also find that the effects of the three treatments were primarily driven by the acquisition
of higher-value referred customers rather than the acquisition of more referred customers,
indicating that these treatments promoted better matching as we expected. Moreover,
we conduct a series of analyses to investigate the workings of these treatments, and find
evidence suggesting that the value-based reward facilitated passive matching and had a
larger impact on current customers of higher value.
Effective information pooling across consumers is critical for accurate conjoint estimation.
In the marketing literature, researchers have primarily investigated three information pooling mechanisms: (1) shrinking the individual-level partworths toward the population mean
(Lenk et al., 1996; Rossi et al., 1996; Evgeniou et al., 2007), (2) recovering segments in the
population and shrinking the individual-level partworths toward their respective segment
means (Allenby et al., 1998; Chen et al., 2017), and (3) approximating the individual-level
partworths using discrete points (Kamakura and Russell, 1989; Ansari and Mela, 2003; Kim
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et al., 2004). In the second essay (Chapter 3), we propose an information pooling mechanism
distinct from the three well-established mechanisms and develop a low-dimension learning
model to operationalize such a mechanism. In our approach, we assume that most variations in consumers’ heterogeneous partworths, viewed as vectors in an Euclidean space, are
along a small number of orthogonal directions; consequently, consumers’ partworth vectors
all reside near some low-dimensional affine subspace of the Euclidean space (James et al.,
2017). In this case, a natural mechanism for pooling information across consumers is to
shrink the individual-level partworths toward this low-dimensional affine subspace, which is
also inferred from the data. Our model implements such a low-dimension information pooling mechanism using a convex optimization framework in which both the distance between
each partworth vector and the affine subspace as well as the dimension of the affine subspace
are penalized. We further enhance our model by incorporating the convex regularization of
Evgeniou et al. (2007) that shrinks the individual-level partworths toward the population
mean.
We compare our low-dimension learning model and a restricted version of the model in
which only the low-dimension information pooling mechanism is implemented to multiple
benchmark models using simulation experiments and two field data sets. We find that the
low-dimension learning model and its restricted version overall outperform the benchmark
models both in terms of parameter recovery and predictive accuracy, and they demonstrate strong performance irrespective of whether the underlying assumption - the true
individual-level partworths have a good low-dimensional affine subspace approximation seems to hold or not. Therefore, the effectiveness of our low-dimension learning model
(and the low-dimension information pooling mechanism) in recovering consumers’ heterogeneous preferences is empirically validated. We also find that the performance of the
low-dimension learning model is very close to that of its restricted version, suggesting that
the incremental value of shrinking the individual-level partworths toward the population
mean can be very limited when we are already shrinking the individual-level partworths
toward a low-dimensional affine subspace.
3

CHAPTER 2 : Enhancing Effectiveness of Referral Programs by Promoting Better
Matching: Evidence from Field Experiments
2.1. Introduction
Customer referral programs, in which a firm’s current customers are rewarded for bringing
in new customers, have been widely used by firms for customer acquisition and have fueled
the phenomenal growth of many companies, including Dropbox, Uber, and Airbnb. In
the case of Dropbox, for instance, a current user receives 500MB of free storage space
for each friend invited to sign up for and install Dropbox. According to Drew Houston,
Co-Founder and CEO of Dropbox, this referral program was largely responsible for the
growth of Dropbox’s user base from 100,000 registered users in September 2008 to more
than 4 million in January 2010. Referral programs provide firms an attractive method to
acquire new customers, as they are cost-effective to run and provide access to prospective
customers whom traditional marketing programs may not effectively reach (Berman, 2016),
and customers acquired through referral programs (i.e., referred customers) can be more
valuable than customers acquired through other methods (Schmitt et al., 2011).
Given the prominent role of referral programs in firms’ customer acquisition practice, both
researchers and managers are keen on understanding factors driving customer referrals and
ways to leverage such factors to enhance the effectiveness of referral programs. In general,
customers make referrals because (1) they want to earn an economic reward, (2) they
want to help their friends make better choices and/or manage their friends’ impressions
of them, and (3) they like the firm and want to help its business.1 In the marketing and
information systems literatures, researchers have empirically investigated the roles of the
first two factors in customer referrals. For instance, Ryu and Feick (2007) find that the
impact of the referral reward on a lab participant’s stated referral likelihood is moderated
by the relationship between the participant and the targeted prospective customer as well
1

https://rewardstream.com/blog/social-referrals-psychology-why-do-people-share/
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as brand strength. Bapna et al. (2016) vary the allocation of the referral reward between
the referring customer and the referred customer in a field experiment, and find that both
equally splitting the reward and allocating all the reward to the referred customer lead to
more successful referrals than allocating all the reward to the referring customer. Jung
et al. (2017) compare different framings of a call-to-action message encouraging customer
referrals in a field experiment, and find that the altruistic framing leads to a higher referral
likelihood, more referrals, and more purchases from referred customers compared to the
egoistic and equitable framings. This stream of research has two limitations. First, it has
not examined the role of customers’ intention to help the firm in making referrals, and
the referral rewards being studied are all contingent only on the acquisition of the referred
customer - the possibility of rewarding the referring customer based on the value of his
referred customers has not been explored. Second, when assessing the impact of the design
and communication of referral programs on their effectiveness, this stream of research has
focused on measures corresponding to the number of referred customers and has not taken
into account the value of each referred customer. While the number of referred customers
is an important aspect of the effectiveness of referral programs, firms also care about the
value of referred customers (Schmitt et al., 2011) and information about the value of referred
customers is critical to our theoretical understanding of customer referrals (Van den Bulte
et al., 2018).
In this essay, we operationalize the effectiveness of referral programs using the total value
of all referred customers, which takes into account both the number and value of referred
customers, and explore how firms can increase the total value of referred customers.2 Specifically, we aim to answer the following question: Given a referral program that rewards a
referring customer contingent on the acquisition of the referred customer (as is the case for
most existing referral programs), can we develop treatments that can be applied to the re2

Conceptually, we assess the value of a referred customer using her customer lifetime value (CLV).
Empirically, however, since we do not have access to the margin information in our application setting (a
Chinese online financial services firm), we will use a referred customer’s investment amount as a proxy for
her value.
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ferral program to increase the total value of referred customers? Clearly, an important lever
for increasing the total value of referred customers is making the referral program acquire
higher-value new customers.3 To shed light on how this lever can be used, we draw on the
recent work in marketing on referral programs and customer value, which has proposed and
identified better matching as a critical mechanism through which referral programs are able
to acquire high-value new customers (Schmitt et al., 2011; Van den Bulte et al., 2018).4 Better matching refers to the phenomenon that referred customers match with the firm better
than customers acquired through other methods do, and there are two distinct matching
processes that can be at work: active matching and passive matching. Active matching
involves current customers’ deliberate screening of their friends and diligent matching of
those friends who they think may be a good fit to the firm. Specifically, active matching
relies on that current customers, by knowing both the needs of their friends and the offerings
of the firm, are likely to be better informed to assess the match between their friends and
the firm than the two parties themselves. When current customers are properly motivated,
they will screen their friends based on their match with the firm and refer good matches to
the firm; moreover, when referring those friends, they may also exert effort to facilitate the
matching by educating their friends about the offerings of the firm. Eventually, the firm is
able to acquire high-value new customers from the social networks of its current customers.
Passive matching, on the other hand, operates through homophily: As current customers
have an above-average chance of being a good match and they tend to refer people who
are similar to themselves, referred customers are more likely to match well with the firm
compared to nonreferred customers. For our research question, in order to make the referral program acquire higher-value new customers, the firm may consider designing and
implementing treatments aimed at promoting better matching between referred customers
and the firm. Promoting better matching can be achieved by motivating active matching,
3
Another lever is making the referral program acquire more new customers, which has been investigated
in the literature (Ryu and Feick, 2007; Bapna et al., 2016; Jung et al., 2017).
4
In the economics and sociology literatures, better matching has also been established as a key mechanism
through which firms derive value from employee referral programs, a recruiting device that rewards current
employees for referring job candidates for hire (Montgomery, 1991; Fernandez et al., 2000; Castilla, 2005;
Beaman and Magruder, 2012; Brown et al., 2016; Pallais and Sands, 2016).
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in which the firm motivates current customers to exert greater effort to screen their friends
and refer good matches, or by facilitating passive matching, in which the firm induces a
higher proportion of high-value current customers to refer their friends who, by homophily,
are more likely to be good matches than friends of low-value current customers.
We propose three treatments aimed at promoting better matching. The first two treatments,
which we term as the gift treatment and the notification treatment, are designed to induce
reciprocity from current customers toward the firm which could motivate them to help the
firm’s business by referring friends.5 In the gift treatment, the firm offers current customers
a gift before inviting them to refer friends. The gift treatment is motivated by the field
evidence that people reciprocate a gift from others by providing goods desired by the latter
(Gneezy and List, 2006; Falk, 2007; Alpizar et al., 2008; Kube et al., 2012; Gilchrist et al.,
2016; Chung and Narayandas, 2017), as well as the established merchandising practice in
which salespeople offer customers a free sample or service to trigger reciprocity which leads
to increased sales (Cialdini, 1993). We expect that the gift treatment will make current
customers feel that they are treated well by the firm, and they will, out of reciprocity, return
the favor to the firm by exerting more effort to carefully screen their friends and match
those who they think may be valuable to the firm (i.e., by engaging in active matching).6
Moreover, if the gift is designed in such a way that it is more valuable to high-value current
customers than to low-value current customers, it will be more likely to elicit reciprocity
from the former than from the latter and hence may induce a higher proportion of high-value
current customers to refer their friends, which facilitates passive matching.
5

Reciprocity refers to “the behavioral phenomenon of people responding toward (un)kind treatment
likewise, even in the absence of reputational concerns” (Kube et al., 2012), and it has long been argued to be
deeply embedded in and have substantial implications for social and economic interactions (Gouldner, 1960;
Cialdini, 1993; Fehr and Gachter, 2000). Similar definitions of reciprocity have also been proposed in the
literature. For instance, Gouldner (1960) suggests that “a norm of reciprocity, in its universal form, makes
two interrelated, minimal demands: (1) people should help those who have helped them, and (2) people
should not injure those who have helped them”. Cialdini (1992) describes reciprocity as the norm that “we
are obligated to the future repayment of favors, gifts, invitations, and the like”. Referring to reciprocity,
Fehr and Gachter (2000) state that “People repay gifts and take revenge even in interactions with complete
strangers and even if it is costly for them and yields neither present nor future material rewards”.
6
Schmitt et al. (2011) have also suggested that reciprocity from current customers toward the firm may
lead to active matching.

7

In the notification treatment, the firm notifies current customers about the value that they
have received from the firm before inviting them to refer friends. Possible applications of
this notification treatment include notifications about customers’ investment return from a
financial services firm, and notifications about customers’ money saved from a daily deals
website. We expect that such a notification will make it salient to current customers that
they have received great value from the firm, which may trigger their intention to reciprocate
to the firm by engaging in active matching. In addition, since the value that customers
receive from the firm is likely to be positively correlated with the value that customers
generate for the firm, high-value customers are more likely to have received great value
from the firm and therefore more likely to refer friends after receiving the notification. In
such cases, passive matching is facilitated.7
The third treatment, which we term as the value-based reward treatment, explores the potential of rewarding the referring customer on the basis of the value of his referred customers.
In most existing referral programs, since the referring customer is rewarded contingent only
on the acquisition of the referred customer, current customers have little economic incentive to engage in active matching and bring in high-value new customers. Such an incentive
structure has raised concerns among managers that referral programs could end up rewarding current customers for referring low-value new customers (Schmitt et al., 2011). In order
to address this issue, we propose that the firm rewards the referring customer based on
the value of his referred customers on top of the regular referral reward contingent on the
acquisition of the referred customers. We expect that the value-based reward treatment,
by providing current customers a direct economic incentive to engage in active matching,
will motivate them to refer high-value new customers.8 At the same time, since high-value
current customers are more likely to have friends who could become high-value new cus7
For instance, in the case of Certificate of Deposit, as the amount of the deposit increases, the customer
receives more value from the financial institution through more interest return and the financial institution
derives more value from the customer through more assets under management.
8
In the context of employee referrals, Beaman and Magruder (2012) show that providing a contingent
bonus based on the referred employee’s performance can make a fraction of current employees select highly
skilled new employees to refer to the firm.
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tomers and generate value-based rewards for them based on homophily, they are likely to
be better incentivized than low-value current customers in the presence of a value-based
reward, implying that passive matching is facilitated.
While we expect the three proposed treatments to promote better matching and enhance
the effectiveness of referral programs, their prospects are actually far from certain. For the
gift and notification treatments, it is ex ante unclear how many current customers would
reciprocate to the firm, especially given the possibility that the gift and the notification are
perceived as deliberate marketing devices, in which case reciprocity can hardly be triggered
(Gouldner, 1960; Cialdini, 1993). As to the value-based reward treatment, since it explicitly
links the size of the reward to the value of referred customers, it could impose considerable
psychological cost on referring customers as they may perceive that they are exploiting
their social connections to seek economic rewards, in which case the value-based reward
may backfire by making current customers less likely to refer friends (Ryu and Feick, 2007;
Gneezy et al., 2011). Moreover, the value-based reward may make referring customers less
persuasive when advocating for the firm (Barasch et al., 2016). Consequently, whether and
to what extent each of these three treatments can promote better matching and ultimately
increase the total value of referred customers need to be empirically investigated.9
We collaborated with a leading Chinese online financial services firm to test these three
treatments. The firm offers customers financial deposit services including a flexible deposit
and an assortment of fixed deposits in which they can invest money and earn interest. The
flexible deposit has a floating interest rate and allows customers to make investments for
any duration and withdraw part or all of the investments at any time, whereas each fixed
deposit has a fixed interest rate and a fixed investment duration. As part of its customer
acquisition strategy, the firm runs a referral program that rewards current customers with an
investment coupon that can be used to reimburse a small proportion of their next investment
9
In this essay, we focus on understanding the impact of each of the three treatments (i.e., gift, notification, and value-based reward) on the effectiveness of referral programs rather than comparing among the
three treatments. This is because these treatments take distinct forms and may operate through different
mechanisms, and hence are not directly comparable ex ante.

9

for bringing in a friend to open an account at the firm. We conducted two randomized field
experiments at the firm, testing the gift and notification treatments in the first experiment
and the value-based reward treatment in the second experiment.10
In the first experiment, we included 93,288 current customers in a two-week campaign,
and randomly assigned them to a control condition and two treatment conditions that
implemented the gift treatment and the notification treatment, respectively. The regular
referral program was implemented in all three conditions, and the only difference across
conditions was the way by which customers were approached for the campaign. Specifically,
at the beginning of the campaign, customers in the control condition received a text message
inviting them to refer friends; customers in the gift condition received a gift - an investment
coupon that could be used to raise the interest rate of their next investment and was valid
during the campaign - and a text message inviting them to refer friends; and customers in the
notification condition received a text message notifying them about their total investment
return and inviting them to refer friends.
In the second experiment, we included 120,258 current customers in a 30-day campaign,
and randomly assigned them to a control condition and two treatment conditions that
operationalized the value-based reward treatment differently. During the campaign, the
regular referral program was implemented in the control condition, while each of the two
treatment conditions augmented the regular referral program with a value-based reward.
In particular, a customer in the first treatment condition would receive a cash reward based
on the number of his referred customers whose total investments in fixed deposits made
during the campaign were above a pre-determined threshold, and a customer in the second
treatment condition would receive a cash reward based on the total investments in fixed
deposits made by his referred customers during the campaign. By testing two different
value-based rewards, we intended to obtain a more thorough understanding of the impact
of the value-based reward treatment on customer referrals.
10

For logistical reasons, we were unable to test all three treatments in a single field experiment.

10

Analyzing data from the two experiments, we find that all three proposed treatments had
an economically substantial and statistically significant impact on the effectiveness of the
focal referral program. In particular, the gift and notification treatments increased the
total value of referred customers by more than 200% in the first experiment, while both
operationalizations of the value-based reward treatment increased the total value of referred
customers by more than 100% in the second experiment.11 We also find that the effects of
all three treatments on the total value of referred customers were primarily driven by the
positive value differential between referred customers acquired in the treatment conditions
and those acquired in the control conditions, i.e., the three treatments helped the referral
program acquire higher-value new customers as expected, but their impact on the number
of referred customers turns out to be modest in magnitude and largely insignificant. One
interesting implication of the latter finding is that, if we were to assess the effectiveness of
the focal referral program using the number of successful referrals as has been done in the
literature, we would erroneously conclude that these treatments are ineffective.
To derive deeper insights on the workings of the three proposed treatments, we use data
from the experiments to explore the mechanisms underlying these treatments. For the
gift and notification treatments, while they are designed to elicit reciprocity from current
customers toward the firm which could in turn promote better matching, they may also
motivate customer referrals by serving as a value signal to current customers: The gift and
notification treatments may signal to current customers that the firm is able to create great
value for its customers, which could enhance their perception about the value that their
friends would receive once referred to the firm; since customers tend to use referrals to help
friends make better choices or manage friends’ impressions of them (Ryu and Feick, 2007;
Kornish and Li, 2010), such an enhanced value perception is likely to motivate customer
referrals. Moreover, with either reciprocity or value signaling being at work, both the
gift and notification treatments could make the referral program acquire higher-value new
11
We note that the findings are not directly comparable between experiments since the two experiments
were conducted at different times and on different samples of customers.
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customers as observed in the data by motivating active matching or facilitating passive
matching. We conduct a series of analyses to investigate the mechanisms underlying the gift
and notification treatments; the findings, however, are not encouraging. Specifically, the lack
of power in most analyses prevents us from obtaining sufficient statistical evidence to draw
conclusions regarding the workings of the gift and notification treatments. Similar to the
gift and notification treatments, the value-based reward treatment could make the referral
program acquire higher-value new customers as observed in the data by motivating active
matching or facilitating passive matching. We find evidence suggesting that the second
operationalization facilitated passive matching, but we do not have sufficient statistical
evidence to reach a conclusion regarding the first operationalization.
Drawing on these findings, this essay contributes to the literature on customer referral programs. As we mentioned earlier, extant work empirically investigating the impact of the
design and communication of referral programs has not taken into account the value of
referred customers when assessing the effectiveness of referral programs (Ryu and Feick,
2007; Bapna et al., 2016; Jung et al., 2017), which is a significant limitation from both the
theoretical and managerial perspectives.12 On the other hand, while research on referral
programs and customer value has proposed and identified better matching as a key mechanism through which referral programs are able to acquire high-value new customers (Schmitt
et al., 2011; Van den Bulte et al., 2018), whether firms can proactively leverage this mechanism to further enhance the effectiveness of referral programs has not been investigated.
We contribute to the literature by proposing three distinct treatments aimed at promoting
better matching and conducting field experiments to test whether these treatments can
increase the total value of referred customers, which we use to measure the effectiveness of
referral programs. We find that all three treatments substantially increased the total value
of referred customers, and the effects of the treatments were primarily driven by the acqui12

Kumar et al. (2010) measure the effectiveness of referral programs using customer referral value (CRV)
which takes into account the value of referred customers. However, their focus is on studying optimal
customer targeting for a given referral marketing campaign instead of investigating the impact of the design
and communication of referral programs on their effectiveness.
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sition of higher-value new customers rather than the acquisition of more new customers.
Therefore, our work answers the call by Godes et al. (2005) and Godes (2011) to investigate
how firms can proactively leverage peer influence to enhance business performance by documenting evidence suggesting that firms can increase the total value of referred customers
by promoting better matching.
The remainder of the essay is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we describe the research
setting for our study, including the design and implementation of the two experiments. We
analyze data from the first experiment in Section 2.3 and data from the second experiment
in Section 2.4, respectively, to investigate the effects of the three treatments and explore the
mechanisms through which they operate. We discuss limitations of our work and suggest a
few directions for future research in Section 2.5.

2.2. Empirical Setting
For our study, we conducted two randomized field experiments in collaboration with a
leading Chinese online financial services firm. The firm offers customers financial deposit
services accessible via both a website and a mobile application, in which they can invest
money and earn interest. There are two types of financial deposits: a flexible deposit and
an assortment of fixed deposits. In the flexible deposit, customers can make investments for
any duration and withdraw part or all of the investments at any time. The flexible deposit
has a floating interest rate (i.e., the interest rate varies daily) that is always lower than the
interest rates of the fixed deposits. Each fixed deposit has a fixed interest rate and a fixed
investment duration. In fixed deposits, customers receive both the principal and the interest
of an investment at maturity, and, if they decide to withdraw the investment prior to its
maturity, a transaction fee is incurred. Fixed deposits vary in terms of duration (from 3
months to 24 months) and interest rate (from 7% to 10.5% annually), with a longer-duration
deposit having a higher interest rate. Both durations and interest rates are comparable to
those offered by competing firms.
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The firm runs a referral program as part of its customer acquisition strategy. Similar to
referral programs of many competing firms, this referral program rewards current customers
an investment coupon for referring a friend to open an account at the firm. Specifically, a
current customer can share a referral link to a friend via either WeChat (a popular Chinese
mobile messaging application), social media, or email, and, if the friend opens an account
using the referral link, the referring customer receives a one-time coupon. When applied
to an investment in a fixed deposit, this reward coupon reimburses a customer for 0.5% of
the investment for up to 20 RMB.13 For example, if a customer applies the reward coupon
to a fixed-deposit investment of 3,000 RMB, he will receive a reimbursement of 15 RMB at
the time of investing and the coupon becomes nullified. A customer can neither apply more
than one reward coupon nor apply a reward coupon together with any other coupons to
the same investment. On the other hand, any new customer, irrespective of the acquisition
method, receives a welcome coupon that reimburses 0.5% of her fixed-deposit investments
for up to 50 RMB and can be applied to multiple investments until the total reimbursements
reach 50 RMB. Both the reward coupon for referring customers and the welcome coupon
for new customers expire in 30 days.
We chose to collaborate with this firm for two main reasons. First, since financial investment
decisions are relatively private and can be risky, customers tend to be cautious when it comes
to referring friends to a firm providing financial investment services. Hence, conducting
experiments at the focal Chinese online financial services firm could provide a stringent test
for the proposed treatments. Second, the Chinese online financial services industry is highly
competitive and new customer acquisition is challenging. Given that online advertising, the
primary customer acquisition channel, has become increasingly expensive, the more costeffective referral programs have started to gain prominence in firms’ customer acquisition
strategy. Testing the proposed treatments at the focal firm could serve as a first step
in generating much-needed insights that firms in this industry can use to enhance the
effectiveness of referral programs.
13

RMB is the Chinese currency. 1 U.S. dollar approximately equals 7 RMB.
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2.2.1. The First Experiment
The first experiment was conducted in December, 2016. Right before the start of the experiment, we selected a random sample of 93,288 customers from the firm’s current customers
who satisfied two criteria: (1) had at least 500 RMB invested in all deposits combined at
the time of sampling and (2) had earned between 100 RMB and 10,000 RMB in interest
since account opening. These two criteria were imposed to ensure that customers included
in the experiment were in an active relationship with the firm and had received a nontrivial
return on their investments. We randomly assigned these customers to a control condition
and two treatment conditions, with the control condition including 30,977 customers, the
first treatment condition including 31,241 customers, and the second treatment condition
including 31,070 customers.
The experiment involved a two-week campaign inviting customers to participate in the
referral program. The regular referral program was implemented in all three conditions,
and the conditions only differed in how customers were approached for the campaign. In
the control condition, customers received a text message encouraging them to refer friends
at the beginning of the campaign. Specifically, the text message stated “Dear customer,
please invite your friends to invest with us, who provide reliable and high-return financial
deposit services!”, and included a link to the referral program page in the mobile app.14
Customers received the same text message again one week later as a reminder.
In the first treatment condition, customers received a one-time 1% interest-raising coupon
for their future investment in fixed deposits as a gift and a text message explaining the
coupon and encouraging them to refer friends at the beginning of the campaign. The gift
coupon was valid for two weeks, i.e., it would expire at the end of the campaign. The text
message stated “Dear customer, you have received a 1% interest-raising coupon as a gift for
being a valued customer. Please feel free to use it. Also please invite your friends to invest
with us, who provide reliable and high-return financial deposit services!”, and included a
14

The text quoted here and those quoted in the following are translated from Chinese.
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link to the referral program page in the mobile app. One week later, customers received a
text message reminding them about the gift coupon and the invitation to refer friends. In
the following, we refer to this treatment condition as the gift condition.
We make several observations regarding the 1% interest-raising coupon. First, as the name
suggests, this coupon could be used to raise the annual interest rate of a future fixed-deposit
investment by 1 percentage point. Since the economic value of this coupon was proportional
to the amount of the investment, it was likely to be more valuable to high-value customers
who, compared to low-value customers, were likely to make larger investments during the
campaign. Second, this coupon was familiar to customers, as interest-raising coupons with
comparable raise in interest rate are sent to all customers multiple times a year. This coupon
differed from other interest-raising coupons in that it was framed as a gift as opposed to a
promotion. Third, since this coupon and the referral reward coupon could not be applied
together to the same investment, there was a substitution between the two.15 In particular,
if a customer found the 1% interest-raising coupon more valuable, it would effectively void
the value of the referral reward coupon and consequently remove the economic incentive of
referring friends.
In the second treatment condition, customers received a text message notifying them about
their total investment return and encouraging them to refer friends at the beginning of
the campaign. Specifically, customers in this condition were divided into four subgroups
based on their total investment return: Those whose total investment return was at least
100 RMB and less than 500 RMB were included in the first subgroup; those whose total
investment return was at least 500 RMB and less than 1,000 RMB were included in the
second subgroup; those whose total investment return was at least 1,000 RMB and less
15
Which coupon was more valuable to a customer depended on the customer’s time preferences and
the amount and duration of his investment. The economic value of the 1% interest-raising coupon was
proportional to the investment duration and would be received by the customer at maturity, whereas the
economic value of the referral reward coupon was not contingent on the investment duration and would be
received by the customer at the time of investing. In addition, there was no upper limit on the economic
value that the 1% interest-raising coupon could generate as the investment amount increased, in contrast to
the upper limit of 20 RMB for the referral reward coupon.
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than 5,000 RMB were included in the third subgroup; and those whose total investment
return was at least 5,000 RMB and no greater than 10,000 RMB were included in the fourth
subgroup. At the beginning of the campaign, customers in the first subgroup received a
text message that stated “Dear customer, do you notice that we have helped you earn at
least 100 RMB on your investments? Please invite your friends to invest with us, who
provide reliable and high-return financial deposit services!”, and included a link to the
referral program page in the mobile app. Customers in the three other subgroups received
the same text message except that 100 RMB was replaced by 500 RMB, 1,000 RMB, and
5,000 RMB, respectively.16 Customers in each subgroup received the same text message
again one week later as a reminder. In the following, we refer to this treatment condition
as the notification condition.
2.2.2. The Second Experiment
The second experiment was conducted in April and May, 2017. Right before the start of
the experiment, we selected a random sample of 120,258 customers from the firm’s current customers who had at least 500 RMB invested in all deposits combined at the time
of sampling. We randomly assigned these customers to a control condition and two treatment conditions, with the control condition including 40,076 customers, the first treatment
condition including 40,145 customers, and the second treatment condition including 40,037
customers.
The experiment involved a 30-day campaign inviting customers to participate in the referral
program. In the control condition, the regular referral program was implemented and
customers received a text message encouraging them to refer friends each week. The text
message stated “Invite friends to invest with us and earn investment coupons!”, and included
a link to the referral program page in the mobile app.
16
We chose to divide customers into subgroups and send a unified notification to customers in each
subgroup instead of sending each customer a personalized notification about his total investment return
given managers’ concern that the latter approach might be perceived as intrusive by customers. If a customer
would like to access the exact value of his total investment return, he could log into his account anytime via
either the website or the mobile app in which such information is prominently displayed.
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In the first treatment condition, a value-based reward was added to the referral program.
For each customer, the value-based reward was specified as follows: (1) new customers who
used his referral link to open an account during the campaign (i.e., referred customers) were
identified, (2) the total investments in fixed deposits made by each referred customer during
the campaign were calculated, and (3) for each referred customer whose total investments
were at least 10,000 RMB, the referring customer would receive 50 RMB in cash at the end
of the campaign. For example, if a referring customer had three referred customers, the first
one investing 30,000 RMB in fixed deposits, the second one investing 10,000 RMB in fixed
deposits, and the third one investing 5,000 RMB in fixed deposits, the referring customer
would receive a cash reward of 100 RMB. A detailed description of this reward was shown
on the referral program page. Customers also received a text message encouraging them
to refer friends each week. The text message stated “Invite friends to invest with us and
earn investment coupons and cash rewards!”, and included a link to the referral program
page in the mobile app. In the following, we refer to this treatment condition as the first
value-based reward condition.
In the second treatment condition, a different value-based reward was added to the referral
program. For each customer, the value-based reward was specified as follows: (1) referred
customers were identified, (2) the total investments in fixed deposits made by all referred
customers during the campaign were calculated, and (3) for every 10,000 RMB in the
total investments, the referring customer would receive 50 RMB in cash at the end of the
campaign. For example, if the referred customers invested a total of 45,000 RMB in fixed
deposits, their referring customer would receive a cash reward of 200 RMB. Other than
the reward, the second treatment condition was identical to the first value-based reward
condition, including the text message. In the following, we refer to this treatment condition
as the second value-based reward condition.17
17
We note that the second value-based reward was more generous than the first value-based reward in
the sense that, for any profile of referred customers, the referring customer would receive the same or more
cash reward under the second reward compared to the first reward. One main difference between these two
rewards was that, a referred customer’s contribution to the reward for the referring customer was capped at 50
RMB under the first reward, whereas her contribution would keep increasing as her fixed-deposit investment
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2.2.3. Data
For each current customer in the two field experiments, we observe the following variables
that were collected right before the experiments: total investment return since account
opening, investment amount in all financial deposits combined, tenure since account opening, recency of the last investment, and whether the customer had successfully referred any
friend to open an account. For each referral made by a customer, it is recorded in the data
if and only if it is used by the receiving friend to open an account at the firm. Ideally, it
would be helpful if we can observe each referral irrespective of whether it is accepted by its
receiver or not. However, since a customer can use a variety of channels including WeChat,
various social media platforms, and email that the firm cannot track to share referral links
to friends, his sharing of a referral link is not recorded in the data; it is only when the
receiver of the referral link uses it to open an account that we can observe this referral and
map the referred new customer to the referring customer. Once a new customer opens an
account, we observe her investment behavior in all financial deposits.

2.3. Empirical Findings: The First Experiment
In this section, we analyze data from the first experiment to investigate the effects of the
gift and notification treatments. First, we verify that the random assignment of customers
was valid. Then, we estimate the aggregate effects of the gift and notification treatments on
the effectiveness of the referral program. Finally, we derive deeper insights on the workings
of these two treatments by exploring the mechanisms through which they operate.
2.3.1. Randomization Check
We assess the validity of the randomization by comparing customers across conditions with
respect to their behaviors prior to the experiment. With a valid random assignment, we
should observe little or no systematic differences in customers’ pre-experiment variables
increased under the second reward. In this experiment, we tested two different value-based rewards in order
to obtain a more thorough understanding of the impact of the value-based reward treatment. The optimal
design of value-based reward is an interesting question that we leave for future research.
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across conditions. The details of the randomization check are reported in Table 1.
Insert Table 1 here.
For each pair of experimental conditions and each pre-experiment variable, we test whether
the two conditions have the same population mean on this variable using a two-sided Welch’s
t-test. To apply Welch’s t-test, we assume that the sample in each condition consists of i.i.d.
draws from an underlying population; on the other hand, Welch’s t-test does not require
the variances of the two populations to be equal, and given the large sample size in each
condition the populations do not have to follow a normal distribution (Lumley et al., 2002).
From Table 1, it is evident that customers’ pre-experiment variables are well balanced across
conditions, confirming the validity of the random assignment in the first experiment.
2.3.2. Aggregate Effects of the Treatments
We measure the effectiveness of the referral program for each current customer by assessing
the total value of his referred customers, which is operationalized as follows. First, we
identify new customers who opened an account at the firm using his referral link during the
two-week campaign period (i.e., his referred customers). Second, we assess the value of each
referred customer; since we do not have access to the margin information of the financial
deposits, we proxy for the value of a referred customer using the amount of investments
she made in all financial deposits combined during the 90-day observational period starting
from the beginning of the experiment. Finally, the total value of a current customer’s
referred customers is calculated as the sum of the value of his referred customers, i.e., we
proxy for the total value of a current customer’s referred customers using the total amount
of investments made by all his referred customers during the 90-day observational period.18
While the total value of referred customers is our key outcome variable, we also consider
three other outcome variables in order to obtain a more thorough understanding of the
impact of the gift and notification treatments on customer referrals: (1) whether a current
18

In the following, we use the terms “value” and “investments” interchangeably when referring to the
value of a referred customer and the total value of a current customer’s referred customers.
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customer has acquired any referred customers during the experiment (Yes/No), (2) the
number of a current customer’s referred customers, and (3) the value of a referred customer
assessed by the amount of investments she made during the 90-day observational period.
We note that all outcome variables except the value of a referred customer are defined on
each current customer, and for these outcome variables the sample size in each condition is
the number of current customers in that condition: 30,977 in the control condition, 31,241
in the gift condition, and 31,070 in the notification condition. On the other hand, the value
of a referred customer is defined on each referred customer, and the sample size in each
condition for this outcome variable is the number of referred customers acquired in that
condition: 83 in the control condition, 101 in the gift condition, and 93 in the notification
condition.
Given the randomization, the average treatment effect of either the provision of the gift
coupon or the notification on the total value of referred customers can be identified via
a direct mean comparison between the control condition and the corresponding treatment
condition. We report the result of the mean comparisons based on two-sided Welch’s t-tests
in the first row of Table 2.
Insert Table 2 here.
Similar to Section 2.3.1, we assume that the sample in each condition consists of i.i.d.
draws from an underlying population in order to apply Welch’s t-test; on the other hand,
the validity of the test does not require the populations to have equal variances or be
normally distributed given the large sample sizes. We find that both the gift and notification
treatments had a substantial impact on the total investments of referred customers. In
particular, the gift treatment and the notification treatment on average increased the total
investments of a current customer’s referred customers by 26.58 RMB and 25.23 RMB,
respectively. Both treatment effects amount to more than 200% lift over the baseline value
of 12.47 RMB, and are statistically significant with p < 0.01 for the gift treatment and
p < 0.05 for the notification treatment.
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So what drove the positive effects of these two treatments on the total investments of
referred customers? Were they driven by the acquisition of more referred customers or by
the acquisition of higher-value referred customers? To answer the question, we examine the
mean comparisons with respect to the three other outcome variables, which are also based
on two-sided Welch’s t-tests and are reported in Table 2. From the second and third rows
of Table 2, we find that both the gift and notification treatments increased the incidence
of having acquired referred customers and the number of referred customers by less than
30% and 25% relative to the control condition, respectively, and none of these effects is
significant at the p < 0.05 level. On the other hand, the last row of Table 2 shows that
referred customers acquired in both treatment conditions on average invested at least 150%
more than those acquired in the control condition did, and both differences are significant
(ps < 0.05).19 Therefore, the data suggest that both the gift and notification treatments
enhanced the effectiveness of the referral program primarily through the acquisition of
higher-investment (and hence higher-value) referred customers rather than the acquisition
of more referred customers.20
One caveat for the mean comparisons with respect to the investments of each referred
customer is that it is unclear whether the sample sizes in the three experimental conditions
19

Unlike the three other outcome variables, investments of a referred customer is defined on referred
customers who were not observational units being randomized in the experiment. Therefore, the mean
comparisons with respect to investments of each referred customer are purely descriptive and do not have a
causal interpretation.
20
Since we simultaneously conduct multiple mean comparisons, multiple testing is a concern. We consider two approaches to address this concern, including the Holm procedure and the Benjamini-Hochberg
procedure. The Holm procedure controls the family-wise error rate (FWER), and it does not impose any assumption on the dependency among tests and is more powerful than the Bonferroni correction (Holm, 1979).
In the Holm procedure, when we set FWER at 0.05, none of the 8 comparisons is significant; on the other
hand, when we set FWER at 0.1, the comparisons between the control and gift conditions with respect
to the total investments of referred customers and investments of each referred customer are significant.
The Benjamini-Hochberg procedure controls the false discovery rate (FDR) under a positive dependence
assumption among tests called PRDS that is likely to hold in our setting; compared to procedures controlling FWER, the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure provides less stringent control of Type-I errors but has
greater power (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995; Benjamini and Yekutieli, 2001). When we set FDR at 0.05,
the comparisons between the control and gift conditions with respect to the total investments of referred
customers and investments of each referred customer are significant; on the other hand, when we set FDR
at 0.1, in addition to the two comparisons that are significant when FDR is set at 0.05, the comparisons
between the control and notification conditions with respect to the total investments of referred customers
and investments of each referred customer are also significant.
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(83, 101, and 93) are sufficient to warrant the relaxation of the normality assumption on
the underlying populations when we apply Welch’s t-test. Given that the majority of
referred customers did not make any investment, we consider the following alternative test
procedure to compare the investments of each referred customer across conditions: Between
the control condition and a treatment condition, we first test whether there is a difference
between the proportions of referred customers with a positive investment amount (i.e.,
positive observations), and then test whether there is a difference between the two positive
subsamples. We report the findings based on this alternative test procedure in Table 3.
Insert Table 3 here.
We compare the proportions of positive observations across conditions using the test for
equal proportions, and find that the proportions are not significantly different between the
control condition and either of the gift and notification conditions (ps > 0.1). On the other
hand, as the Shapiro-Wilk tests indicate that the positive subsamples in all three conditions
are not normally distributed (ps < 0.001), we compare the positive subsamples across
conditions using the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. We find that the positive subsamples
in both the gift and notification conditions have a higher average investment amount than
that in the control condition, and the difference between the control and gift conditions is
significant (p < 0.05) whereas the difference between the control and notification conditions
is marginally significant (p < 0.1). Taken together, the comparisons with respect to the
value of each referred customer based on this alternative test procedure are consistent with
our earlier findings based on Welch’s t-tests.21
2.3.3. Regression Analyses of Aggregate Effects
In this section, we estimate the aggregate effects of the gift and notification treatments using
regression models. When the outcome variable is total investments of a current customer’s
21

In Appendix, we report comparisons with respect to the total investments and number of a current
customer’s referred customers based on a similar alternative test procedure, and comparisons with respect
to the incidence of having acquired referred customers based on the test for equal proportions.
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referred customers, we consider the following linear model:
Yi = α + βg Tg,i + βn Tn,i + θ> Xi + i ,

(2.1)

where i refers to the i-th current customer, Yi denotes the total investments of the ith current customer’s referred customers (in RMB), Tg,i is the dummy variable for the
gift treatment, Tn,i is the dummy variable for the notification treatment, Xi is a vector
containing pre-experiment variables, and i is the idiosyncratic term. We estimate this
model using ordinary least squares (OLS) and report the results in the first column of
Table 4.
Insert Table 4 here.
The OLS estimation of Model (2.1) suggests that both the gift and notification treatments
significantly increased the total investments of referred customers, and the estimated effect
sizes are very close to those obtained from mean comparisons. As a robustness check, we
consider multiple alternative regression specifications. First, since the total investments
of referred customers are right-skewed, we estimate Model (2.1) with a log-transformed
dependent variable using OLS; given that a positive constant needs to be added to total investments of referred customers before taking the logarithm and there is no single “optimal”
choice of such a constant, we estimate the log-linear model with four different choices of the
additive constant: 1, 10, 100, and 1,000. Second, we estimate a tobit specification of Model
(2.1) as the total investments of referred customers are zero for most current customers.
We report results from the alternative specifications in Table 4. The findings from these
specifications are not encouraging: While the coefficients of both treatments are positive
in all specifications, most of them are not significant at the p < 0.05 level. Therefore,
the positive effects of the gift and notification treatments on total investments of referred
customers are not robust under the alternative specifications being considered.
When the outcome variable is the incidence of having acquired referred customers, we es-
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timate a linear probability model (i.e., Model (2.1) with Yi denoting the dummy variable
for whether the i-th current customer has acquired referred customers) and a probit specification of Model (2.1). On the other hand, when the outcome variable is the number of
referred customers, we estimate Model (2.1) with Yi denoting the number of the i-th current customer’s referred customers and a negative binomial model with a quadratic variance
function (i.e., an NB2 model).22 Results are summarized in Table 5.
Insert Table 5 here.
From Table 5, we find that the effect sizes of both treatments on the incidence and number
of referred customers from the OLS estimations are very close to those obtained from mean
comparisons. In terms of statistical significance, the linear probability and probit models
indicate that neither treatment had an impact on the incidence of having acquired referred
customers that is significant at the p < 0.05 level, and the linear and NB2 models show that
neither treatment effect on the number of referred customers is significant at the p < 0.05
level; both findings are consistent with those from mean comparisons.
Finally, for investments of each referred customer, the outcome variable defined on referred
customers, we consider the following linear model:
Zj = α̃ + β˜g Tg,j + β˜n Tn,j + εj ,

(2.2)

where j refers to the j-th referred customer, Zj denotes the j-th referred customer’s total
investments (in RMB), Tg,j is the dummy variable for whether the j-th referred customer
was acquired in the gift condition, Tn,j is the dummy variable for whether the j-th referred
customer was acquired in the notification condition, and εj is the idiosyncratic term. We
note that since referred customers were not randomly assigned to the experimental conditions, we do not intend to give a causal interpretation for the parameters β˜g and β˜n ; instead,
these parameters merely serve to capture the differences between the average investment
22
Given that an overdispersion test rejects the null hypothesis of equidispersion in favor of the alternative
hypothesis of overdispersion (p < 0.01), we choose to estimate an NB2 model instead of a Poisson model.
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amount of referred customers acquired in the control condition and that of referred customers acquired in the gift and notification conditions. We estimate this model using OLS
and report the results in the first column of Table 6.
Insert Table 6 here.
Confirming our previous finding based on mean comparisons, the OLS estimation of Model
(2.2) suggests that referred customers acquired in both treatment conditions on average
invested at least 7,000 RMB more than those acquired in the control condition did, and
both differences are significant (ps < 0.05). Similar to the case of total investments of
referred customers, we assess the robustness of this finding using alternative regression
specifications, including Model (2.2) with a log-transformed dependent variable with four
different choices of the additive constant: 1, 10, 100, and 1,000, and a tobit specification
of Model (2.2). We report results from these alternative specifications in Table 6. We
find that, while the coefficients for both treatment condition dummy variables are always
positive, only one turns out to be marginally significant at the p < 0.1 level and none is
significant at the p < 0.05 level. Consequently, the positive differences between the two
treatment conditions and the control condition in terms of investments of each referred
customer are not robust under the alternative specifications being considered.
2.3.4. Exploring How Treatments Promoted Better Matching
In the previous sections, we find that both the gift and notification treatments enhanced the
effectiveness of the referral program primarily through the acquisition of higher-investment
referred customers, or, in other words, by promoting better matching between referred
customers and the firm.23 Research on referral programs and customer value has proposed
active matching and passive matching as two distinct matching processes through which
better matching operates (Schmitt et al., 2011; Van den Bulte et al., 2018); correspondingly,
23

We emphasize that the finding that referred customers acquired in the gift and notification conditions
on average invested more than those acquired in the control condition did is statistically significant under
Welch’s t-test, the two-stage alternative test, and the OLS estimation of the linear model; on the other hand,
it is insignificant under the log-linear and tobit models.
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there are two potential channels through which a treatment could promote better matching:
(1) by motivating active matching, in which the treatment motivates current customers to
exert greater effort to screen their friends and refer good matches to the firm, and (2) by
facilitating passive matching, in which the treatment induces a higher proportion of highvalue current customers to refer their friends who, by homophily, are more likely to be good
matches than friends of low-value current customers.
In our setting, both the gift and notification treatments could impact customer referrals
by eliciting reciprocity from and/or serving as a value signal to current customers, both
of which could motivate active matching. Specifically, offering current customers a gift
coupon before inviting them to refer friends may elicit reciprocity from current customers
toward the firm (Gneezy and List, 2006; Falk, 2007; Alpizar et al., 2008; Kube et al., 2012;
Gilchrist et al., 2016; Chung and Narayandas, 2017), which could in turn make them feel
obliged to exert effort to screen their friends carefully and match those who they think may
be valuable to the firm (Schmitt et al., 2011). The provision of the gift interest-raising
coupon may also signal to current customers that the actual interest rates of the financial
deposits could be higher than the listed interest rates, which may enhance their perception
about the value that their friends would receive once referred to the firm; since customers
tend to use referrals to help friends make better choices or manage friends’ impressions of
them (Ryu and Feick, 2007; Kornish and Li, 2010), such an enhanced value perception is
likely to motivate current customers to engage in active matching. As to the notification
treatment, a text message notifying current customers about their total investment return
may make it salient to them that they have received great value from the firm, which could
also trigger reciprocity from and/or serve as a value signal to them, and in turn motivate
active matching.
In addition to motivating active matching, both the gift and notification treatments could
also facilitate passive matching. Given that high-value current customers are likely to have a
better match with the firm and hence invest more in the fixed deposits during the campaign
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period compared to low-value current customers, the gift coupon is likely to be more valuable
to high-value current customers because its value is proportional to the amount of the fixeddeposit investment to which it is applied.24 As a result, the gift treatment is more likely to
elicit reciprocity from high-value current customers assuming reciprocity is the mechanism
through which it impacts customer referrals, and it is likely to serve as a stronger signal
to high-value current customers assuming value signaling is the underlying mechanism. In
either case, the gift treatment is likely to motivate a higher proportion of high-value current
customers to refer their friends and facilitate passive matching. On the other hand, since
higher-value current customers are likely to have received more investment return from
the firm, notifying current customers about their total investment return is more likely
to induce reciprocity from and/or serves as a stronger value signal to high-value current
customers. Consequently, high-value current customers are more likely to refer friends after
receiving the notification compared to low-value current customers and passive matching is
facilitated.
In this section, we seek to shed light on how the gift and notification treatments promoted
better matching by investigating whether the data are consistent with the treatments motivating active matching and/or facilitating passive matching. We start with the implication
of a treatment motivating active matching. Assuming there are two identical current customers, A and B, and A is assigned to the control condition while B is assigned to a
treatment condition. If the treatment indeed motivates active matching and both A and
B have acquired referred customers, we expect that the average value of B’s referred customers is higher than the average value of A’s referred customers. To examine whether data
from the experiment are consistent with such an implication, we estimate Model (2.1) on
the sample of current customers who have acquired referred customers during the experiment.25 Here, the dependent variable Yi denotes the average investment amount of the i-th
24

In Appendix, we show that customers of higher value, operationalized as those with a higher total
investment return and those with a larger current investment amount, invested more in the fixed deposits
during the experiment when offered the gift coupon.
25
For simplicity, we refer to current customers who have acquired referred customers during the experiment
as referrers hereafter.
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referrer’s referred customers. Since referrers are likely to be different across conditions, we
try to partially address this selection issue by controlling for their observable characteristics Xi , including log total investment return, log investment amount, tenure, time since
last investment, and whether had successful referrals before the experiment. We report the
results of the OLS estimation in the first column of the upper section of Table 7.
Insert Table 7 here.
We find that both treatments are estimated to have increased the average investments of
a referrer’s referred customers by at least 7,000 RMB and both effects are significant (ps
< 0.05), which is consistent with both treatments motivating active matching. One caveat
of this regression analysis is that controlling for the five referrers’ observable characteristics
is unlikely to fully address the selection issue. As a robustness check, we include a richer
set of controls by adding the interaction of each pair of the five characteristics (i.e., a total
of ten interactions) to the model and redo the analysis. We report the results of the OLS
estimation in the first column of the lower section of Table 7. It is evident that the inclusion
of the interactions only has a limited impact on the estimated effect sizes of both treatments
and both effects remain significant (ps < 0.05). Therefore, our finding is still consistent with
both treatments motivating active matching after adopting a richer set of controls.
Similar to Section 2.3.3, we also assess the robustness of this finding using multiple alternative regression specifications, including log-linear models with four different choices of
the additive constant (1, 10, 100, and 1,000) and a tobit model. All models are estimated
both with and without controlling for the pairwise interactions of the five referrers’ characteristics. We report results from these alternative specifications in Table 7. Clearly, the
functional form assumption has a considerable impact on our finding: While the coefficients
of both treatments are positive in all specifications, only one turns out to be marginally
significant at the p < 0.1 level and none is significant at the p < 0.05 level. Consequently,
results from the log-linear and tobit models suggest that our earlier finding based on the
linear models is not robust; under the alternative regression specifications, we do not have
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sufficient statistical evidence suggesting that the average investments of referred customers
are higher for referrers in the two treatment conditions than for those in the control condition.
Now we consider the implication of a treatment facilitating passive matching. If a treatment
indeed facilitates passive matching, we expect that, compared to the control condition, it
induces a higher proportion of high-value current customers to refer friends and hence leads
to a higher average value of referrers. To investigate whether data from the experiment are
consistent with such an implication, we operationalize the value of a current customer using
two observable characteristics, total investment return and current investment amount, and
compare referrers in the two treatment conditions and those in the control condition with
respect to these two characteristics. We report the results of the comparisons in Table 8.
Insert Table 8 here.
Using Welch’s t-test, we find that referrers in the gift and notification conditions are not
significantly different from those in the control condition both in terms of total investment
return and current investment amount (ps > 0.1). One caveat of applying Welch’s t-test
in the current setting is that, as the Shapiro-Wilk tests indicate that all samples are nonnormal (ps < 0.001), it is unclear whether the sample sizes (76, 99, and 83) are sufficient to
warrant the relaxation of the normality assumption on the underlying populations when we
apply Welch’s t-test. As a robustness check, we compare referrers across conditions using the
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test which does not impose the normality assumption. Again, we
find that the differences between the control condition and the two treatment conditions are
insignificant (ps > 0.1).26 While we do not find significant differences between the control
26

We note that, by operationalizing the value of a current customer using his total investment return and
current investment amount, we implicitly assume that referrers with a higher total investment return and
those with a larger current investment amount are likely to acquire referred customers of higher value. To
assess the validity of this assumption, we calculate the correlation between each of these two characteristics
and the average investments of referred customers on the sample of all referrers. Between total investment
return and average investments of referred customers, Pearson’s r = 0.15 (p < 0.05) and Spearman’s
ρ = 0.10 (p = 0.10); between current investment amount and average investments of referred customers,
Pearson’s r = 0.15 (p < 0.05) and Spearman’s ρ = 0.05 (p > 0.1). We interpret this finding as suggestive
evidence supporting our assumption, with the caveat that when using Spearman’s ρ we cannot reject the
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condition and the two treatment conditions in terms of referrers’ total investment return and
current investment amount, we emphasize that referrers in the control condition and those in
the two treatment conditions could differ with respect to some unobservable characteristics
that are correlated with the value of referred customers through homophily. As a result,
we cannot rule out the possibility of the gift and notification treatments facilitating passive
matching based on the data we have.
2.3.5. Heterogeneous Effects of the Treatments
In this section, we investigate how the effects of the gift and notification treatments vary
across current customers. By exploring customer heterogeneity in treatment effects, we
aim to shed light on the mechanisms through which the two treatments impacted customer
referrals. Specifically, we are interested in answering the following question: Did the gift
and notification treatments enhance the effectiveness of the referral program by eliciting
reciprocity from current customers or serving as a value signal to current customers? Understanding customer heterogeneity in treatment effects is also managerially relevant, as it
could provide firms guidance on identifying current customers on whom the treatments are
likely to be most effective and hence may serve as good targets for future implementations
of these treatments. In the following, we consider customer characteristics that may moderate the effects of the gift and notification treatments on the total investments of referred
customers (our key outcome variable), the incidence of having acquired referred customers,
and the number of referred customers.
Customer Value
As discussed in Section 2.3.4, the gift and notification treatments are likely to elicit stronger
reciprocity from higher-value current customers if they work by inducing reciprocity from
current customers toward the firm, and they are likely to serve as a stronger signal to
higher-value current customers if value signaling is the underlying mechanism. With either
null hypothesis of zero association.
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mechanism being at work, high-value current customers are likely to be better motivated by
the treatments to refer friends, especially those who are good matches, to the firm compared
to low-value current customers. Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses regarding
the moderating role of customer value:
H1: The treatments have a larger impact on current customers of higher value in terms of
the total investments of referred customers.
H2: The treatments have a larger impact on current customers of higher value in terms of
the incidence of having acquired referred customers.
H3: The treatments have a larger impact on current customers of higher value in terms of
the number of referred customers.
Investment Recency
If the gift and notification treatments work by inducing reciprocity from current customers
toward the firm, we predict that both treatments have a larger impact on customers whose
last investment was more recent. This is because customers whose last investment was more
recent are likely to have a stronger relationship with the firm at the time of the experiment
compared to those whose last investment was less recent (Netzer et al., 2008; Kumar et al.,
2010), and hence are more likely to feel the obligation to reciprocate to the firm by referring friends (especially those who are good matches) after receiving either the gift or the
notification. On the other hand, if value signaling is at work, we predict that both treatments have a smaller impact on customers whose last investment was more recent based
on two institutional details. First, the real-time information about total investment return
is prominently displayed in a customer’s account. Second, the firm sends all customers
interest-raising coupons as a promotion multiple times a year, and information about current and past interest-raising coupons is available in the coupon section of a customer’s
account. Since before making an investment, a customer needs to log into his account and
is likely to browse the coupon section to check if any coupon can be applied to the in32

vestment, these two institutional details imply that a customer who makes an investment
is likely to have accessed information about his total investment return and information
about promotional interest-raising coupons, which, similar to the gift coupon, may remind
him that the actual interest rates of the financial deposits could be higher than the listed
interest rates. Compared to customers whose last investment was less recent, those whose
last investment was more recent are likely to have accessed a more up-to-date version of
such information at a more recent time, in which case the signaling value of the gift coupon
and the notification is smaller and hence a smaller impact on customer referrals. In sum, we
propose the following hypotheses assuming that the gift and notification treatments work
by eliciting reciprocity from current customers:
H4a: The treatments have a larger impact on current customers whose last investment was
more recent in terms of the total investments of referred customers.
H5a: The treatments have a larger impact on current customers whose last investment was
more recent in terms of the incidence of having acquired referred customers.
H6a: The treatments have a larger impact on current customers whose last investment was
more recent in terms of the number of referred customers.
In contrast, we propose the following competing hypotheses assuming that the gift and
notification treatments work by serving as a value signal to current customers:
H4b: The treatments have a smaller impact on current customers whose last investment
was more recent in terms of the total investments of referred customers.
H5b: The treatments have a smaller impact on current customers whose last investment
was more recent in terms of the incidence of having acquired referred customers.
H6b: The treatments have a smaller impact on current customers whose last investment
was more recent in terms of the number of referred customers.
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Past Referral Behavior
Customers who had made successful referrals in the past are likely to have a more committed
relationship with the firm (Verhoef et al., 2002); if the gift and notification treatments work
by inducing reciprocity, these customers are more likely to feel the obligation to reciprocate
to the firm by referring friends (especially those who are good matches) after receiving
either the gift or the notification than those who had not made successful referrals in the
past. Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses regarding the moderating role of
past referral behavior assuming that the gift and notification treatments work by eliciting
reciprocity from current customers:
H7: The treatments have a larger impact on current customers who had made successful
referrals before the experiment in terms of the total investments of referred customers.
H8: The treatments have a larger impact on current customers who had made successful
referrals before the experiment in terms of the incidence of having acquired referred
customers.
H9: The treatments have a larger impact on current customers who had made successful
referrals before the experiment in terms of the number of referred customers.
Empirical Testing of the Hypotheses
In this section, we empirically test our proposed hypotheses using regression analyses. For
hypotheses pertaining to the total investments of referred customers, our key outcome
variable, we consider the following linear model:
Yi = α + βg Tg,i + βn Tn,i + θ> Xi + γg> Tg,i Xi + γn> Tn,i Xi + i ,

(2.3)

where i refers to the i-th current customer, Yi denotes the total investments of the ith current customer’s referred customers (in RMB), Tg,i is the dummy variable for the
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gift treatment, Tn,i is the dummy variable for the notification treatment, Xi is a vector
containing potential moderators that we are going to test, and i is the idiosyncratic term.
In order to test H1 (i.e., the moderating role of customer value), we adopt three different
operationalizations of customer value, including log total investment return, log investment
amount, and a single factor between log total investment return and log investment amount
which we term as the value factor (Iyengar and Park, 2018).27 Corresponding to the three
operationalizations of customer value, we consider three specifications for Xi : In the first
specification, Xi includes the i-th current customer’s log total investment return, time since
last investment, and whether he had made successful referrals in the past; the second and
third specifications replace log total investment return with log investment amount and the
value factor, respectively. We estimate Model (2.3) with different specifications of Xi using
OLS and report the results in the first three columns of Table 9.
Insert Table 9 here.
Across different specifications of Xi , we find that the interactions between both treatments
and all three operationalizations of customer value are all positive. Specifically, a 10% increase in total investment return increases the effect of the gift treatment by 0.94 RMB
and the effect of the notification treatment by 1.98 RMB; a 10% increase in current investment amount increases the effect of the gift treatment by 1.38 RMB and the effect of the
notification treatment by 1.75 RMB; and increasing the value factor by 0.1 increases the
effect of the gift treatment by 1.35 RMB and the effect of the notification treatment by
2.19 RMB. We also find negative interactions between both treatments and time since last
investment, where making the last investment one day less recent decreases the effect of the
gift treatment by 0.01-0.07 RMB and the effect of the notification treatment by 0.02-0.09
RMB. Finally, the interactions between both treatments and the dummy variable of having
made referrals before the experiment (i.e., the past referrals dummy) are all positive; we find
27

We obtain the factor scores by conducting a factor analysis on log total investment return and log
investment amount, which reveals a single factor accounting for 77.45% of the total variance in the two
variables.
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that the effect of the gift treatment is between 119.41 to 121.20 RMB larger and the effect
of the notification treatment is between 18.78 to 23.43 RMB larger for current customers
who had made successful referrals compared to those who had not. An inspection of the
statistical significance of these interactions, however, indicates that the lack of power is an
issue: Few interactions are significant at the p < 0.05 level, which include the interaction of
the notification and log total investment return in the first specification, the interaction of
the gift and log investment amount in the second specification, and the interaction of the
gift and the past referrals dummy in all three specifications.
To assess the robustness of the findings from the linear models, we estimate log-linear and
tobit variants of Model (2.3) and report results in Tables 9, 10, and 11.
Insert Tables 10 and 11 here.
In all log-linear and tobit models, we find that the interactions between both treatments
and all three operationalizations of customer value are positive but none is significant at the
p < 0.05 level. This finding, together with the one from the linear models, suggests that we
do not have sufficient statistical evidence to reach a conclusion regarding H1. We also find
that the signs of the interactions between both treatments and time since last investment are
not consistent across models; most of these interactions are not significant at the p < 0.05
level, with the exception of the interaction between the gift and time since last investment
in the tobit models, which is positive and significant (ps < 0.05). Hence, we are unable
to make claims regarding H4a and H4b given these largely insignificant interactions with
inconsistent signs across models. Finally, the interaction between the gift (notification)
treatment and the past referrals dummy is positive (negative) in all log-linear and tobit
models, but none is significant at the p < 0.05 level. Taken together, these insignificant
results and our earlier finding from the linear models do not provide us sufficient statistical
evidence to draw conclusions regarding H7.
For hypotheses pertaining to the incidence of having acquired referred customers, we es-

36

timate linear probability models (i.e., Model (2.3) with Yi denoting the dummy variable
for whether the i-th current customer has acquired referred customers) and probit models.
Results are summarized in Table 12.
Insert Table 12 here.
From Table 12, we find that the interactions between both treatments and all three operationalizations of customer value are positive but none is significant at the p < 0.05 level
based on both the linear probability and probit models; as a result, we are unable to make
claims regarding H2. In the probit models, the interaction between the gift and time since
last investment is positive and significant (ps < 0.05), which is consistent with H5b and
inconsistent with H5a for the gift treatment; however, this finding is not robust under the
linear probability models as the interaction becomes insignificant. On the other hand, the
interaction between the notification and time since last investment is not significant at the
p < 0.05 level in both the linear probability and probit models, indicating that we do not
have sufficient statistical evidence to reach a conclusion regarding H5a and H5b for the notification treatment. Finally, while the interaction of the gift and the past referrals dummy
changes sign across models and is never significant at the p < 0.05 level, the interaction of
the notification and the past referrals dummy is negative and significant in both the linear
probability and probit models (ps < 0.05). Therefore, our finding is inconsistent with H8
for the notification treatment.
For hypotheses pertaining to the number of referred customers, we estimate Model (2.3)
with Yi denoting the number of the i-th current customer’s referred customers and NB2
models.28 Results are summarized in Table 13.
Insert Table 13 here.
We make the following observations from Table 13. First, the interactions between both
28
Given that an overdispersion test rejects the null hypothesis of equidispersion in favor of the alternative
hypothesis of overdispersion for all specifications of Xi (ps < 0.01), we choose to estimate NB2 models
instead of Poisson models.
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treatments and all three operationalizations of customer value are positive in both the
linear and NB2 models, but only one - the interaction between the notification and log total
investment return in the NB2 model - is significant at the p < 0.05 level. Therefore, we
do not have sufficient statistical evidence to reach a conclusion regarding H3. Second, the
interaction between the gift and time since last investment is positive and significant (ps
< 0.05) in the NB2 models, which is consistent with H6b and inconsistent with H6a for the
gift treatment, but this finding is not robust under the linear models. On the other hand,
the interaction between the notification and time since last investment is not significant
at the p < 0.05 level in both the linear and NB2 models. Finally, while the interaction
of the gift and the past referrals dummy is negative but not significant at the p < 0.05
level in both the linear and NB2 models, the interaction of the notification and the past
referrals dummy is negative and significant in the NB2 models (ps < 0.05). This finding
is inconsistent with H9 for the notification treatment, but it is not robust under the linear
models as the interaction becomes not significant at the p < 0.05 level.
To summarize, the lack of statistical power is a serious issue in the empirical testing of our
proposed hypotheses. Among all hypotheses, we only have sufficient statistical evidence
to reach a conclusion regarding H8 for the notification treatment, where the data are inconsistent with H8 for the notification treatment. We fail to obtain statistically significant
interactions consistent across different models that would allow us to draw sharp conclusions
regarding all other hypotheses, and hence are largely unable to shed light on the mechanisms
through which the gift and notification treatments impacted customer referrals.

2.4. Empirical Findings: The Second Experiment
In this section, we analyze data from the second experiment to investigate the effects of
the two operationalizations of the value-based reward treatment. Similar to Section 2.3,
we first verify that the random assignment of customers was valid. We then estimate the
aggregate effects of the two value-based rewards on the effectiveness of the referral program.
Finally, we shed light on the workings of these two value-based rewards by exploring the
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mechanisms through which they operate.
2.4.1. Randomization Check
We assess the validity of the randomization by comparing customers across conditions with
respect to their behaviors prior to the experiment. Again, with a valid random assignment,
we should observe little or no systematic differences in customers’ pre-experiment variables
across conditions. The details of the randomization check are reported in Table 14.
Insert Table 14 here.
Similar to Section 2.3.1, we use a two-sided Welch’s t-test to examine whether two experimental conditions have the same population mean on a pre-experiment variable. From
Table 14, it is evident that customers’ pre-experiment variables are well balanced across
conditions, confirming the validity of the random assignment in the second experiment.
2.4.2. Aggregate Effects of the Treatments
We measure the effectiveness of the referral program for each current customer using the
total value of his referred customers, which is operationalized similarly as in Section 2.3.2.
Specifically, we identify new customers who opened an account at the firm using a current
customer’s referral link during the 30-day campaign period (i.e., his referred customers), and
proxy for the total value of a current customer’s referred customers using the total amount
of investments made by all his referred customers in all financial deposits combined during
the 90-day observational period starting from the beginning of the experiment. In addition
to the total value of referred customers, we also consider three other outcome variables in
order to obtain a more thorough understanding of the impact of the value-based rewards
on customer referrals: (1) whether a current customer has acquired any referred customers
during the experiment (Yes/No), (2) the number of a current customer’s referred customers,
and (3) the value of a referred customer assessed by the amount of investments she made
during the 90-day observational period. We note that all outcome variables except the
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value of a referred customer are defined on each current customer, and for these outcome
variables the sample size in each condition is the number of current customers in that
condition: 40,076 in the control condition, 40,145 in the first value-based reward condition,
and 40,037 in the second value-based reward condition. On the other hand, the value of a
referred customer is defined on each referred customer, and the sample size in each condition
for this outcome variable is the number of referred customers acquired in that condition:
263 in the control condition, 300 in the first value-based reward condition, and 328 in the
second value-based reward condition.
The randomization allows us to identify the average treatment effect of each value-based
reward on the total value of a current customer’s referred customers via a direct mean
comparison between the control condition and the corresponding treatment condition. We
report the result of the mean comparisons based on two-sided Welch’s t-tests in the first
row of Table 15.
Insert Table 15 here.
Again, we assume that the sample in each condition consists of i.i.d. draws from an underlying population in order to apply Welch’s t-test; on the other hand, the validity of the test
does not require the populations to have equal variances or be normally distributed given
the large sample sizes. It is clear that both value-based rewards had a substantial impact
on the total investments of referred customers. In particular, the first and second valuebased rewards on average increased the total investments of a current customer’s referred
customers by 127.84 RMB and 99.93 RMB, respectively. Both treatment effects amount to
more than 100% lift over the baseline value of 92.97 RMB and are statistically significant
(ps < 0.01).
We also examine the mean comparisons with respect to the three other outcome variables
using two-sided Welch’s t-test in order to understand which of the two, the acquisition of
more referred customers or the acquisition of higher-value referred customers, was the main
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driver of the positive effects of the two value-based rewards on the total investments of
referred customers. From the second and third rows of Table 15, we find that only the
second value-based reward had a positive effect on the incidence of having acquired referred
customers that is close to being significant (p = 0.053) and a positive and significant effect
on the number of referred customers (p < 0.05), whereas the effects of the first valuebased reward on these two outcome variables are insignificant. The effect sizes of the
second value-based reward, however, are modest: It only increased the incidence of having
acquired referred customers and the number of referred customers by less than 25% relative
to the control condition. On the other hand, the last row of Table 15 shows that referred
customers acquired in the first value-based reward condition and those acquired in the
second value-based reward condition on average invested at least 100% and 65% more than
those acquired in the control condition did, respectively, and both differences are significant
(ps < 0.05). Therefore, similar to the findings in the first experiment, the data suggest
that both value-based rewards enhanced the effectiveness of the referral program primarily
through the acquisition of higher-investment (and hence higher-value) referred customers
rather than the acquisition of more referred customers.29
Similar to Section 2.3.2, one caveat for the mean comparisons with respect to the investments of each referred customer is that it is unclear whether the sample sizes in the three
experimental conditions (263, 300, and 328) are sufficient to warrant the relaxation of the
normality assumption on the underlying populations when we apply Welch’s t-test. We
29

Similar to Section 2.3.2, we adopt the Holm procedure and the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure to address
the issue of multiple testing. In the Holm procedure, when we set the family-wise error rate (FWER) at
0.05, the comparisons between the control and both value-based reward conditions with respect to the
total investments of referred customers are significant; on the other hand, when we set FWER at 0.1, in
addition to the two comparisons that are significant when FWER is set at 0.05, the comparison between
the control and first value-based reward conditions with respect to investments of each referred customer
and the comparison between the control and second value-based reward conditions with respect to the
number of referred customers are also significant. In the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure, when we set
FDR at 0.05, the comparisons between the control and first value-based reward conditions with respect
to the total investments of referred customers and investments of each referred customer are significant,
and the comparisons between the control and second value-based reward conditions with respect to the
total investments of referred customers, the number of referred customers, and investments of each referred
customer are significant as well; on the other hand, when we set FDR at 0.1, in addition to the 5 comparisons
that are significant when FDR is set at 0.05, the comparison between the control and second value-based
reward conditions with respect to the incidence of having acquired referred customers is also significant.
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adopt a similar alternative test procedure to compare the investments of each referred customer across conditions in which, between the control condition and a treatment condition,
we first test whether there is a difference between the proportions of referred customers
with a positive investment amount (i.e., positive observations), and then test whether there
is a difference between the two positive subsamples. We report the findings based on this
alternative test procedure in Table 16.
Insert Table 16 here.
We compare the proportions of positive observations across conditions using the test for
equal proportions, and find that the proportions are not significantly different between the
control condition and either value-based reward condition (ps > 0.1). On the other hand, as
the Shapiro-Wilk tests indicate that the positive subsamples in all three conditions are not
normally distributed (ps < 0.001), we compare the positive subsamples across conditions
using the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. We find that the positive subsamples in both valuebased reward conditions have a higher average investment amount than that in the control
condition, and the difference between the control and first value-based reward conditions
is marginally significant (p < 0.1) whereas the difference between the control and second
value-based reward conditions is significant (p < 0.05). Taken together, the comparisons
with respect to the value of each referred customer based on this alternative test procedure
are consistent with our earlier findings based on Welch’s t-tests.30
2.4.3. Regression Analyses of Aggregate Effects
In this section, we estimate the aggregate effects of both value-based reward treatments
using regression models. When the outcome variable is total investments of a current
customer’s referred customers, we consider the following linear model:
Yi = α + βf r Tf r,i + βsr Tsr,i + θ> Xi + i ,
30

(2.4)

In Appendix, we report comparisons with respect to the total investments and number of a current
customer’s referred customers based on a similar alternative test procedure, and comparisons with respect
to the incidence of having acquired referred customers based on the test for equal proportions.
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where i refers to the i-th current customer, Yi denotes the total investments of the i-th
current customer’s referred customers, Tf r,i is the dummy variable for the first value-based
reward treatment, Tsr,i is the dummy variable for the second value-based reward treatment,
Xi is a vector containing pre-experiment variables, and i is the idiosyncratic term. We
estimate this model using OLS and report the results in the first column of Table 17.
Insert Table 17 here.
The OLS estimation of Model (2.4) suggests that both value-based rewards significantly
increased the total investments of referred customers (ps < 0.01), and the estimated effect
sizes are very close to those obtained from mean comparisons. Similar to Section 2.3.3,
we assess the robustness of this finding using multiple alternative regression specifications,
including Model (2.4) with a log-transformed dependent variable with four different choices
of the additive constant: 1, 10, 100, and 1,000, and a tobit specification of Model (2.4).
Results from these alternative specifications are reported in Table 17. We find that the
coefficients of both value-based reward treatments are positive and significant (ps < 0.05)
in all alternative specifications being considered, indicating that the finding of the positive
effects of both value-based reward treatments on total investments of referred customers is
robust across different regression specifications.
When the outcome variable is the incidence of having acquired referred customers, we estimate a linear probability model (i.e., Model (2.4) with Yi denoting the dummy variable
for whether the i-th current customer has acquired referred customers) and a probit specification of Model (2.4). On the other hand, when the outcome variable is the number of
referred customers, we estimate Model (2.4) with Yi denoting the number of the i-th current customer’s referred customers and an NB2 specification of Model (2.4).31 Results are
summarized in Table 18.
Insert Table 18 here.
31

Given that an overdispersion test rejects the null hypothesis of equidispersion in favor of the alternative
hypothesis of overdispersion (p < 0.01), we choose to estimate an NB2 model instead of a Poisson model.

43

From Table 18, we find that the effect sizes of both treatments on the incidence and number
of referred customers based on the OLS estimations are very close to those obtained from
mean comparisons. In terms of statistical significance, the linear probability and probit
models indicate that neither treatment had an impact on the incidence of having acquired
referred customers that is significant at the p < 0.05 level, and the linear and NB2 models
show that only the second value-based reward treatment had a significant impact on the
number of referred customers (ps < 0.05); both findings are consistent with those from
mean comparisons.
For investments of each referred customer, the outcome variable defined on referred customers, we consider the following linear model:

Zj = α̃ + β̃f r Tf r,j + β̃sr Tsr,j + εj ,

(2.5)

where j refers to the j-th referred customer, Zj denotes the j-th referred customer’s total
investments (in RMB), Tf r,j is the dummy variable for whether the j-th referred customer
was acquired in the first value-based reward condition, Tsr,j is the dummy variable for
whether the j-th referred customer was acquired in the second value-based reward condition,
and εj is the idiosyncratic term. Similar to Section 2.3.3, we do not intend to give a
causal interpretation for the parameters β̃f r and β̃sr , which merely serve to capture the
differences between the average investment amount of referred customers acquired in the
control condition and that of referred customers acquired in the two value-based reward
conditions. We estimate this model using OLS and report the results in the first column of
Table 19.
Insert Table 19 here.
Confirming our previous finding based on mean comparisons, the OLS estimation of Model
(2.5) suggests that referred customers acquired in both treatment conditions on average
invested at least 9,000 RMB more than those acquired in the control condition did, and

44

both differences are significant (ps < 0.05). As a robustness check, we consider multiple alternative regression specifications, including Model (2.5) with a log-transformed dependent
variable with four different choices of the additive constant: 1, 10, 100, and 1,000, and a
tobit specification of Model (2.5). We report results from these alternative specifications in
Table 19. While the coefficients for both treatment condition dummy variables are always
positive, most of them are not significant at the p < 0.1 level. The largely insignificant
coefficient estimates are likely due to a lack of power; since each of the two treatment conditions implemented an operationalization of the value-based reward treatment, we can seek
to obtain greater statistical power by combining the two treatment conditions into a single
composite value-based reward condition. We redo all analyses in Table 19 after combining
the two treatment conditions, and report the results in Table 20.
Insert Table 20 here.
We find that the coefficient of the value-based reward condition dummy variable is significant
in the linear, tobit, and one log-linear specifications (ps < 0.05), marginally significant in two
log-linear specifications (ps < 0.1), and insignificant in one log-linear specification. Hence,
combining the two original treatment conditions into one composite value-based reward
condition indeed provides us more power, and the finding that referred customers acquired
by current customers who were offered a value-based reward on average invested more than
those acquired by current customers not offered one seems to be reasonably robust across
different specifications.
2.4.4. Exploring How Treatments Promoted Better Matching
In the previous sections, we find that both value-based reward treatments enhanced the
effectiveness of the referral program primarily through the acquisition of higher-investment
referred customers. Since the value-based rewards offer current customers an economic
incentive to bring in high-value referred customers, they could promote better matching
by motivating current customers to exert greater effort to screen their friends and refer
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good matches to the firm (i.e., motivating active matching). On the other hand, homophily
implies that, compared to low-value current customers, high-value current customers are
more likely to have friends who could become high-value new customers and whose referrals
could earn them value-based rewards; that is, high-value current customers are likely to be
better incentivized than low-value current customers when offered a value-based reward, in
which case passive matching is facilitated.
In this section, we seek to shed light on how the value-based reward treatments promoted
better matching by investigating whether the data are consistent with the treatments motivating active matching and/or facilitating passive matching. Similar to Section 2.3.4, we
first examine whether the average investments of referred customers are higher for referrers
in the two treatment conditions than for those in the control condition after controlling for
referrers’ observable characteristics. Specifically, we estimate Model (2.4) on the sample of
referrers. Here, the dependent variable Yi denotes the average investment amount of the
i-th referrer’s referred customers, and the vector Xi includes the i-th referrer’s log total
investment return, log investment amount, tenure, time since last investment, and whether
he had successful referrals before the experiment. We report results of the OLS estimation
in the first column of the upper section of Table 21.
Insert Table 21 here.
The first value-based reward treatment is estimated to have increased the average investments of a referrer’s referred customers by more than 12,000 RMB and the effect is significant
(p < 0.05), whereas the effect of the second value-based reward treatment is considerably
smaller and insignificant. After controlling for the pairwise interactions of the five characteristics, the effect of the first value-based reward treatment becomes marginally significant
(p < 0.1) and the effect of the second value-based reward treatment remains insignificant,
as shown in the first column of the lower section of Table 21. We also assess the robustness
of the findings from linear models using multiple alternative regression specifications, including log-linear models with four different choices of the additive constant (1, 10, 100, and
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1,000) and a tobit model; all models are estimated both with and without controlling for
the pairwise interactions of the five referrers’ characteristics. We report results from these
alternative specifications in Table 21. While the coefficients of both treatments are positive
in all specifications, all are insignificant (ps > 0.1) with the exception of the coefficient of
the first value-based reward treatment in the two tobit specifications. Therefore, across the
regression specifications being considered, we do not observe a consistent pattern that the
average investments of referred customers are significantly higher for referrers in the two
treatment conditions compared to those in the control condition, after controlling for referrers’ observable characteristics. Finally, we redo all analyses in Table 21 after combining
the two value-based reward conditions into a single composite value-based reward condition
and report the results in Table 22.
Insert Table 22 here.
The coefficient of the composite value-based reward treatment is positive in all specifications;
however, only one turns out to be marginally significant at the p < 0.1 level and none is
significant at the p < 0.05 level. Hence, we still do not have sufficient statistical evidence
suggesting that the average investments of referred customers are higher for referrers who
were offered a value-based reward compared to those not offered one, after controlling for
referrers’ observable characteristics.
We now investigate whether referrers in the two value-based reward conditions on average
have a higher total investment return and a larger current investment amount than those
in the control condition. Results of the comparisons are summarized in Table 23.
Insert Table 23 here.
We find that referrers in both value-based reward conditions have a higher total investment
return and a larger current investment amount than those in the control condition, but only
the differences between the control and second value-based reward conditions are significant
based on Welch’s t-tests (ps < 0.05). Again, as the Shapiro-Wilk tests indicate that all
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samples are non-normal (ps < 0.001), it is unclear whether the sample sizes (241, 260, and
285) are sufficient to warrant the relaxation of the normality assumption on the underlying
populations when we use Welch’s t-test. As a robustness check, we compare referrers across
conditions using the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test which does not impose the normality
assumption. Findings from the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests are largely consistent with
those based on Welch’s t-tests, with the exception that the difference between the control
and first value-based reward conditions in terms of referrers’ total investment return is
now marginally significant (p < 0.1). Taken together, our findings are consistent with the
second value-based reward treatment facilitating passive matching; on the other hand, we
do not observe a consistent pattern that referrers in the first value-based reward condition
on average have a significantly higher value than those in the control condition.32 Finally,
we redo all analyses in Table 23 after combining the two value-based reward conditions into
a single composite value-based reward condition, and report the results in Table 24.
Insert Table 24 here.
We find that referrers in the composite value-based reward condition on average have a
higher total investment return and a larger current investment amount than those in the
control condition; the difference in terms of total investment return is significant based
on both Welch’s t-test and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (ps < 0.05), whereas the
difference in terms of current investment amount is marginally significant based on Welch’s
t-test (p < 0.1) and significant based on the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (p < 0.05).
Therefore, the data are consistent with the provision of a value-based reward facilitating
passive matching.
32

Similar to Section 2.3.4, we implicitly assume that referrers with a higher total investment return and
those with a larger current investment amount are likely to acquire referred customers of higher value. To
assess the validity of this assumption, we calculate the correlation between each of these two characteristics
and the average investments of referred customers on the sample of all referrers. Between total investment
return and average investments of referred customers, Pearson’s r = 0.15 (p < 0.01) and Spearman’s ρ = 0.16
(p < 0.01); between current investment amount and average investments of referred customers, Pearson’s
r = 0.18 (p < 0.01) and Spearman’s ρ = 0.15 (p < 0.01). Hence, our assumption is supported by the data.
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2.4.5. Heterogeneous Effects of the Treatments
In this section, we investigate how the effects of the two value-based reward treatments vary
across current customers. Understanding customer heterogeneity in treatment effects could
shed light on the workings of value-based rewards and provide firms guidance on identifying
current customers on whom value-based rewards are likely to be most effective. In the
following, we consider customer characteristics that may moderate the effects of the valuebased reward treatments on the total investments of referred customers (our key outcome
variable), the incidence of having acquired referred customers, and the number of referred
customers.
Customer Value
As discussed in Section 2.4.4, high-value current customers are likely to be better incentivized to refer friends (especially those who are good matches) when offered a value-based
reward than low-value current customers, because homophily implies that the former are
more likely to have friends who could become high-value new customers and generate valuebased rewards for them. Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses regarding the
moderating role of customer value:
H10: The treatments have a larger impact on current customers of higher value in terms
of the total investments of referred customers.
H11: The treatments have a larger impact on current customers of higher value in terms
of the incidence of having acquired referred customers.
H12: The treatments have a larger impact on current customers of higher value in terms
of the number of referred customers.
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Empirical Testing of the Hypotheses
In this section, we empirically test our proposed hypotheses using regression analyses. For
H10, we consider the following linear model:

Yi = α + βf r Tf r,i + βsr Tsr,i + θXi + γf r Tf r,i Xi + γsr Tsr,i Xi + i ,

(2.6)

where i refers to the i-th current customer, Yi denotes the total investments of the i-th
current customer’s referred customers (in RMB), Tf r,i is the dummy variable for the first
value-based reward treatment, Tsr,i is the dummy variable for the second value-based reward
treatment, Xi is a variable that operationalizes the value of the i-th current customer, and
i is the idiosyncratic term. Similar to Section 2.3.5, we adopt three different operationalizations of customer value, including log total investment return, log investment amount,
and a single factor between log total investment return and log investment amount which
we term as the value factor.33 We estimate Model (2.6) with different specifications of Xi
using OLS and report the results in the first three columns of Table 25.
Insert Table 25 here.
We find that the interactions between both treatments and all three operationalizations
of customer value are all positive. Specifically, a 10% increase in total investment return
increases the effects of the first and second value-based reward treatments by 4.14 and 4.78
RMB, respectively; a 10% increase in current investment amount increases the effects of
the two treatments by 3.67 and 7.02 RMB, respectively; and increasing the value factor
by 0.1 increases the effects of the two treatments by 5.77 and 8.54 RMB, respectively. An
inspection of the statistical significance of these interactions indicates that, while the interactions between the first reward and the three operationalizations of customer value are not
significant at the p < 0.05 level, the interactions between the second reward and the three
33

We obtain the factor scores by conducting a factor analysis on log total investment return and log
investment amount, which reveals a single factor accounting for 90.23% of the total variance in the two
variables.
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operationalizations of customer value are significant (ps < 0.05). We also estimate Model
(2.6) after combining the two value-based reward conditions into a single composite valuebased reward condition, and report the results in the last three columns of Table 25. We
find that the interactions between the composite reward and the three operationalizations
of customer value are positive, and two out of three are significant at the p < 0.05 level.
To assess the robustness of the findings from the linear models, we estimate log-linear and
tobit variants of Model (2.6) and report results in Tables 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30.
Insert Tables 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30 here.
Across all log-linear and tobit models, a consistent pattern of results emerges: The interactions between the first reward and the three operationalizations of customer value are
always positive but never significant at the p < 0.05 level; on the other hand, the interactions between the second reward and the three operationalizations of customer value are
always positive and significant (ps < 0.05). We also find that the interactions between the
composite reward and the three operationalizations of customer value are always positive
and mostly significant at the p < 0.05 level. These findings, together with the one from the
linear models, provide strong support for H10 for the second value-based reward treatment,
whereas we do not have sufficient statistical evidence to reach a conclusion regarding H10
for the first value-based reward treatment.34 In addition, when treating the two value-based
rewards as a single composite reward, the data also support H10.
To test H11, we estimate linear probability models (i.e., Model (2.6) with Yi denoting the
dummy variable for whether the i-th current customer has acquired referred customers) and
probit models. Results are summarized in Tables 31 and 32.
34

The finding that the interactions between the second reward and operationalizations of customer value
have larger magnitudes and smaller p-values than the interactions between the first reward and operationalizations of customer value is expected. This is because while a referred customer’s contribution to the reward
for the referring customer is capped at 50 RMB under the first reward, her contribution can go beyond 50
RMB as her fixed-deposit investments increase under the second reward; consequently, the second reward
could be more motivating for current customers to refer friends, especially those who are good matches.
The potential difference in motivation is likely to lead to a larger difference in total investments of referred
customers for current customers of higher value, who as homophily implies are more likely to have friends
who are good matches that they can refer to the firm.
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Insert Tables 31 and 32 here.
We find that, in both the linear probability and probit models, the interactions between
the first reward and the three operationalizations of customer value are always positive but
never significant at the p < 0.05 level, and the interactions between the second reward
and the three operationalizations of customer value are always positive and significant
(ps < 0.05). We also find that the interactions between the composite reward and the
three operationalizations of customer value are always positive and significant (ps < 0.05).
Therefore, the data provide strong support for H11 for the second value-based reward
treatment, whereas we do not have enough power to draw conclusions regarding H11 for the
first value-based reward treatment. Moreover, when treating the two value-based rewards
as a single composite reward, the data also support H11.
To test H12, we estimate Model (2.6) with Yi denoting the number of the i-th current
customer’s referred customers and NB2 models.35 Results are summarized in Tables 33 and
34.
Insert Tables 33 and 34 here.
We find that, in both the linear and NB2 models, the interactions between the first reward
and the three operationalizations of customer value are always positive but mostly not significant at the p < 0.05 level, and the interactions between the second reward and the three
operationalizations of customer value are always positive and significant (ps < 0.05). We
also find that the interactions between the composite reward and the three operationalizations of customer value are always positive and significant (ps < 0.05). Therefore, the data
provide strong support for H12 for the second value-based reward treatment, whereas we do
not have enough power to draw conclusions regarding H12 for the first value-based reward
treatment. When treating the two value-based rewards as a single composite reward, the
data also support H12.
35
Given that an overdispersion test rejects the null hypothesis of equidispersion in favor of the alternative
hypothesis of overdispersion for all specifications of Xi (ps < 0.01), we choose to estimate NB2 models
instead of Poisson models.
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2.5. Conclusions and Future Research
Enhancing the effectiveness of referral programs is a key challenge facing firms that use referral programs to acquire new customers. In this essay, we propose three treatments aimed
at enhancing the effectiveness of referral programs by promoting better matching, including (1) offering current customers a gift before inviting them to refer friends, (2) notifying
current customers about the value that they have received from the firm before inviting
them to refer friends, and (3) rewarding referring customers based on the value of their
referred customers. We test the effectiveness of these three treatments by conducting two
field experiments in collaboration with a leading Chinese online financial services firm. We
find that all three treatments substantially enhanced the effectiveness of the focal referral
program, which is measured for each current customer as the total value of his referred
customers. We also find that the enhancement was primarily driven by the acquisition of
higher-value new customers rather than the acquisition of more new customers. Moreover,
we conduct a series of analyses to explore the mechanisms underlying these treatments.
From the analyses, we find evidence suggesting that the second operationalization of the
value-based reward treatment facilitated passive matching and had a larger impact on current customers of higher value; on the other hand, we do not have sufficient evidence to
draw definitive conclusions regarding the workings of the other treatments.
Our research has several limitations. First, the lack of statistical power in many analyses
conducted for the first experiment limits our ability to draw conclusions regarding the
workings of the gift and notification treatments. There are a few options for alleviating
this power issue that future research may adopt. For instance, researchers could increase
the statistical power of a future experiment testing the gift and notification treatments by
having a larger sample size in the experiment. Researchers may also consider ways that
could potentially make the treatments more effective (i.e., increase their effect sizes), such
as making the gift coupon more generous, using gifts that are more valuable than interestraising coupons from customers’ perspective, and making the notification more salient to
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customers. Moreover, researchers may explore contexts other than online financial services
to test the gift and notification treatments. In our data, we find that only a very small
proportion of current customers have made successful referrals in the experiments, and a
likely explanation is that customers tend to be very cautious when referring friends in our
setting since financial investment decisions are private and can be risky. If researchers use
a context in which customers are more likely to make referrals, then there could be more
power to test the gift and notification treatments.
Second, we have only considered one operationalization of the gift treatment, which is
an interest-raising coupon. Other types of gifts may work better, and it is interesting
to understand the relationship between the features of a gift and its impact on customer
referrals. For instance, is a gift “closer” (i.e., more relevant) to the focal product/service
more likely to elicit reciprocity from current customers toward the firm than a gift “more
distant” (i.e., less relevant) to the focal product/service, or the other way around? A priori,
it can be the case that a “closer” gift is likely to be of higher value to current customers
and hence is more likely to induce reciprocity. On the other hand, it is also possible that a
“closer” gift is more likely to be perceived by current customers as a deliberate marketing
device instead of a genuine kind treatment, in which case reciprocity can hardly be triggered.
It will be interesting to test such predictions in future experiments.
Third, we have only considered two value-based rewards with simple structures in this essay.
As extensions, we can consider developing value-based rewards based on theoretical models
of customer referrals and testing these value-based rewards in diverse contexts. We can also
consider other reward structures that are likely to promote better matching. For example,
Schmitt et al. (2011) suggest that firms may want to make the referral reward a function
of the value of the referring customer. It is interesting to understand whether rewarding
a referring customer based on his own value is more or less effective than rewarding him
based on his referred customers’ value. More broadly, investigating the design of the referral
reward structure is likely to generate interesting insights on customer referrals and also prove
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useful for firms to enhance the effectiveness of their referral programs.
Finally, we are unable to conduct direct tests on the mechanisms underlying the treatments
based on our data. To address this issue, researchers may consider augmenting field experimental data on customers’ referral behaviors with post-experiment surveys and/or lab
experiments in which they could directly measure the mechanisms at work. For example,
researchers could test the gift and notification treatments in a lab experiment, and, after
the treatments are administered, ask subjects to state their intention to reciprocate to and
their value perception of the focal firm. Such information could shed additional light on
how the treatments impact customer referrals.
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(13.94)

(0.64)

(1.56)

30,977

0.1307 (0.0019)

98.30

556.46

37,682.66 (330.30)

2,443.38

(13.91)

(0.64)

(1.57)

31,241

0.1294 (0.0019)

97.64

555.10

38,051.21 (319.42)

2,439.09

Gift

(13.90)

(0.63)

(1.56)

31,070

0.1293 (0.0019)

97.07

555.91

37,941.05 (318.91)

2,450.22

Notification

p = 0.614

p = 0.465

p = 0.538

p = 0.423

p = 0.827

C vs. G

p = 0.599

p = 0.171

p = 0.804

p = 0.574

p = 0.729

C vs. N

p = 0.982

p = 0.527

p = 0.712

p = 0.807

p = 0.571

G vs. N

Notes. The columns “Control”, “Gift”, and “Notification” report means and standard errors (in parentheses) of pre-experiment variables in the
control condition, the gift condition, and the notification condition, respectively. The column “C vs. G” reports p-values of two-sided Welch’s
t-tests comparing the control condition and the gift condition on pre-experiment variables. The columns “C vs. N” and “G vs. N” report the
counterparts in the comparison between the control condition and the notification condition and those in the comparison between the gift condition
and the notification condition, respectively.

Sample Size

Had Successful Referrals (Yes/No)

Time since Last Investment (in Days)

Tenure (in Days)

Investment Amount (in RMB)

Total Investment Return (in RMB)

Control

Table 1: Randomization Check: The First Experiment
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0.0027

4,655.49 12,078.99

Number of RCs

Investments of Each RC (in RMB)

12,597.48

0.0030

0.0027

37.71

Notification

7,423.51

0.0006

0.0007

26.58

Difference

2,841.12

0.0005

0.0004

9.84

SE

0.010

0.230

0.092

0.007

p-Value

7,942.00

0.0003

0.0002

25.23

Difference

3,636.92

0.0005

0.0004

11.51

SE

0.031

0.513

0.591

0.028

p-Value

Control vs. Notification

Notes. RC denotes Referred Customer. The columns “Control”, “Gift”, and “Notification” report means of outcome variables in the control
condition, the gift condition, and the notification condition, respectively. The columns under “Control vs. Gift” report the comparisons between
the control and gift conditions and those under “Control vs. Notification” report the comparisons between the control and notification conditions,
all based on two-sided Welch’s t-tests. We note that the first three outcome variables are defined on each current customer, with the sample size
in the control, gift, and notification conditions being 30,977, 31,241, and 31,070, respectively; on the other hand, the last outcome variable is
defined on each referred customer, with the sample size in the control, gift, and notification conditions being 83, 101, and 93, respectively.

0.0032

0.0032

0.0025

Has Acquired RCs (Yes/No)

39.05

12.47

Gift

Total Investments of RCs (in RMB)

Control

Control vs. Gift

Table 2: Mean Comparisons: The First Experiment

58
34

11,364.87

83

40.96%

46

26,521.27

101

45.54%

Gift

39

30,040.15

93

41.94%

Notification

p = 0.039

p = 0.635

C vs. G

p = 0.057

p = 1.000

C vs. N

Notes. RC denotes Referred Customer. In the section “Full Sample of All RCs”, the columns “Control”, “Gift”, and “Notification” report the
proportion of referred customers with a positive investment amount in each condition, and the columns “C vs. G” and “C vs. N” report p-values
of the test for equal proportions comparing the control condition and the gift and notification conditions. In the section “Subsample of RCs with
Positive Investments”, the columns “Control”, “Gift”, and “Notification” report the average investment amount of referred customers with positive
investments in each condition, and the columns “C vs. G” and “C vs. N” report p-values of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test comparing the
control condition and the gift and notification conditions.

Subsample Size

Average Investments (in RMB)

Subsample of RCs with Positive Investments

Sample Size

Proportion of RCs with Positive Investments

Full Sample of All RCs

Control

Table 3: An Alternative Test Comparing Investments of Each Referred Customer: The First Experiment
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4.33∗∗ (1.13)
−5.32 (4.54)

13.42∗ (5.98)
−12.30 (18.52)

−287.47∗∗ (24.66)

35.76∗∗ (6.26)

−154.97∗∗ (47.82)

−13.98 (11.95)

93,288

93,288

93,288

93,288

Notes. † p < .1. ∗ p < .05. ∗∗ p < .01. TIRC denotes Total Investments of Referred Customers. We report robust standard errors in parentheses for
all linear models estimated using OLS, and report (default) standard errors in parentheses for the tobit model (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). All
continuous independent variables have been mean-centered, and tenure and time since last investment are in the unit of 1,000 days. For ease of
exposition, the coefficients and standard errors have been multiplied by 1,000 in all linear models with a log-transformed dependent variable, and
the coefficients and standard errors have been divided by 1,000 in the tobit model.

93,288

93,288

1.09 × 10−3

(3.25)

(6.51)

(6.33)

10.50∗∗ (3.16)

−4.29

5.00

9.72

Tobit

TIRC

Observations

1.16 × 10−3

6,909.14∗∗ (0.44)

6.77∗∗ (1.56)

−5.95∗∗ (1.75)

−1.88 (1.33)

1.25∗∗ (0.35)

−0.42 (0.38)

1.00 (0.73)

1.61∗ (0.76)

OLS

log(TIRC+103 )

−2,147.43

1.18 × 10−3

4,608.10∗∗ (0.82)

12.34∗∗ (2.70)

−11.49∗∗ (3.13)

−3.10 (2.34)

2.23∗∗ (0.60)

−0.89 (0.67)

1.32 (1.28)

2.45† (1.35)

OLS

log(TIRC+102 )

Log-Likelihood

1.18 × 10−3

5.88 × 10−4

R2

2,307.23∗∗ (1.22)

6.40∗∗ (1.63)

(4.37)

24.32∗∗ (5.18)

72.08∗∗ (25.87)
3.23

18.30∗∗ (3.93)

−23.46∗∗ (6.14)

−17.45∗∗ (4.62)

−4.24 (3.43)

−51.88∗ (22.41)

Intercept

Had Successful Referrals

Time Since Last Investment

Tenure

Log Investment Amount

3.28∗∗ (0.86)

−1.40 (0.98)

−1.92 (1.29)

0.67

(4.69)

Log Total Investment Return

1.54 (1.88)

1.75 (2.50)

25.05∗ (11.47)

Notification Treatment

3.28† (1.98)

OLS

4.13 (2.63)

OLS

log(TIRC+101 )

26.44∗∗ (9.84)

OLS

Model

log(TIRC+100 )

Gift Treatment

TIRC

Dependent Variable

Table 4: Regression Analyses on Total Investments of Referred Customers (TIRC): The First Experiment
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∗∗

∗∗

∗∗

∗∗

∗∗

†

(0.0003)

(0.0008)

(0.0010)

(0.0008)

(0.0002)

(0.0002)

(0.0004)

(0.0004)

∗∗

∗∗

∗∗

∗∗

∗∗

(0.0003)

(0.0009)

(0.0011)

(0.0008)

(0.0002)

(0.0002)

(0.0005)

(0.0005)

93,288

1.97 × 10−3

0.0021

0.0049

−0.0072

−0.0002

0.0013

−0.0009

0.0003

0.0005

OLS

∗∗

∗∗

∗∗

∗∗

∗∗

(0.1454)

(0.1427)

(1.3463)

(0.2915)

(0.0759)

(0.0790)

(0.1610)

(0.1584)

93,288

−1,740.12

−6.6304

1.0665

−7.6806

−0.2201

0.4443

−0.2718

0.1317

0.2000

NB2

Number of Referred Customers

Notes. † p < .1. ∗ p < .05. ∗∗ p < .01. We report robust standard errors in parentheses for all linear models estimated using OLS, and report (default)
standard errors in parentheses for the probit and NB2 (negative binomial model with a quadratic variance function) models
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). All continuous independent variables have been mean-centered, and tenure and time since last investment are in the
unit of 1,000 days.

93,288

93,288

(0.0456)

(0.0481)

(0.4008)

(0.0949)

(0.0249)

(0.0261)

(0.0532)

(0.0516)

Observations

∗∗

∗∗

∗∗

∗∗

∗∗

†

−1,673.73

−3.0158

0.3566

−2.1585

−0.0379

0.1521

−0.1035

0.0348

0.0884

Log-Likelihood

2.04 × 10−3

0.0019

Intercept

R2

0.0043

−0.0065

−0.0000

0.0012

Had Successful Referrals

Time Since Last Investment

Tenure

Log Investment Amount

−0.0009

0.0002

Notification Treatment

Log Total Investment Return

0.0007

Gift Treatment

OLS

Model

Probit

Has Acquired Referred Customers

Dependent Variable

Table 5: Regression Analyses on Incidence and Number of Referred Customers: The First Experiment
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1.04 × 10−2

(8,016.69)

(7,832.04)

−22,315.93 ∗∗ (6,243.86)

11,360.25

12,582.58

Tobit

IERC

277

277

277

277

Notes. † p < .1. ∗ p < .05. ∗∗ p < .01. IERC denotes Investments of Each Referred Customer. We report robust standard errors in parentheses for all
linear models estimated using OLS, and report (default) standard errors in parentheses for the tobit model (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010).

277

277

6.34 × 10−3

(0.21)
7.75 ∗∗ (0.13)

0.26

0.36 † (0.21)

OLS

log(IERC+103 )

Observations

4.48 × 10−3

(0.36)

(0.35)

6.29 ∗∗ (0.24)

0.32

0.48

OLS

log(IERC+102 )

−1,535.30

3.61 × 10−3

1.86 × 10−2

(0.52)

(0.51)

4.91 ∗∗ (0.36)

0.35

0.58

OLS

log(IERC+101 )

Log-Likelihood

R2

3.55 ∗∗ (0.48)

(0.69)

(0.68)

4,655.49 ∗∗ (1,063.78)

0.37

7,942.00 ∗ (3,656.83)

Notification Condition

Intercept

0.69

OLS

7,423.51 ∗∗ (2,855.72)

OLS

Model

log(IERC+100 )

Gift Condition

IERC

Dependent Variable

Table 6: Regression Analyses on Investments of Each Referred Customer (IERC): The First Experiment
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3.52 × 10−2

5.28 × 10−2

No

Yes

12,333.52 (8,194.57)

10,353.08 (7,825.51)

Tobit

AIRC

6.50 × 10−2

7.78 × 10−2

Yes

Yes

13,757.56 † (8,169.17)

9,643.96 (7,820.44)

Tobit

AIRC

258

258

258

258

Notes. † p < .1. ∗ p < .05. ∗∗ p < .01. We report robust standard errors in parentheses for all linear models estimated using OLS, and report (default) standard
errors in parentheses for the tobit models. Characteristics include log total investment return, log investment amount, tenure, time since last investment, and
whether had successful referrals prior to the experiment. Characteristics: Interactions include the interaction of each pair of these five characteristics
(i.e., all ten interactions).

258

258

8.00 × 10−2

Yes

Yes

0.38 (0.23)

0.30 (0.22)

OLS

log(AIRC+103 )

258

Observations

7.30 × 10−2

Yes

Yes

0.51 (0.41)

0.37 (0.38)

OLS

log(AIRC+102 )

258

−1,493.97

6.79 × 10−2

Yes

Yes

0.59 (0.60)

0.42 (0.56)

OLS

log(AIRC+101 )

258

Log-Likelihood

R2

Yes

Yes

Characteristics: Interactions

Yes

Yes

0.66 (0.79)

9,323.15 ∗ (3,892.36)

Notification Treatment

Characteristics

0.46 (0.74)

OLS

6,846.71 ∗ (3,018.40)

OLS

Model

log(AIRC+100 )

258

Gift Treatment

AIRC

Dependent Variable

258

258

4.58 × 10−2

No

Yes

0.30 (0.23)

0.31 (0.21)

OLS

log(AIRC+103 )

Observations

4.01 × 10−2

No

Yes

0.36 (0.39)

0.36 (0.36)

OLS

log(AIRC+102 )

−1,497.80

3.70 × 10−2

No

Yes

0.38 (0.57)

0.39 (0.53)

OLS

log(AIRC+101 )

Log-Likelihood

R2

No

No

Characteristics: Interactions

Yes

Yes

0.39 (0.76)

8,896.33 ∗ (4,016.39)

Notification Treatment

Characteristics

0.41 (0.70)

OLS

7,528.74 ∗ (3,050.64)

OLS

Model

log(AIRC+100 )

Gift Treatment

AIRC

Dependent Variable

Table 7: Regression Analyses on Average Investments of Referred Customers (AIRC): The First Experiment
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76

99

83

p = 0.252

p = 0.307

p = 0.120

p = 0.101

C vs. N

Notes. The columns “Control”, “Gift”, and “Notification” report means and standard errors (in parentheses) of observable characteristics
on the samples of current customers who have acquired referred customers during the experiment (i.e., referrers) in the control condition,
the gift condition, and the notification condition, respectively. The columns “C vs. G” and “C vs. N” report p-values of two-sided Welch’s
t-tests and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests comparing the control and gift conditions and p-values of those comparing the control and
notification conditions, respectively.

Sample Size

p = 0.728

Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test

80,795.44 (10,813.78)

(295.85)

p = 0.999

65,717.55 (7,656.28)

2,893.65

Welch’s t-test

Investment Amount (in RMB)

65,740.79 (9,939.21)

(263.70)

p = 0.653

2,602.51

C vs. G

Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test

(258.05)

Notification

p = 0.334

2,245.22

Gift

Welch’s t-test

Total Investment Return (in RMB)

Control

Table 8: Who Have Acquired Referred Customers in the First Experiment?
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(2.58)

−2.39

Notification

Log Total Investment Return (Log Return)

(8.43)

93,288

93,288

(2.20)

(10.90)

(6.90)

(50.47)

(46.97)

(11.40)

(59.69)

(39.87)

(7.26)

(15.87)

93,288

7.48 × 10−4

9.37 ∗∗ (2.88)

19.44

−39.69

21.93 †

119.41 ∗

−34.36

13.53 †

24.05

−56.47 ∗∗ (16.66)

0.73

22.51 ∗

11.12

OLS

4.57

1.47

19.13

27.13 †

2.73

20.74 ∗∗

−37.59 ∗∗

2.08 †

3.13

1.68

93,288

1.10 × 10−3

93,288

1.28 × 10−3

6.85 ∗∗ (1.53)

(1.32)

(2.44)

(2.29)

5.53

2.52

18.81

22.32

2.59

93,288

1.16 × 10−3

6.81 ∗∗ (1.52)

(10.91)

(13.88)

(2.02)

(13.46)

(15.77)

(2.19)

21.01 ∗∗ (7.93)

−46.50 ∗∗ (10.11)

0.37

3.21

1.75

OLS

(10.89) −11.23

(13.44)

(1.89)

(13.50)

(15.57)

(2.04)

(7.91)

(9.75)

(1.22)

(2.43)

(2.29)

OLS

(10.99) −10.67

(14.07)

(2.04)

(13.52)

(15.99)

6.71 ∗∗ (1.51)

−11.52

1.03

2.80

19.00

16.52

(2.30)

(7.99)
1.72

(9.84)

21.70 ∗∗

(1.45)

(2.42)

(2.26)

−49.48 ∗∗

−1.41

3.26

1.73

OLS

log(TIRC+100 )

Notes. † p < .1. ∗ p < .05. ∗∗ p < .01. TIRC denotes Total Investments of Referred Customers. We report robust standard errors in parentheses for linear and
log-linear models estimated using OLS. All continuous independent variables have been mean-centered, and time since last investment is in the unit of 1,000 days.
For ease of exposition, the coefficients and standard errors have been multiplied by 1,000 in log-linear models.

Observations

7.78 × 10−4

6.75 × 10−4

(51.28)

R2

23.43

(47.21)

(12.34)

(60.45)

(40.83)

(6.45)

(15.62)

9.45 ∗∗ (2.88)

(51.55)

−24.77

17.53

121.20 ∗

−10.89

13.78 ∗

23.59

9.21 ∗∗ (2.85)

18.78

(58.94)

(59.29)

19.78 ∗

−85.66

(47.84)

120.21 ∗

(8.10)

9.38

−65.36

(16.09)

25.26

(2.11)

(10.79)

(6.86)

−40.84 ∗∗ (15.60)

3.70 †

22.01 ∗

10.79

Intercept

Notification × Had Referrals

Notification × Time

Notification × Value Factor

Notification × Log Investment

Notification × Log Return

Gift × Had Referrals

Gift × Time

Gift × Value Factor

Gift × Log Investment

Gift × Log Return

Had Successful Referrals (Had Referrals)

Time Since Last Investment (Time)

Value Factor
−61.87 ∗∗ (17.67)

(10.95)

22.62 ∗

Log Investment Amount (Log Investment)

(6.83)

11.05

Gift

OLS

Model

OLS

TIRC

Dependent Variable

Table 9: Heterogeneous Effects on Total Investments of Referred Customers (TIRC): The First Experiment
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(8.18)

−7.60

(8.19)

93,288

1.10 × 10−3

93,288

1.28 × 10−3

93,288

1.16 × 10−3

(0.71)

(1.25)

(1.15)

(5.58)

(7.22)

(1.26)

(1.17)

−3.76

0.96

0.97

11.85 †

12.52

1.61

(5.53)

(6.69)

(0.99)

(6.99)

(7.81)

(1.05)

9.27 ∗ (3.80)

−17.73 ∗∗ (4.70)

1.00 † (0.59)

1.80

0.92

OLS

(0.63)

(1.26)

(1.16)

−4.09

1.25

1.55

11.67 †

9.61

1.51

(5.53)

(6.96)

(1.03)

(6.97)

(7.88)

(1.11)

9.42 ∗ (3.81)

−22.17 ∗∗ (4.92)

0.12

1.85

0.96

OLS

93,288

1.09 × 10−3

93,288

1.28 × 10−3

93,288

1.15 × 10−3

4,608.42 ∗∗ (0.75) 4,608.49 ∗∗ (0.76) 4,608.47 ∗∗ (0.76)

−4.25

−1.61

(1.03)

(7.00)
1.66

(8.03)
11.79 †

(1.17)

6.19

0.97

9.77 ∗ (3.84)

−23.54 ∗∗ (4.85)

−0.76

1.87

0.95

OLS

log(TIRC+102 )

Notes. † p < .1. ∗ p < .05. ∗∗ p < .01. TIRC denotes Total Investments of Referred Customers. We report robust standard errors in parentheses for log-linear
models estimated using OLS. All continuous independent variables have been mean-centered, and time since last investment is in the unit of 1,000 days.
For ease of exposition, the coefficients and standard errors have been multiplied by 1,000 in log-linear models.

Observations

R2

−7.15

(10.39)

(1.52)

(10.17)

(11.77)

(1.65)

(5.84)

(7.49)

(0.97)

(1.84)

(1.72)

2,307.56 ∗∗ (1.13) 2,307.66 ∗∗ (1.14) 2,307.63 ∗∗ (1.14)

(8.25)

−7.81

Notification × Had Referrals

Intercept

(10.03)

3.36

2.75

15.29

15.94

2.06

15.15 ∗∗

−0.34

(1.43)

(10.21)

(11.64)

(1.54)

(5.82)

(7.20)

−34.27 ∗∗

0.24

2.53

1.34

Notification × Time

1.23

15.54

19.81 †

2.18

14.94 ∗

(0.90)

(1.84)

(1.72)

OLS

2.04
(10.62)

(1.53)

(10.22)

15.44
2.23

(11.95)

11.30

(1.73)

(5.88)

1.35

(7.32)

15.67 ∗∗

−27.62 ∗∗

1.53 †

2.46

1.29

OLS

log(TIRC+101 )

Notification × Value Factor

Notification × Log Investment

Notification × Log Return

Gift × Had Referrals

Gift × Time

Gift × Value Factor

Gift × Log Investment

Gift × Log Return

Had Successful Referrals (Had Referrals)

Time Since Last Investment (Time)

Value Factor
−36.43 ∗∗

(1.07)

−1.09

Log Investment Amount (Log Investment)

Log Total Investment Return (Log Return)

(1.83)

2.57

Notification

(1.70)

1.33

OLS

Gift

Model

Dependent Variable

Table 10: Heterogeneous Effects on TIRC Continued: The First Experiment
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(0.71)

(0.65)

Notification × Log Return

−1.39

−1.09

−0.48

0.66

(3.11)

(3.60)

(0.58)

(0.62)
(4.29)

−1.30

−0.42

1.01 †

(3.10)

(3.77)

(0.59)

7.71 † (4.00)

3.89

0.89

4.42 ∗ (2.00)

93,288

93,288

(5.50)

−20.56

205.79

3.41

8.33

(14.74)

(167.09)

(5.69)

(13.20)

374.48 ∗ (153.24)

4.08

36.85 ∗∗ (10.55)

(4.21)

(13.02)

(12.39)

(5.56)

−22.16

216.98

6.70

7.18

(14.84)

(167.50)

(5.82)

(13.30)

376.97 ∗ (153.70)

4.93

37.98 ∗∗ (10.66)

−458.11 ∗∗ (145.37)

0.54

21.49 †

25.58 ∗

Tobit

93,288

−2,144.73

93,288

−2,149.67

Notes. † p < .1. ∗ p < .05. ∗∗ p < .01. TIRC denotes Total Investments of Referred Customers. We report robust standard errors in parentheses for log-linear models
estimated using OLS, and report (default) standard errors in parentheses for tobit models. All continuous independent variables have been mean-centered, and
time since last investment is in the unit of 1,000 days. For ease of exposition, the coefficients and standard errors have been multiplied by 1,000 in log-linear
models, and the coefficients and standard errors have been divided by 1,000 in tobit models.

93,288

93,288

1.12 × 10−3

(14.98)

(168.77)

(5.60)

(13.45)

(4.18)

(12.99)

(12.39)

−422.60 ∗∗ (143.90)

5.70

20.87

24.07 †

Tobit

TIRC

−303.84 ∗∗ (27.84) −300.22 ∗∗ (27.40) −301.17 ∗∗ (27.52)

−23.38

210.47

7.58

7.10

Observations

1.24 × 10−3

(5.33)

374.06 ∗ (154.82)

4.25

40.11 ∗∗ (10.83)

−2,151.61

1.05 × 10−3

(4.03)

(13.25)

(12.64)

−476.36 ∗∗ (147.15)

−4.13

23.41 †

27.20 ∗

Tobit

Log-Likelihood

R2

(3.13)

(4.05)

(4.26)

7.81 † (4.02)

5.73

(0.33)

(0.71)

(0.65)

−10.98 ∗∗ (2.56)

0.07

1.17

0.63

OLS

6,909.41 ∗∗ (0.40) 6,909.45 ∗∗ (0.41) 6,909.44 ∗∗ (0.41)

Notification × Had Referrals

Intercept

−2.33

Notification × Value Factor

Notification × Time

(0.56)

1.06 †

Notification × Log Investment

7.79 † (4.02)

Gift × Had Referrals

(4.43)

1.83

Gift × Time

Gift × Value Factor

Gift × Log Investment

0.98 † (0.59)

0.55

Gift × Log Return
(0.66)

4.34 ∗ (1.99)

4.61 ∗ (2.02)

Time Since Last Investment (Time)

Had Successful Referrals (Had Referrals)

0.54 † (0.31)

1.14

0.60

OLS

−8.59 ∗∗ (2.42)

(0.37)

(0.71)

1.18 †
−0.41

(0.64)

0.62

OLS

log(TIRC+103 )

−11.72 ∗∗ (2.58)

Value Factor

Log Investment Amount (Log Investment)

Log Total Investment Return (Log Return)

Notification

Gift

Model

Dependent Variable

Table 11: Heterogeneous Effects on TIRC Continued: The First Experiment
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(0.0017)

(0.0025)

−0.2966 ∗

1.3032

(0.1245)

(1.1485)

−0.2681 ∗

1.4518

0.0539

2.2367 ∗

0.0254

(0.1240)

(1.1502)

(0.0464)

−0.2851 ∗

1.4690

(0.1239)

(1.1477)

0.0834 † (0.0468)

(0.1127)

(1.0587)

(0.0446)

0.4286 ∗∗ (0.0835)

(0.1124) −0.0408

(1.0619)

(0.0442)

(0.0334)
−4.2219 ∗∗ (0.9103)

−0.0004

0.1572 † (0.0885)

0.2121 ∗ (0.0838)

Probit

93,288

93,288

−1,681.50

93,288

−1,692.66

Notes. † p < .1. ∗ p < .05. ∗∗ p < .01. We report robust standard errors in parentheses for linear probability models estimated using OLS, and report (default)
standard errors in parentheses for probit models. All continuous independent variables have been mean-centered, and time since last investment is in the unit of
1,000 days.

93,288

93,288

1.65 × 10−3

Observations

93,288

2.2052 ∗

0.0163

0.4152 ∗∗ (0.0832)

−3.8111 ∗∗ (0.9118)

(0.1136) −0.0331
(0.0446)

(0.0893)

(0.0844)

0.0702 ∗ (0.0332)

0.1464

0.2052 ∗

Probit

0.0018 ∗∗ (0.0003) −3.0968 ∗∗ (0.0715) −3.0885 ∗∗ (0.0704) −3.0828 ∗∗ (0.0703)

−0.0036 ∗

(0.0003)

0.0849 †

(1.0585)

(0.0427)

−1,693.40

1.90 × 10−3

1.62 × 10−3

(0.0017)

0.0018 ∗∗ (0.0003)

0.0018 ∗∗ (0.0003)

(0.0017)

(0.0024)

2.2070 ∗

(0.0020) −0.0432

(0.0027)

(0.0004)

0.0262

0.4552 ∗∗ (0.0843)

−4.3556 ∗∗ (0.9108)

−0.0627 ∗ (0.0320)

0.1790 ∗ (0.0893)

0.2196 ∗∗ (0.0852)

Probit

Log-Likelihood

R2

Intercept

Notification × Had Referrals

−0.0035 ∗

0.0019

0.0018

(0.0024)

−0.0036 ∗

Notification × Time
0.0006

Notification × Value Factor

(0.0003)
0.0006 †

0.0004

0.0005

(0.0003)

Notification × Log Return

Notification × Log Investment

(0.0020)

0.0006 †

0.0005

(0.0020)

0.0005

Gift × Had Referrals

(0.0027)

0.0013

0.0018

0.0008

(0.0003)

0.0051 ∗∗ (0.0013)

Gift × Time

0.0003

(0.0002)

−0.0113 ∗∗ (0.0017)

0.0000

0.0002
(0.0027)

(0.0004)

0.0050 ∗∗ (0.0013)

0.0053 ∗∗ (0.0013)
0.0001

−0.0089 ∗∗ (0.0017)

−0.0120 ∗∗ (0.0016)

(0.0004)

0.0007 † (0.0004)

0.0006

OLS

Has Acquired Referred Customers

Gift × Value Factor

Gift × Log Investment

Gift × Log Return

Had Successful Referrals (Had Referrals)

Time Since Last Investment (Time)

Value Factor

Log Investment Amount (Log Investment)

(0.0004)

(0.0004)

0.0005 ∗ (0.0002)

0.0007

0.0007 † (0.0004)

Notification

Log Total Investment Return (Log Return) −0.0004 † (0.0002)

0.0006

(0.0004)

OLS

0.0006

OLS

Gift

Model

Dependent Variable

Table 12: Heterogeneous Effects on Incidence of Having Acquired Referred Customers: The First Experiment
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(0.0004)

(0.0023)

(0.0028)

(0.3660)

(3.8637)

93,288

93,288

(0.2837)

(0.3620)

(3.8408)

(0.1428)

(0.3374)

(3.5561)

(0.1376)

93,288

−1,746.16

−6.9201 ∗∗ (0.2394)

−0.7787 ∗

4.6634

0.1743

−0.2374

7.3985 ∗

0.0132

1.3012 ∗∗ (0.2462)

−12.9469 ∗∗ (3.0524)

0.2324 ∗ (0.1028)

0.5025 † (0.3015)

0.6937 ∗

NB2

(0.1033)

(0.3407)

(3.5672)

(0.1387)

(0.3638)

(3.8516)

93,288

−1,757.16

−6.9055 ∗∗ (0.2404)

−0.8402 ∗

4.9276

0.2813 † (0.1444)

−0.2706

7.8486 ∗

0.0754

1.3529 ∗∗ (0.2486)

−14.4437 ∗∗ (3.0719)

0.0033

0.5495 † (0.3002)

0.7155 ∗ (0.2835)

NB2

Notes. † p < .1. ∗ p < .05. ∗∗ p < .01. We report robust standard errors in parentheses for linear models estimated using OLS, and report (default) standard errors in
parentheses for NB2 models. All continuous independent variables have been mean-centered, and time since last investment is in the unit of 1,000 days.

93,288

93,288

−6.9557 ∗∗ (0.2452)

−0.8781 ∗

4.3625

Observations

1.61 × 10−3

0.0019 ∗∗ (0.0003)

−0.0040 †

(0.3440)
0.2872 ∗ (0.1368)

−0.2891

(3.5726)

(0.1323)

−1,758.75

1.85 × 10−3

1.55 × 10−3

(0.0022)

0.0019 ∗∗ (0.0003)

(0.0023)

(0.0026)

0.0018 ∗∗ (0.0003)

−0.0039 †

0.0016

(0.0004)

(0.0022)

(0.0029)

7.8816 ∗

0.1060

1.4381 ∗∗ (0.2517)

−14.9286 ∗∗ (3.0827)

−0.1956 ∗ (0.0983)

0.6334 ∗ (0.3033)

0.7520 ∗∗ (0.2883)

NB2

Log-Likelihood

R2

Intercept

Notification × Had Referrals

−0.0041 †

0.0017

(0.0028)

0.0003

Notification × Time

(0.0004)

(0.0022) −0.0007

Notification × Value Factor

0.0005

(0.0022) −0.0007

0.0008 † (0.0004)

−0.0007

(0.0029)

0.0007 †

Notification × Log Investment

Notification × Log Return

Gift × Had Referrals

0.0020

0.0021

(0.0029)

(0.0004)

0.0062 ∗∗ (0.0017)

Gift × Time
0.0018

(0.0003)

−0.0124 ∗∗ (0.0020)

0.0001

0.0002

(0.0004)

(0.0004)

0.0008 † (0.0004)

0.0006

OLS

Number of Referred Customers

Gift × Value Factor

Gift × Log Investment
0.0001

0.0002

Gift × Log Return
(0.0004)

0.0061 ∗∗ (0.0017)

0.0064 ∗∗ (0.0017)

Had Successful Referrals (Had Referrals)

Time Since Last Investment (Time)

−0.0096 ∗∗ (0.0018)

0.0006 ∗∗ (0.0002)

0.0008 † (0.0004)

0.0006

OLS

−0.0133 ∗∗ (0.0019)

Value Factor

Log Investment Amount (Log Investment)

Log Total Investment Return (Log Return) −0.0005 † (0.0003)

0.0008 † (0.0004)

Notification

(0.0004)

0.0006

OLS

Gift

Model

Dependent Variable

Table 13: Heterogeneous Effects on Number of Referred Customers: The First Experiment

69
(0.58)

(1.79)

40,076

0.1110 (0.0016)

92.38

601.56

72,213.53 (913.36)

9,239.12 (125.94)

(0.57)

(1.80)

40,145

0.1124 (0.0016)

91.83

601.62

72,492.67 (875.08)

9,412.78 (131.48)

First Reward

(0.58)

(1.80)

40,037

0.1119 (0.0016)

92.34

604.53

73,013.00 (861.17)

9,425.45 (130.09)

Second Reward

p = 0.535

p = 0.496

p = 0.979

p = 0.825

p = 0.340

C vs. F

p = 0.683

p = 0.962

p = 0.242

p = 0.524

p = 0.303

C vs. S

p = 0.833

p = 0.527

p = 0.253

p = 0.672

p = 0.945

F vs. S

Notes. The columns “Control”, “First Reward”, and “Second Reward” report means and standard errors (in parentheses) of pre-experiment
variables in the control condition, the first value-based reward condition, and the second value-based reward condition, respectively. The column
“C vs. F” reports p-values of two-sided Welch’s t-tests comparing the control condition and the first value-based reward condition on
pre-experiment variables. The columns “C vs. S” and “F vs. S” report the counterparts in the comparison between the control condition and the
second value-based reward condition and those in the comparison between the first and second value-based reward conditions, respectively.

Sample Size

Had Successful Referrals (Yes/No)

Time since Last Investment (in Days)

Tenure (in Days)

Investment Amount (in RMB)

Total Investment Return (in RMB)

Control

Table 14: Randomization Check: The Second Experiment

70
0.0082

0.0071

192.90

SR

14,166.89 29,548.51 23,546.02

0.0075

0.0065

220.81

FR

15,381.62

0.0009

0.0005

127.84

Difference

6,129.20

0.0007

0.0006

46.99

SE

0.012

0.172

0.405

0.007

p-Value

9,379.12

0.0016

0.0011

99.93

Difference

4,313.32

0.0007

0.0006

35.10

SE

0.030

0.016

0.053

0.004

p-Value

Control vs. Second Reward

Notes. RC denotes Referred Customer. The columns “Control”, “FR”, and “SR” report means of outcome variables in the control condition,
the first value-based reward condition, and the second value-based reward condition, respectively. The columns under “Control vs. First Reward”
report the comparisons between the control and first value-based reward conditions and those under “Control vs. Second Reward” report the
comparisons between the control and second value-based reward conditions, all based on two-sided Welch’s t-tests. We note that the first three
outcome variables are defined on each current customer, with the sample size in the control, first value-based reward, and second value-based
reward conditions being 40,076, 40,145, and 40,037, respectively; on the other hand, the last outcome variable is defined on each referred customer,
with the sample size in the control, first value-based reward, and second value-based reward conditions being 263, 300, and 328, respectively.

Investments of Each RC (in RMB)

0.0066

0.0060

Has Acquired RCs (Yes/No)

Number of RCs

92.97

Total Investments of RCs (in RMB)

Control

Control vs. First Reward

Table 15: Mean Comparisons: The Second Experiment

71
98

38,019.32

263

37.26%

122

72,660.28

300

40.67%

First Reward

134

57,635.03

328

40.85%

Second Reward

p = 0.052

p = 0.460

C vs. F

p = 0.028

p = 0.422

C vs. S

Notes. RC denotes Referred Customer. In the section “Full Sample of All RCs”, the columns “Control”, “First Reward”, and “Second Reward”
report the proportion of referred customers with a positive investment amount in each condition, and the columns “C vs. F” and “C vs. S” report
p-values of the test for equal proportions comparing the control condition and the two value-based reward conditions. In the section “Subsample of
RCs with Positive Investments”, the columns “Control”, “First Reward”, and “Second Reward” report the average investment amount of referred
customers with positive investments in each condition, and the columns “C vs. F” and “C vs. S” report p-values of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
test comparing the control condition and the two value-based reward conditions.

Subsample Size

Average Investments (in RMB)

Subsample of RCs with Positive Investments

Sample Size

Proportion of RCs with Positive Investments

Full Sample of All RCs

Control

Table 16: An Alternative Test Comparing Investments of Each Referred Customer: The Second Experiment

72

6.39∗∗ (1.32)
−14.74∗∗ (4.96)
−29.39∗∗ (7.18)
17.94∗∗ (5.00)

8.29∗∗ (1.71)
−18.46∗∗ (6.37)
−39.83∗∗ (9.38)
24.64∗∗ (6.55)
19.31∗∗ (2.34)
1.43 × 10−3

(33.87)

−216.78† (118.08)
(96.14)
(45.50)

48.71

−128.82
−73.00
101.82∗∗ (20.56)
7.74 × 10−4

Log Investment Amount

Tenure

Time Since Last Investment

Had Successful Referrals

Intercept

−654.27∗∗ (32.44)

47.60∗∗ (10.72)

−288.80∗∗ (65.72)

−48.96∗∗ (16.96)

120,258

120,258

120,258

120,258

Notes. † p < .1. ∗ p < .05. ∗∗ p < .01. TIRC denotes Total Investments of Referred Customers. We report robust standard errors in parentheses for
all linear models estimated using OLS, and report (default) standard errors in parentheses for the tobit model. All continuous independent variables
have been mean-centered, and tenure and time since last investment are in the unit of 1,000 days. For ease of exposition, the coefficients and
standard errors have been multiplied by 1,000 in all linear models with a log-transformed dependent variable, and the coefficients and standard errors
have been divided by 1,000 in the tobit model.

120,258

120,258

1.43 × 10−3

6,913.51∗∗ (0.77)

(5.57)
22.16∗∗ (5.84)

0.49

24.95∗ (10.08)

21.26∗ (10.15)

Tobit

TIRC

Observations

1.45 × 10−3

4,615.22∗∗ (1.26)

5.59∗∗ (2.08)

−9.89∗∗ (3.02)

−6.95∗∗ (2.29)

2.75∗∗ (0.60)

0.73 (0.57)

3.76∗∗ (1.24)

2.94∗ (1.21)

OLS

log(TIRC+103 )

−6,402.59

1.44 × 10−3

2,317.23∗∗ (1.79)

11.44∗∗ (3.49)

−19.12∗∗ (5.03)

−10.91∗∗ (3.58)

4.52∗∗ (0.95)

0.78 (0.90)

5.72∗∗ (2.00)

4.46∗ (1.95)

OLS

log(TIRC+102 )

Log-Likelihood

R2

0.70 (1.26)

0.58 (1.63)

(30.90)

55.53†

Log Total Investment Return

7.73∗∗ (2.82)

9.77∗∗ (3.66)

98.42∗∗ (35.05)

Second Reward

5.90∗ (2.75)

OLS

7.31∗ (3.57)

OLS

log(TIRC+101 )

127.26∗∗ (46.95)

OLS

Model

log(TIRC+100 )

First Reward

TIRC

Dependent Variable

Table 17: Regression Analyses on Total Investments of Referred Customers (TIRC): The Second Experiment

73
∗∗

∗∗

∗∗

∗∗

∗∗

∗∗

†

(0.0004)

(0.0011)

(0.0015)

(0.0009)

(0.0003)

(0.0002)

(0.0006)

(0.0006)

∗∗

∗∗

∗∗

∗∗

∗∗

∗∗

∗

(0.0004)

(0.0013)

(0.0017)

(0.0012)

(0.0003)

(0.0003)

(0.0007)

(0.0007)

120,258

3.06 × 10−3

0.0054

0.0107

−0.0126

−0.0032

0.0025

−0.0009

0.0016

0.0009

OLS

∗∗

∗∗

∗∗

∗∗

∗∗

∗∗

∗

(0.0774)

(0.0948)

(0.6562)

(0.1576)

(0.0555)

(0.0528)

(0.0928)

(0.0940)

120,258

−4,855.71

−5.4779

0.9778

−4.7587

−0.4324

0.3797

−0.1652

0.2214

0.1500

NB2

Number of Referred Customers

Notes. † p < .1. ∗ p < .05. ∗∗ p < .01. We report robust standard errors in parentheses for all linear models estimated using OLS, and report
(default) standard errors in parentheses for the probit and NB2 models. All continuous independent variables have been mean-centered, and tenure
and time since last investment are in the unit of 1,000 days.

120,258

120,258

(0.0260)

(0.0331)

(0.2136)

(0.0547)

(0.0190)

(0.0181)

(0.0320)

Observations

∗∗

∗∗

∗∗

∗∗

∗∗

∗∗

†

(0.0325)

−4,530.65

−2.6531

0.3678

−1.4915

−0.1611

0.1267

−0.0517

0.0623

0.0323

Log-Likelihood

3.29 × 10−3

0.0050

Intercept

R2

0.0093

−0.0108

Time Since Last Investment

Had Successful Referrals

−0.0028

0.0021

Tenure

Log Investment Amount

−0.0007

0.0011

Second Reward

Log Total Investment Return

0.0004

First Reward

OLS

Model

Probit

Has Acquired Referred Customers

Dependent Variable

Table 18: Regression Analyses on Incidence and Number of Referred Customers: The Second Experiment

74

4.90 × 10−3

(12,767.43)
−69,303.10 ∗∗ (10,298.73)

19,690.42

27,545.96 ∗ (12,987.92)

Tobit

IERC

891

891

891

891

Notes. † p < .1. ∗ p < .05. ∗∗ p < .01. IERC denotes Investments of Each Referred Customer. We report robust standard errors in parentheses for all
linear models estimated using OLS, and report (default) standard errors in parentheses for the tobit model.

891

891

3.75 × 10−3

7.90 ∗∗ (0.10)

0.27 † (0.14)

0.27 † (0.14)

OLS

log(IERC+103 )

Observations

2.97 × 10−3

(0.22)

(0.23)

6.37 ∗∗ (0.16)

0.36

0.37

OLS

log(IERC+102 )

−4,955.25

2.50 × 10−3

7.47 × 10−3

(0.31)

(0.31)

4.91 ∗∗ (0.22)

0.45

0.46

OLS

log(IERC+101 )

Log-Likelihood

R2

3.47 ∗∗ (0.29)

(0.40)

(0.41)

14,166.89 ∗∗ (2,687.99)

0.53

9,379.12 ∗ (4,320.55)

Second Reward

Intercept

0.54

OLS

15,381.62 ∗ (6,139.72)

OLS

Model

log(IERC+100 )

First Reward

IERC

Dependent Variable

Table 19: Regression Analyses on Investments of Each Referred Customer (IERC): The Second Experiment
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2.50 × 10−3

6.21 × 10−3

−69,366.62 ∗∗ (10,306.08)

23,458.84 ∗ (11,379.43)

Tobit

IERC

891

891

891

891

Notes. † p < .1. ∗ p < .05. ∗∗ p < .01. IERC denotes Investments of Each Referred Customer. We report robust standard errors in parentheses for all
linear models estimated using OLS, and report (default) standard errors in parentheses for the tobit model.

891

891

4.90 × 10−3

7.90 ∗∗ (0.10)

0.27 ∗ (0.12)

OLS

log(IERC+103 )

Observations

3.75 × 10−3

6.37 ∗∗ (0.16)

0.37 † (0.19)

OLS

log(IERC+102 )

−4,955.46

2.97 × 10−3

4.91 ∗∗ (0.22)

0.45 † (0.27)

OLS

log(IERC+101 )

Log-Likelihood

R2

3.47 ∗∗ (0.29)

14,166.89 ∗∗ (2,687.99)

Intercept

(0.35)

0.53

OLS

12,246.56 ∗∗ (4,157.06)

OLS

Model

log(IERC+100 )

Value-Based Reward

IERC

Dependent Variable

Table 20: Regression Analyses on IERC Continued: The Second Experiment
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10−2
6.68 ×

No
10−2

8.57 ×

No
10−2

Yes

0.16 (0.15)

0.23 (0.15)

OLS

log(AIRC+103 )

No

Yes

8,814.09 (12,511.24)

24,594.68 † (12,612.29)

Tobit

AIRC

7.34 × 10−2

1.27 × 10−1

Yes

Yes

5,795.87 (12,188.45)

25,116.83 ∗ (12,320.97)

786

786

786

786

Notes. † p < .1. ∗ p < .05. ∗∗ p < .01. We report robust standard errors in parentheses for all linear models estimated using OLS, and report (default) standard
errors in parentheses for the tobit models. Characteristics include log total investment return, log investment amount, tenure, time since last investment, and
whether had successful referrals prior to the experiment. Characteristics: Interactions include the interaction of each pair of these five characteristics (i.e., all
ten interactions).

786

786

1.18 × 10−1

Yes

Yes

0.12 (0.15)

0.23 (0.15)

Tobit

AIRC

Observations

9.59 × 10−2

Yes

Yes

0.18 (0.23)

0.35 (0.24)

OLS

log(AIRC+103 )

786

−4,720.98

8.18 × 10−2

Yes

Yes

0.24 (0.33)

0.46 (0.34)

OLS

log(AIRC+102 )

786

Log-Likelihood

R2

Yes

Yes

Characteristics: Interactions

Yes

0.31 (0.43)

Yes

791.10 (4,571.81)

0.56 (0.44)

OLS

log(AIRC+101 )

log(AIRC+100 )
OLS

786

786

Characteristics

Second Reward

12,451.33 † (6,369.94)

OLS

Model

First Reward

AIRC

Dependent Variable

786

786

5.40 ×

No

Yes

0.23 (0.23)

0.36 (0.24)

OLS

log(AIRC+102 )

Observations

10−2

Yes

0.32 (0.33)

0.47 (0.34)

OLS

log(AIRC+101 )

−4,737.91

4.59 ×

No

Yes

0.41 (0.42)

0.58 (0.44)

OLS

log(AIRC+100 )

Log-Likelihood

8.09 ×

No

Characteristics: Interactions
10−2

Yes

Characteristics

R2

2,053.12 (4,563.88)

Second Reward

12,239.28 ∗ (6,204.93)

OLS

Model

First Reward

AIRC

Dependent Variable

Table 21: Regression Analyses on Average Investments of Referred Customers (AIRC): The Second Experiment
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4.57 × 10−2

7.76 × 10−2

No

Yes

16,536.41 (11,114.01)

Tobit

AIRC

7.29 × 10−2

1.23 × 10−1

Yes

Yes

15,174.15 (10,847.45)

786

786

786

786

Notes. † p < .1. ∗ p < .05. ∗∗ p < .01. We report robust standard errors in parentheses for all linear models estimated using OLS, and report (default) standard
errors in parentheses for the tobit models. Characteristics include log total investment return, log investment amount, tenure, time since last investment, and
whether had successful referrals prior to the experiment. Characteristics: Interactions include the interaction of each pair of these five characteristics (i.e., all
ten interactions).

786

786

1.18 × 10−1

Yes

Yes

0.17 (0.13)

Tobit

AIRC

Observations

9.53 × 10−2

Yes

Yes

0.26 (0.21)

OLS

log(AIRC+103 )

786

−4,722.38

8.13 × 10−2

Yes

Yes

0.35 (0.29)

OLS

log(AIRC+102 )

786

Log-Likelihood

R2

Yes

Yes

Characteristics: Interactions

Yes

Yes

0.43 (0.38)

OLS

log(AIRC+101 )

log(AIRC+100 )
OLS

786

786

Characteristics

6,371.57 (4,125.65)

OLS

Model

Value-Based Reward

AIRC

Dependent Variable

786

786

8.54 × 10−2

No

Yes

0.19 (0.13)

OLS

log(AIRC+103 )

Observations

6.65 × 10−2

No

Yes

0.29 (0.20)

OLS

log(AIRC+102 )

−4,738.80

5.37 × 10−2

No

Yes

0.39 (0.29)

OLS

log(AIRC+101 )

Log-Likelihood

R2

No

No

Characteristics: Interactions

Yes

Yes

0.49 (0.37)

OLS

log(AIRC+100 )

Characteristics

6,962.55 † (4,098.51)

OLS

Model

Value-Based Reward

AIRC

Dependent Variable

Table 22: Regression Analyses on AIRC Continued: The Second Experiment

78
241

260

285

p = 0.001

p = 0.010

p = 0.001

p = 0.014

C vs. S

Notes. The columns “Control”, “First Reward”, and “Second Reward” report means and standard errors (in parentheses) of observable
characteristics on the samples of current customers who have acquired referred customers during the experiment (i.e., referrers) in the control
condition, the first value-based reward condition, and the second value-based reward condition, respectively. The columns “C vs. F” and “C vs.
S” report p-values of two-sided Welch’s t-tests and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests comparing the control and first value-based reward
conditions and p-values of those comparing the control and second value-based reward conditions, respectively.

Sample Size

p = 0.456

133,068.36 (11,272.54)

Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test

104,103.73 (12,474.38)

p = 0.551

94,739.58 (9,522.25)

Welch’s t-test

Investment Amount (in RMB)

p = 0.055

14,454.24 (2,122.08)

C vs. F

Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test

9,230.89 (1,194.46)

Second Reward

p = 0.703

8,619.57 (1,066.68)

First Reward

Welch’s t-test

Total Investment Return (in RMB)

Control

Table 23: Who Have Acquired Referred Customers in the Second Experiment?

79
241

545

Notes. The columns “Control” and “Value-Based Reward” report means and standard errors (in parentheses) of observable characteristics on the
samples of current customers who have acquired referred customers during the experiment (i.e., referrers) in the control and composite value-based
reward conditions, respectively. The column “C vs. V” reports p-values of two-sided Welch’s t-tests and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests
comparing the control and composite value-based reward conditions.

Sample Size

p = 0.019

(8,391.62)

Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test

119,250.37

p = 0.054

(9,522.25)

Welch’s t-test

Investment Amount (in RMB)

94,739.58

(1,251.38)

p = 0.003

11,962.37

Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test

(1,066.68)

C vs. V

p = 0.042

8,619.57

Value-Based Reward

Welch’s t-test

Total Investment Return (in RMB)

Control

Table 24: Who Have Acquired Referred Customers in the Second Experiment (Continued)?

80

98.02 ∗∗ (34.95)

98.52 ∗∗ (34.99)

(27.01)
(39.50)

120,258

(47.23)

120,258

6.97 × 10−4

93.42 ∗∗ (18.97)

85.39 ∗ (35.93)

57.66

66.27 ∗∗ (20.24)

98.10 ∗∗ (34.96)

127.69 ∗∗ (47.09)

OLS

OLS

120,258

5.35 × 10−4

93.32 ∗∗ (18.94)

44.56 ∗ (18.85)

35.12 ∗∗ (11.15)

113.16 ∗∗ (32.23)

TIRC

120,258

7.29 × 10−4

93.43 ∗∗ (18.97)

53.35 † (27.29)

56.43 ∗∗ (16.89)

113.01 ∗∗ (32.24)

OLS

120,258

6.87 × 10−4

93.42 ∗∗ (18.97)

71.44 ∗ (32.96)

66.27 ∗∗ (20.24)

112.99 ∗∗ (32.24)

OLS

Notes. † p < .1. ∗ p < .05. ∗∗ p < .01. TIRC denotes Total Investments of Referred Customers. We report robust standard errors in parentheses for linear models
estimated using OLS. All continuous independent variables have been mean-centered.

120,258

7.46 × 10−4

5.39 × 10−4

R2

Observations

93.43 ∗∗ (18.97)

70.16 ∗ (29.08)

36.71

93.32 ∗∗ (18.94)

47.83 ∗ (21.03)

41.36

56.43 ∗∗ (16.89)

127.70 ∗∗ (47.09)

127.71 ∗∗ (47.07)

35.12 ∗∗ (11.15)

OLS

OLS

Intercept

Composite Reward × Value Factor

Composite Reward × Log Investment

Composite Reward × Log Return

Second Reward × Value Factor

Second Reward × Log Investment

Second Reward × Log Return

First Reward × Value Factor

First Reward × Log Investment

First Reward × Log Return

Value Factor

Log Investment Amount (Log Investment)

Log Total Investment Return (Log Return)

Composite Reward

Second Reward

First Reward

Model

Dependent Variable

Table 25: Heterogeneous Effects on Total Investments of Referred Customers (TIRC): The Second Experiment

81

(1.61)
(2.10)

120,258

1.17 × 10−3

5.89 × 10−4
120,258

22.03 ∗∗ (2.31)

8.33 ∗∗ (2.34)

1.65

22.00 ∗∗ (2.31)

6.43 ∗∗ (1.82)

2.63

(2.59)

120,258

9.32 × 10−4

22.02 ∗∗ (2.31)

10.74 ∗∗ (2.93)

3.20

6.02 ∗∗ (1.75)

9.72 ∗∗ (3.65)

7.39 ∗ (3.58)

OLS

120,258

5.50 × 10−4

22.00 ∗∗ (2.31)

4.53 ∗∗ (1.44)

2.32 ∗ (1.09)

8.60 ∗∗ (3.03)

OLS

log(TIRC+100 )

120,258

1.08 × 10−3

22.03 ∗∗ (2.31)

4.98 ∗∗ (1.86)

6.15 ∗∗ (1.40)

8.57 ∗∗ (3.03)

OLS

120,258

8.67 × 10−4

22.02 ∗∗ (2.31)

6.96 ∗∗ (2.32)

6.02 ∗∗ (1.75)

8.58 ∗∗ (3.03)

OLS

Notes. † p < .1. ∗ p < .05. ∗∗ p < .01. TIRC denotes Total Investments of Referred Customers. We report robust standard errors in parentheses for log-linear
models estimated using OLS. All continuous independent variables have been mean-centered. For ease of exposition, the coefficients and standard errors
have been multiplied by 1,000 in log-linear models.

Observations

R2

Intercept

Composite Reward × Value Factor

Composite Reward × Log Investment

Composite Reward × Log Return

Second Reward × Value Factor

Second Reward × Log Investment

Second Reward × Log Return

First Reward × Value Factor

First Reward × Log Investment

First Reward × Log Return

Value Factor

Log Investment Amount (Log Investment)

Log Total Investment Return (Log Return)
6.15 ∗∗ (1.40)

9.70 ∗∗ (3.65)

9.78 ∗∗ (3.65)

Second Reward

2.32 ∗ (1.09)

7.39 ∗ (3.58)

7.40 ∗ (3.58)

First Reward

Composite Reward

OLS

OLS

Model

Dependent Variable

Table 26: Heterogeneous Effects on TIRC Continued: The Second Experiment

82

(1.64)

120,258

1.21 × 10−3

6.24 × 10−4
120,258

2,319.21 ∗∗ (1.77)

6.54 ∗∗ (1.83)

1.32

2,319.19 ∗∗ (1.77)

4.97 ∗∗ (1.42)

2.06 † (1.25)

(2.02)

120,258

9.76 × 10−4

2,319.21 ∗∗ (1.77)

8.37 ∗∗ (2.29)

2.52

4.83 ∗∗ (1.36)

7.69 ∗∗ (2.82)

5.96 ∗ (2.76)

OLS

120,258

5.86 × 10−4

2,319.19 ∗∗ (1.77)

3.51 ∗∗ (1.12)

1.94 ∗ (0.84)

6.87 ∗∗ (2.33)

OLS

log(TIRC+101 )

120,258

1.13 × 10−3

2,319.21 ∗∗ (1.77)

3.92 ∗∗ (1.45)

4.85 ∗∗ (1.09)

6.84 ∗∗ (2.33)

OLS

120,258

9.11 × 10−4

2,319.21 ∗∗ (1.77)

5.44 ∗∗ (1.81)

4.83 ∗∗ (1.36)

6.84 ∗∗ (2.33)

OLS

Notes. † p < .1. ∗ p < .05. ∗∗ p < .01. TIRC denotes Total Investments of Referred Customers. We report robust standard errors in parentheses for log-linear
models estimated using OLS. All continuous independent variables have been mean-centered. For ease of exposition, the coefficients and standard errors
have been multiplied by 1,000 in log-linear models.

Observations

R2

Intercept

Composite Reward × Value Factor

Composite Reward × Log Investment

Composite Reward × Log Return

Second Reward × Value Factor

Second Reward × Log Investment

Second Reward × Log Return

First Reward × Value Factor

First Reward × Log Investment

First Reward × Log Return

Value Factor

Log Investment Amount (Log Investment)

Log Total Investment Return (Log Return)
4.85 ∗∗ (1.09)

7.68 ∗∗ (2.82)

7.74 ∗∗ (2.82)

Second Reward

1.94 ∗ (0.84)

5.96 ∗ (2.76)

5.97 ∗ (2.76)

First Reward

Composite Reward

OLS

OLS

Model

Dependent Variable

Table 27: Heterogeneous Effects on TIRC Continued: The Second Experiment
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(1.19)

120,258

1.27 × 10−3

6.77 × 10−4
120,258

4,616.48 ∗∗ (1.24)

4.75 ∗∗ (1.34)

0.99

4,616.47 ∗∗ (1.24)

3.52 ∗∗ (1.03)

1.49 † (0.89)

(1.47)

120,258

1.04 × 10−3

4,616.47 ∗∗ (1.24)

6.01 ∗∗ (1.67)

1.85

3.63 ∗∗ (0.98)

5.69 ∗∗ (2.00)

4.50 ∗ (1.96)

OLS

2.87 ∗∗ (1.05)

3.54 ∗∗ (0.78)

5.10 ∗∗ (1.65)

OLS

120,258

6.41 × 10−4

120,258

1.19 × 10−3

4,616.47 ∗∗ (1.24) 4, 616.48 ∗∗ (1.24)

2.50 ∗∗ (0.80)

1.54 ∗ (0.60)

5.12 ∗∗ (1.65)

OLS

log(TIRC+102 )

120,258

9.77 × 10−4

4,616.47 ∗∗ (1.24)

3.93 ∗∗ (1.31)

3.63 ∗∗ (0.98)

5.11 ∗∗ (1.65)

OLS

Notes. † p < .1. ∗ p < .05. ∗∗ p < .01. TIRC denotes Total Investments of Referred Customers. We report robust standard errors in parentheses for log-linear
models estimated using OLS. All continuous independent variables have been mean-centered. For ease of exposition, the coefficients and standard errors
have been multiplied by 1,000 in log-linear models.

Observations

R2

Intercept

Composite Reward × Value Factor

Composite Reward × Log Investment

Composite Reward × Log Return

Second Reward × Value Factor

Second Reward × Log Investment

Second Reward × Log Return

First Reward × Value Factor

First Reward × Log Investment

First Reward × Log Return

Value Factor

Log Investment Amount (Log Investment)

Log Total Investment Return (Log Return)
3.54 ∗∗ (0.78)

5.68 ∗∗ (2.00)

5.73 ∗∗ (2.00)

Second Reward

1.54 ∗ (0.60)

4.50 ∗ (1.96)

4.50 ∗ (1.96)

First Reward

Composite Reward

OLS

OLS

Model

Dependent Variable

Table 28: Heterogeneous Effects on TIRC Continued: The Second Experiment
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(0.77)

120,258

1.34 × 10−3

7.49 × 10−4
120,258

6,914.13 ∗∗ (0.75)

3.01 ∗∗ (0.86)

0.67

6,914.12 ∗∗ (0.75)

2.13 ∗∗ (0.66)

0.94 † (0.57)

(0.95)

120,258

1.12 × 10−3

6,914.13 ∗∗ (0.75)

3.73 ∗∗ (1.08)

1.20

2.40 ∗∗ (0.62)

3.75 ∗∗ (1.24)

2.96 ∗ (1.21)

OLS

120,258

7.15 × 10−4

6,914.12 ∗∗ (0.75)

1.54 ∗∗ (0.51)

1.10 ∗∗ (0.37)

3.37 ∗∗ (1.01)

OLS

log(TIRC+103 )

120,258

1.25 × 10−3

6,914.13 ∗∗ (0.75)

1.84 ∗∗ (0.68)

2.25 ∗∗ (0.50)

3.36 ∗∗ (1.01)

OLS

120,258

1.06 × 10−3

6,914.13 ∗∗ (0.75)

2.46 ∗∗ (0.84)

2.40 ∗∗ (0.62)

3.36 ∗∗ (1.01)

OLS

Notes. † p < .1. ∗ p < .05. ∗∗ p < .01. TIRC denotes Total Investments of Referred Customers. We report robust standard errors in parentheses for log-linear
models estimated using OLS. All continuous independent variables have been mean-centered. For ease of exposition, the coefficients and standard errors
have been multiplied by 1,000 in log-linear models.

Observations

R2

Intercept

Composite Reward × Value Factor

Composite Reward × Log Investment

Composite Reward × Log Return

Second Reward × Value Factor

Second Reward × Log Investment

Second Reward × Log Return

First Reward × Value Factor

First Reward × Log Investment

First Reward × Log Return

Value Factor

Log Investment Amount (Log Investment)

Log Total Investment Return (Log Return)
2.25 ∗∗ (0.50)

3.74 ∗∗ (1.24)

3.77 ∗∗ (1.24)

Second Reward

1.10 ∗∗ (0.37)

2.96 ∗ (1.21)

2.96 ∗ (1.21)

First Reward

Composite Reward

OLS

OLS

Model

Dependent Variable

Table 29: Heterogeneous Effects on TIRC Continued: The Second Experiment
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(6.07)

120,258

Observations

(10.93)

(7.78)

120,258

−6,442.97

−632.33 ∗∗ (31.24)

22.98 ∗∗ (8.00)

5.42

18.22 ∗∗ (5.80)

10.64

17.88 † (10.45)

Tobit

10.72 ∗

6.50 †

16.74 †

(4.56)

(3.79)

(9.07)

Tobit

120,258

−6,463.73

−634.88 ∗∗ (31.39)

TIRC

(9.59)

(5.41)

120,258

−6,432.70

−633.64 ∗∗ (31.33)

8.36

19.37 ∗∗ (4.60)

15.78 †

Tobit

(9.30)

(6.91)

120,258

−6,445.74

−632.62 ∗∗ (31.26)

14.12 ∗

18.22 ∗∗ (5.80)

15.12

Tobit

Notes. † p < .1. ∗ p < .05. ∗∗ p < .01. TIRC denotes Total Investments of Referred Customers. We report (default) standard errors in parentheses for tobit models.
All continuous independent variables have been mean-centered. For ease of exposition, the coefficients and standard errors have been divided by 1,000 in tobit
models.

120,258

−6,428.96

Intercept
−6,462.12

16.57 ∗∗ (6.30)

0.53

19.35 ∗∗ (4.60)

Log-Likelihood

(5.27)

(5.16)

(3.79)

−632.95 ∗∗ (31.29)

15.09 ∗∗

6.34

6.50 †

−634.94 ∗∗ (31.39)

Composite Reward × Value Factor

Composite Reward × Log Investment

Composite Reward × Log Return

Second Reward × Value Factor

Second Reward × Log Investment

Second Reward × Log Return

First Reward × Value Factor

First Reward × Log Investment

First Reward × Log Return

Value Factor

Log Investment Amount (Log Investment)

Log Total Investment Return (Log Return)

Composite Reward

(11.35)

15.10

Second Reward

9.11

19.96 † (10.68)

17.45 † (10.26)

First Reward
(10.51)

Tobit

Tobit

Model

Dependent Variable

Table 30: Heterogeneous Effects on TIRC Continued: The Second Experiment
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(0.0003)

120,258

1.49 × 10−3

4.72 × 10−4
120,258

0.0060∗∗ (0.0004)

0.0012∗∗ (0.0003)

0.0002

0.0060∗∗ (0.0004)

0.0009∗∗ (0.0003)

0.0005† (0.0002)

0.0012∗∗ (0.0002)

(0.0004)

120,258

9.91 × 10−4

0.0060∗∗ (0.0004)

0.0015∗∗ (0.0004)

0.0005

0.0011∗∗ (0.0003)

120,258

4.39 × 10−4

0.0060∗∗ (0.0004)

0.0007∗∗ (0.0002)

(0.0002)

(0.0005)

120,258

1.41 × 10−3

0.0060∗∗ (0.0004)

0.0007∗∗ (0.0003)

0.0012∗∗ (0.0002)

0.0008

OLS

(0.0005)

120,258

9.34 × 10−4

0.0060∗∗ (0.0004)

0.0010∗∗ (0.0003)

0.0011∗∗ (0.0003)

0.0008

OLS

Notes. † p < .1. ∗ p < .05. ∗∗ p < .01. We report robust standard errors in parentheses for linear probability models estimated using OLS. All continuous
independent variables have been mean-centered.

Observations

R2

Intercept

Composite Reward × Value Factor

Composite Reward × Log Investment

Composite Reward × Log Return

Second Reward × Value Factor

Second Reward × Log Investment

Second Reward × Log Return

First Reward × Value Factor

First Reward × Log Investment

First Reward × Log Return

Value Factor

Log Investment Amount (Log Investment)

0.0003

(0.0005)

OLS

Log Total Investment Return (Log Return)

(0.0002)

(0.0006)

0.0011† (0.0006)

0.0005

OLS

0.0008
0.0003

(0.0006)

0.0011† (0.0006)

0.0005

OLS

Has Acquired Referred Customers

Composite Reward

0.0011† (0.0006)

Second Reward

(0.0006)

0.0005

OLS

First Reward

Model

Dependent Variable

Table 31: Heterogeneous Effects on Incidence of Having Acquired Referred Customers: The Second Experiment
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< .05.

∗∗ p

(0.0243)

0.0770∗∗ (0.0244)

0.0279

0.0647∗∗ (0.0174)

(0.0329)

0.0384∗∗ (0.0138)

(0.0113)

(0.0277)

(0.0291)

0.0329∗ (0.0167)

0.0768∗∗ (0.0137)

0.0210

(0.0283)

0.0530∗ (0.0211)

0.0647∗∗ (0.0174)

0.0220

Probit

120,258

−4,646.59

120,258

−4,677.54

120,258

−4,710.56

120,258

−4,650.09

120,258

−4,680.05

< .01. We report (default) standard errors in parentheses for probit models. All continuous independent variables have been

120,258

Observations

∗p

−4,709.01

Notes. † p < .1.
mean-centered.

(0.0191)

0.0564∗∗ (0.0193)

0.0089

0.0768∗∗ (0.0137)

0.0249

(0.0326)

Probit

−2.5126∗∗ (0.0227) −2.5324∗∗ (0.0238) −2.5202∗∗ (0.0231) −2.5126∗∗ (0.0227) −2.5324∗∗ (0.0238) −2.5202∗∗ (0.0231)

0.0495∗∗ (0.0159)

0.0268† (0.0159)

Log-Likelihood

Intercept

Composite Reward × Value Factor

Composite Reward × Log Investment

Composite Reward × Log Return

Second Reward × Value Factor

Second Reward × Log Investment

Second Reward × Log Return

First Reward × Value Factor

First Reward × Log Investment

First Reward × Log Return

Value Factor

Log Investment Amount (Log Investment)

(0.0113)

(0.0341)

0.0165

0.0164

0.0164

0.0173

(0.0333)

Probit

Log Total Investment Return (Log Return)

(0.0319)

0.0208

Probit

0.0296

0.0393

Second Reward

(0.0320)

Probit

Has Acquired Referred Customers

Composite Reward

0.0183

Probit

First Reward

Model

Dependent Variable

Table 32: Heterogeneous Effects on Incidence of Having Acquired Referred Customers Continued: The Second Experiment
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0.0016∗

0.0009
(0.0007)

(0.0007)

(0.0004)

120,258

1.43 × 10−3

4.60 × 10−4
120,258

0.0066∗∗ (0.0004)

0.0016∗∗ (0.0004)

0.0005

0.0013∗∗ (0.0002)

0.0066∗∗ (0.0004)

0.0013∗∗ (0.0003)

0.0006∗ (0.0003)

(0.0002)

120,258

9.51 × 10−4

0.0066∗∗ (0.0004)

0.0021∗∗ (0.0005)

0.0008† (0.0004)

0.0011∗∗ (0.0003)

120,258

4.21 × 10−4

0.0066∗∗ (0.0004)

0.0009∗∗ (0.0003)

(0.0002)

120,258

1.36 × 10−3

0.0066∗∗ (0.0004)

0.0010∗∗ (0.0003)

0.0013∗∗ (0.0002)

0.0012∗ (0.0006)

OLS

120,258

8.91 × 10−4

0.0066∗∗ (0.0004)

0.0014∗∗ (0.0004)

0.0011∗∗ (0.0003)

0.0013∗ (0.0006)

OLS

Notes. † p < .1. ∗ p < .05. ∗∗ p < .01. We report robust standard errors in parentheses for linear models estimated using OLS. All continuous independent variables
have been mean-centered.

Observations

R2

Intercept

Composite Reward × Value Factor

Composite Reward × Log Investment

Composite Reward × Log Return

Second Reward × Value Factor

Second Reward × Log Investment

Second Reward × Log Return

First Reward × Value Factor

First Reward × Log Investment

First Reward × Log Return

Value Factor

Log Investment Amount (Log Investment)

0.0002

0.0002

(0.0007)

(0.0007)

OLS

Log Total Investment Return (Log Return)

Second Reward

0.0016∗

0.0009

OLS

0.0013∗ (0.0006)

(0.0007)

0.0016∗

OLS

Number of Referred Customers

Composite Reward

(0.0007)

0.0009

OLS

First Reward

Model

Dependent Variable

Table 33: Heterogeneous Effects on Number of Referred Customers: The Second Experiment
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< .05.

∗∗ p

(0.0722)

0.2442∗∗ (0.0727)

0.0990

0.1716∗∗ (0.0519)

(0.0982)

0.1236∗∗ (0.0413)

(0.0340)

(0.0829)

(0.0870)

0.1111∗ (0.0496)

0.2149∗∗ (0.0409)

0.0902

(0.0845)

0.1744∗∗ (0.0631)

0.1716∗∗ (0.0520)

0.0985

NB2

120,258

−4,969.43

120,258

−5,000.59

120,258

−5,032.62

120,258

−4,972.38

120,258

−5,002.86

< .01. We report (default) standard errors in parentheses for NB2 models. All continuous independent variables have been

120,258

Observations

∗p

−5,031.00

Notes. † p < .1.
mean-centered.

(0.0566)

0.1766∗∗ (0.0574)

0.0431

0.2149∗∗ (0.0409)

0.0954

(0.0967)

NB2

−5.0284∗∗ (0.0684) −5.0902∗∗ (0.0712) −5.0507∗∗ (0.0692) −5.0284∗∗ (0.0684) −5.0902∗∗ (0.0712) −5.0507∗∗ (0.0693)

0.1593∗∗ (0.0475)

0.0842† (0.0474)

Log-Likelihood

Intercept

Composite Reward × Value Factor

Composite Reward × Log Investment

Composite Reward × Log Return

Second Reward × Value Factor

Second Reward × Log Investment

Second Reward × Log Return

First Reward × Value Factor

First Reward × Log Investment

First Reward × Log Return

Value Factor

Log Investment Amount (Log Investment)

(0.0339)

(0.1018)

0.0931

0.0346

0.0346

0.0679

(0.0990)

NB2

Log Total Investment Return (Log Return)

(0.0952)

0.1008

NB2

0.1296

0.1480

Second Reward

(0.0951)

NB2

Number of Referred Customers

Composite Reward

0.1051

NB2

First Reward

Model

Dependent Variable

Table 34: Heterogeneous Effects on Number of Referred Customers Continued: The Second Experiment

CHAPTER 3 : A Low-Dimension Learning Approach to Modeling Consumer
Heterogeneity in Choice-Based Conjoint Estimation
3.1. Introduction
Conjoint analysis, and choice-based conjoint (CBC) in particular, has been widely used by
both researchers and practitioners to assess how consumers with heterogeneous preferences
value different product or service attributes (Wittink and Cattin, 1989; Green and Srinivasan, 1990; Huber, 2004). The understanding of consumers’ heterogeneous preferences
plays a central role in a variety of marketing decisions, such as pricing, targeted promotions, differentiated product offerings, and market segmentation (Allenby and Rossi, 1998).
In most conjoint applications, researchers are faced with the challenge that short questionnaires are adopted due to concerns over response rates and response quality, and, as a
result, the amount of information elicited from each consumer is limited (Lenk et al., 1996).
Given the scarcity of information from each consumer, adequate modeling of consumer
heterogeneity becomes critical for conjoint estimation.
Modeling consumer heterogeneity entails pooling information across consumers; for each
consumer, her information is used to help estimating other consumers’ partworths while
other consumers’ information also contributes to the estimation of her own partworths.
Hence, identifying effective information pooling mechanisms is the key for accurate estimation of the individual-level partworths. In the marketing literature, researchers have
primarily investigated three distinct information pooling mechanisms, each of which has
been implemented by multiple models for recovering consumer heterogeneity. First, in the
hierarchical Bayes (HB) model with a normal population distribution (Lenk et al., 1996;
Rossi et al., 1996) and the convex optimization model of Evgeniou et al. (2007), information sharing is induced by shrinking the individual-level partworths toward the population
mean. Second, the HB normal component mixture model (Allenby et al., 1998) and the
sparse learning model of Chen et al. (2017) pool information across consumers by recover-
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ing segments in the population and shrinking the individual-level partworths toward their
respective segment means. Finally, the finite mixture model (Kamakura and Russell, 1989)
and the HB model with a Dirichlet process prior (Ansari and Mela, 2003; Kim et al., 2004)
approximate the individual-level partworths using discrete points. As these models have all
demonstrated strong empirical performance in modeling consumer heterogeneity, the effectiveness of their underlying information pooling mechanisms in addressing the challenge of
limited individual-level information is evident.
In this essay, we propose an innovative low-dimension learning model for recovering consumers’ heterogeneous partworths in CBC, built upon an information pooling mechanism
that is distinct from but also compatible with the three well-established mechanisms in the
marketing literature. We assume that most variations in consumers’ heterogeneous partworths, viewed as vectors in an Euclidean space, are along a small number of orthogonal
directions; consequently, consumers’ partworth vectors all reside near some low-dimensional
affine subspace of the Euclidean space (James et al., 2017).36 This assumption is likely to
hold when consumers have more substantial preference variations over a small number of
attributes compared to the other attributes. Since there is a good low-dimensional affine
subspace approximation for consumers’ heterogeneous partworths, a natural mechanism for
pooling information across consumers is to shrink the individual-level partworths toward
this low-dimensional affine subspace, which is also inferred from the data. Our model implements such a low-dimension information pooling mechanism using a convex optimization
framework in which both the distance between each partworth vector and the affine subspace
as well as the dimension of the affine subspace are penalized.
We note that our low-dimension information pooling mechanism may lead to effective information sharing across consumers that cannot be induced by the three information pooling mechanisms in the literature, and vice versa. Therefore, coupling the low-dimension
mechanism with any of the extant information pooling mechanisms could potentially give
36

Examples of affine subspace of an Euclidean space include lines and planes that do not necessarily
contain the origin of the space. We will provide a formal definition of affine subspace in Section 3.2.
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rise to more effective information sharing across consumers than any single mechanism.
In other words, we view our low-dimension mechanism and the extant information pooling mechanisms as complements rather than substitutes in addressing the challenge posed
by the scarcity of information from each consumer. To illustrate this perspective, in our
low-dimension learning model, we choose to also shrink the individual-level partworths toward the population mean besides shrinking them toward a low-dimensional affine subspace
by incorporating the convex regularization of Evgeniou et al. (2007), which is straightforward within our convex optimization framework. Similar to extant machine learning-based
models for recovering consumer heterogeneity (Evgeniou et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2017),
we determine the amount of each type of shrinkage using cross-validation (Vapnik, 1998;
Hastie et al., 2016).
We compare our low-dimension learning model and a restricted version of the model in
which only the low-dimension information pooling mechanism is implemented to multiple
benchmark models using simulation experiments and two field data sets. In simulations, the
low-dimension learning model and its restricted version overall outperform the benchmark
models both in terms of parameter recovery and predictive accuracy. In particular, both
demonstrate strong performance irrespective of whether their underlying assumption - the
true individual-level partworths have a good low-dimensional affine subspace approximation
- seems to hold or not. In the two field data sets, these two models also emerge as the overall
best performing models. We also find that, across simulations and field data sets, the performance of the low-dimension learning model is very close to that of its restricted version,
suggesting that the incremental value of shrinking the individual-level partworths toward
the population mean can be very limited when we are already shrinking the individual-level
partworths toward a low-dimensional affine subspace.
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we describe the setup of
CBC and develop our low-dimension learning model for recovering consumers’ heterogeneous
partworths in CBC. We compare our low-dimension learning model and the benchmark
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models using simulation experiments in Section 3.3 and two field conjoint data sets in
Section 3.4. We conclude in Section 3.5.

3.2. The Low-Dimension Learning Model
3.2.1. Conjoint Setup
We consider a choice-based conjoint (CBC) experiment consisting of I respondents. In
the CBC experiment, respondent i makes choice decisions over J choice sets, each of which
includes H conjoint profiles with p attributes.37 We use the row vector xijh ∈ Rp to represent
the h-th profile in the j-th choice set of respondent i, and use the column vector βi ∈ Rp
to represent the partworth vector of respondent i. We assume that respondent i chooses

H
her most preferred profile xijh∗ from her j-th choice set xijh h=1 using a standard logit
model with an additive specification of the utility function. Specifically, we assume that

Uijh = xijh βi + ijh , where ijh i,j,h are independently and identically distributed type
H
I extreme value random variables, and xijh∗ is chosen such that Uijh∗ = max Uijh h=1
(Train, 2009).
3.2.2. Model Development
Given data from the CBC experiment, a natural starting point for conjoint estimation is
to separately estimate each respondent’s partworths using the logit maximum likelihood
estimator (MLE). The logit MLE of respondent i’s partworths is obtained by solving the
following optimization problem:

min −

J
X

exijh∗ βi
,
log PH
xijh βi
h=1 e
j=1

s.t. βi ∈ Rp .
37

For ease of exposition, we assume that all respondents need to answer the same number of choice
questions and that all choice sets contain the same number of conjoint profiles. Our model, however, can be
straightforwardly extended to accommodate varying numbers of choice sets across respondents and varying
numbers of conjoint profiles across choice sets.
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Equivalently, we can obtain the logit MLE of all respondents’ partworths by solving the
following joint optimization problem:

min −

I X
J
X
i=1

exijh∗ βi
,
log PH
xijh βi
h=1 e
j=1

(3.1)

s.t. βi ∈ Rp , for i = 1, 2, . . . , I.
In most conjoint studies, short questionnaires are adopted due to concerns over response
rates and response quality and the amount of information elicited from each respondent
is limited (Lenk et al., 1996). The scarcity of individual-level information poses a serious
challenge to the separate estimation of each respondent’s logit model: When the number of
choice sets J is small, the individual-level logit models become excessively flexible relative
to the amount of data available to estimate these models; consequently, the logit MLE tends
to overfit and yield poor estimates of respondents’ partworths, and can be unidentified for
many respondents (Rossi and Allenby, 1993; Allenby and Rossi, 1998; James et al., 2017).
In machine learning, a well-established approach to controlling the flexibility of a model
and improving its predictive accuracy and interpretability is to regularize the estimation
of the model (Hoerl and Kennard, 1970; Tibshirani, 1996; Zou and Hastie, 2005; Hastie
et al., 2016). In the regularization approach, instead of simply minimizing an empirical loss
function derived from the model that measures the fit between the model parameters and the
data (e.g., the minus log-likelihood function in Problem (3.1)), the researcher minimizes the
sum of the empirical loss function and a regularization function. The regularization function
is specified to reflect the researcher’s prior belief regarding which model parameters are more
appropriate for his research objectives, such as prediction and variable selection, and those
deemed as more appropriate are assigned lower values. Including the regularization function
in the optimization problem thus effectively limits the set of possible parameter estimates
and makes model parameters that are regarded as “better” based on the researcher’s prior
knowledge more likely to be chosen by the estimation procedure. Classical examples of the
regularization approach include ridge regression (Hoerl and Kennard, 1970) and the lasso
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(Tibshirani, 1996).
In the following, we develop our low-dimension learning model as an approach to regularizing
the estimation of the individual-level logit models. To motivate, let us imagine for now that
 I
we can actually observe the set of true partworths β̂i i=1 . We further assume that we
 I
have conducted a principal component analysis on β̂i i=1 and have found that the first few
principal components collectively account for most variance in the true partworths, which
is likely to be the case if respondents have more substantial preference variations over a
small number of attributes than over the other attributes. Under this assumption, we can
construct an affine subspace, obtained by appropriately shifting the linear subspace spanned
 I
by these principal components, that is close to β̂i i=1 (James et al., 2017); in other words,
 I
there exists a good low-dimensional affine subspace approximation for β̂i i=1 .38 This
observation suggests that, when estimating the individual-level logit models, we can consider
 I
regularizing the estimated partworths βi i=1 so that they reside in a low-dimensional affine
subspace. Such a regularization is likely to induce some bias, but the cost of the bias could
be well outweighed by the benefit of the reduction in the variance for the estimation, and as
a result the regularization could lead to a better bias-variance trade-off and more accurate
estimates (Hastie et al., 2016).
To operationalize this low-dimensional affine subspace regularization, we propose the following optimization problem:

min −

I X
J
X
i=1


exijh∗ βi
+ λ · Φ βi
log PH
xijh βi
h=1 e
j=1

I 
,
i=1

(3.2)

s.t. βi ∈ Rp , for i = 1, 2, . . . , I.
In Problem (3.2), the regularization function Φ



βi

I 
i=1

is defined as the minimum of

the dimension of any affine subspace of Rp that contains all βi ’s, and its inclusion in the
 I
objective function serves to encourage the partworths βi i=1 to reside in a low-dimensional
38
A subset W of Rp is an affine subspace of Rp if there exist a vector ρ ∈ Rp and a linear subspace V of
Rp such that W = ρ + v v ∈ V . Intuitively, W is obtained by shifting V by ρ.
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affine subspace. Moreover, the regularization parameter λ ≥ 0 controls the relative strength
of the two components of the objective function and hence the trade-off between fit and
regularization. To make Problem (3.2) more mathematically tractable, we reformulate the
 I 
regularization function Φ βi i=1 through the following equations:
Φ



βi

I 
i=1

= min Dim(W ),
s.t. W is an affine subspace of Rp ; βi ∈ W, for i = 1, 2, . . . , I.
= min Dim(V ),
s.t. V is a linear subspace of Rp , ρ ∈ Rp ; βi − ρ ∈ V, for i = 1, 2, . . . , I.

= min Dim Span(β1 − ρ, β2 − ρ, . . . , βI − ρ) ,
s.t. ρ ∈ Rp .


= min Rank β1 − ρ, β2 − ρ, . . . , βI − ρ ,
s.t. ρ ∈ Rp .

We briefly discuss the rationale behind each of these four equations. For simplicity, we refer
to the optimization problem to the right of the q-th equals sign as the q-th optimization
problem. The first equation simply reflects the mathematical definition of the regularization
 I 
function Φ βi i=1 . As to the second equation, we note that W is an affine subspace of
Rp if and only if there exist a vector ρ ∈ Rp and a linear subspace V of Rp such that

W = ρ + V , ρ + v v ∈ V . It is straightforward to verify that, for any feasible W in the
first optimization problem, any (ρ, V )-pair satisfying W = ρ + V is feasible in the second
optimization problem, and Dim(V ) = Dim(W ); on the other hand, for any feasible (ρ, V )pair in the second optimization problem, W , ρ + V is feasible in the first optimization
problem, and Dim(W ) = Dim(V ). As a result, the optimal values of the first and second
optimization problems are equal and hence the second equation holds. Given that the second
optimization problem has two decision variables, ρ and V , a simple approach to solving this
problem is to first find the optimal V for any given ρ and then plug in the optimal V as a
function of ρ and optimize over ρ. It is clear that, any linear subspace V of Rp containing

I
βi − ρ for all i also contains the linear subspace spanned by βi − ρ i=1 , which we denote
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as Span(β1 − ρ, β2 − ρ, . . . , βI − ρ), and therefore for any given ρ the associated optimal
V ∗ (ρ) is Span(β1 − ρ, β2 − ρ, . . . , βI − ρ).39 The third optimization problem is obtained
once we plug V ∗ (ρ) in the second optimization problem. Finally, a basic result in linear
algebra indicates that the dimension of the linear subspace spanned by a set of vectors in
Rp is equal to the rank of the matrix whose columns are composed of these vectors, which
immediately leads to the fourth equation.
Replacing Φ



I 
i=1

βi

with the fourth optimization problem in Problem (3.2), we arrive at

the following equivalent optimization problem:

min −

I X
J
X
i=1



exijh∗ βi
+ λ · Rank β1 − ρ, β2 − ρ, . . . , βI − ρ ,
log PH
xijh βi
h=1 e
j=1

(3.3)

s.t. βi ∈ Rp , for i = 1, 2, . . . , I; ρ ∈ Rp .
In the rest of this section, we make three modifications to Problem (3.3) to enhance its modeling flexibility and computational tractability. First, while we assume that there exists a
 I
good low-dimensional affine subspace approximation for the true partworths β̂i i=1 , it is
 I
unlikely that β̂i i=1 will actually reside in a low-dimensional affine subspace. Therefore,
compared to the “hard” regularization in Problem (3.3) that encourages the partworths
 I
βi i=1 to reside in a low-dimensional affine subspace, a “soft” regularization only encour I
aging βi i=1 to be close to a low-dimensional affine subspace is likely to better capture the
preferences of respondents. To implement such a “soft” regularization, we first reformulate
Problem (3.3) in the following equivalent form:

min −

I X
J
X
i=1 j=1

exijh∗ βi

log PH

h=1

exijh βi



+ λ · Rank θ1 , θ2 , . . . , θI



+∞·

I
X

βi − ρ − θi

2
,
2

i=1

s.t. βi , θi ∈ Rp , for i = 1, 2, . . . , I; ρ ∈ Rp .
(3.4)
Here a

2
2

,

p
X

a2t for a = (a1 , a2 , . . . , ap ) ∈ Rp , and θi ’s are decision variables. The equiv-

t=1
39

Formally, Span(β1 − ρ, β2 − ρ, . . . , βI − ρ) ,

I
X

ki (βi − ρ)|ki ∈ R, for i = 1, 2, . . . , I .

i=1
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alence between Problems (3.3) and (3.4) can be seen by noting that the third component
I
X
2
of the objective function of Problem (3.4), ∞ ·
βi − ρ − θi 2 , enforces θi = βi − ρ for
i=1

all i in the optimal solution. To switch to the “soft” regularization, we replace ∞ by a
finite regularization parameter τ ≥ 0 in Problem (3.4), leading to the following modified
optimization problem:

min −

I
X


exijh∗ βi
+ λ · Rank θ1 , θ2 , . . . , θI + τ ·
βi − ρ − θi
log PH
xijh βi
h=1 e
i=1
j=1

I X
J
X
i=1

2
,
2

s.t. βi , θi ∈ Rp , for i = 1, 2, . . . , I; ρ ∈ Rp .
(3.5)
In Problem (3.5), while the second component of the objective function (i.e., the rank
 I

function) encourages θi i=1 to reside in a low-dimensional linear subspace and hence ρ +
θi

I
i=1

to reside in a low-dimensional affine subspace, the third component of the objective
 I
function, by penalizing the discrepancy between βi and ρ+θi , encourages βi i=1 to be close

I
to the low-dimensional affine subspace containing ρ + θi i=1 but without being enforced
to reside in a low-dimensional affine subspace. As a result, Problem (3.5) implements the
“soft” regularization discussed above.
Second, we note that Problem (3.5) is computationally intractable since the rank function
is neither continuous nor convex. In the optimization and machine learning literatures, an
effective approach to dealing with the computational challenge posed by the rank function
that has seen many successful applications is to approximate the rank of a matrix using its
nuclear norm (Cai et al., 2010; Pong et al., 2010; Candès et al., 2011; Ma et al., 2011). The
nuclear norm of a matrix A, which we denote as A

∗

, is defined as the sum of its singular

values, and a key property of the nuclear norm is that it is the tightest convex approximation
of the rank function (Fazel, 2002). We adopt such a convex relaxation approach and replace
the rank function by the nuclear norm in Problem (3.5), which gives rise to the following

98

modified optimization problem:40

min −

I X
J
X
i=1



exijh∗ βi
+ λ · θ1 , θ2 , · · · , θI
log PH
xijh βi
h=1 e
j=1

+τ ·
∗

I
X
i=1

β i − ρ − θi

2
,
2

(3.6)

s.t. βi , θi ∈ Rp , for i = 1, 2, . . . , I; ρ ∈ Rp .

Effectively, our proposed low-dimension regularization pools information across respondents by shrinking the individual-level partworths toward a low-dimensional affine subspace. Such an information pooling mechanism is distinct from but also compatible with
several well-established information pooling mechanisms in the marketing literature, including (1) shrinking the individual-level partworths toward the population mean (Lenk et al.,
1996; Rossi et al., 1996; Evgeniou et al., 2007), (2) recovering segments and shrinking the
individual-level partworths toward their respective segment means (Allenby et al., 1998;
Chen et al., 2017), and (3) approximating the individual-level partworths using discrete
points (Kamakura and Russell, 1989; Ansari and Mela, 2003; Kim et al., 2004). Since these
mechanisms could lead to effective information sharing across respondents that cannot be
induced by the low-dimension regularization, we could potentially enhance the estimation
accuracy of our model by complementing the low-dimension regularization with any of
these information pooling mechanisms. In this essay, we choose to shrink the individuallevel partworths toward the population mean by incorporating the convex regularization
of Evgeniou et al. (2007) in our approach, which gives rise to the low-dimension learning
40

One may attempt
Problem (3.5) by enumerating all possible values of the rank function.
 tto tsolve
I
t
That is,
 one finds {βi , θi }i=1 , ρ that minimizes the objective function subject to the constraint that
Rank θ1 , θ2 , . . . , θI
= t for t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , min(p, I), and then compares the objective values among
 t t I
{βi , θi }i=1 , ρt ’s and identifies the one
objective value. The problem of this solution
 with the lowest

approach is that the constraint Rank θ1 , θ2 , . . . , θI
= t is non-convex, i.e., the feasible set it implies
is non-convex, in which case a local optimal solution is not guaranteed to be a global optimal solution;
consequently, the optimization problem becomes computationally intractable.
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(LDL) optimization problem:41

min −

I X
J
X
i=1 j=1

+γ·

exijh∗ βi

log PH

I
X

h=1

exijh βi

+λ·



θ1 , θ2 , · · · , θI


∗

+τ ·

I
X

β i − ρ − θi

2
2

i=1

(βi − β0 )> D−1 (βi − β0 ),

(3.7)

i=1

s.t. βi , θi ∈ Rp , for i = 1, 2, . . . , I; ρ, β0 ∈ Rp ;
D ∈ Rp×p is a positive semidefinite matrix scaled to have trace 1.

The last component of the objective function, γ ·

I
X

(βi − β0 )> D−1 (βi − β0 ), is the convex

i=1

regularization function of Evgeniou et al. (2007). Using the first order condition, it can be
I
1X
shown that in the optimal solution of the LDL optimization problem we have β0 =
βi ,
I
i=1
and hence the last component indeed shrinks the individual-level partworths toward the
population mean (Evgeniou et al., 2007).42 We note that in the LDL optimization prob I
 I
lem, the decision variables include βi i=1 , β0 , D, ρ, and θi i=1 , and the regularization
parameters include λ > 0, τ > 0, and γ > 0.
3.2.3. The Full Model and the Solution Strategy
Using the LDL optimization problem to estimate the individual-level partworths involves
two tasks: (1) selecting the regularization parameters and (2) solving for the optimal solution of the LDL optimization problem given the regularization parameters. In this section,
we discuss our solution strategy for each task and present our full low-dimension learning
(LDL) model. Since our solution strategy for selecting the regularization parameters relies
on solving the LDL optimization problem, we first discuss the solution algorithm for the
LDL optimization problem and then the selection of the regularization parameters.
41

Our choice of incorporating the convex regularization of Evgeniou et al. (2007) in our model is motivated
by its strong empirical performance in modeling consumer heterogeneity and the fact that its incorporation
in our model is straightforward, only requiring the addition of a new component in the objective function
and a new constraint.
42
Readers are referred to Evgeniou et al. (2007) for more details on the convex regularization function
and the associated constraint on the matrix D.
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Solving the Low-Dimension Learning Optimization Problem
Given the regularization parameters λ > 0, τ > 0, and γ > 0, the LDL optimization
problem is a convex optimization problem. A fundamental property of convex optimization
problems is that any locally optimal solution is also a globally optimal solution, implying
that convex optimization problems are tractable in theory (Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004).
To solve for the optimal solution of the LDL optimization problem, we exploit its special
structure and propose a block coordinate descent (BCD) algorithm (Tseng, 2001; Hong
et al., 2017). In the BCD algorithm, we partition the decision variables into several blocks,
and minimize the objective function with respect to the first block of decision variables
while holding the other blocks fixed, and then minimize the objective function with respect
to the second block of decision variables while holding the other blocks fixed, and so on;
once we have minimized the objective function with respect to the last block of decision
variables, we move to the first block and iterate the process. We formally state the BCD
algorithm in Table 35, where we refer to the objective function of the LDL optimization

 I 
I
problem as L βi i=1 , β0 , D, ρ, θi i=1 for ease of exposition.
Insert Table 35 here.
From Table 35, we note that the implementation of the BCD algorithm entails solving five
subproblems, each corresponding to one block of decision variables. We discuss the solution
algorithm for each subproblem below.

Solving βi

I
-Subproblem.
i=1


The βi

I
-subproblem
i=1

is separable in βi ’s, i.e., solving

this subproblem is equivalent to separately solving the following optimization problem for
each i:

minp −

βi ∈R

J
X

exijh∗ βi
log PH
+ τ · βi − ρl − θil
x
β
i
ijh
h=1 e
j=1

2
2

+ γ · (βi − β0l )> (Dl )−1 (βi − β0l ).
(3.8)
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Since Problem (3.8) is both convex and smooth, we solve it using Newton’s method (Boyd
and Vandenberghe, 2004).
Solving β0 -Subproblem. The β0 -subproblem is equivalent to the following optimization
problem:
minp

β0 ∈R

I
X

(β0 − βil+1 )> (Dl )−1 (β0 − βil+1 ).

(3.9)

i=1

Problem (3.9) is both convex and quadratic, and hence can be solved by simply taking the
I
1 X l+1
l+1
βi .
first-order condition, which yields the optimal solution β0 =
I
i=1

Solving D-Subproblem.

The D-subproblem is equivalent to the following optimization

problem:

min

I
X

(βil+1 − β0l+1 )> D−1 (βil+1 − β0l+1 ),

(3.10)

i=1

s.t. D ∈ Rp×p is a positive semidefinite matrix scaled to have trace 1.

Problem (3.10) admits a closed-form solution, Dl+1 =

I
1
1 X l+1
(βi − β0l+1 )(βil+1 − β0l+1 )> 2 ,
2v
i=1

where v is selected so that Dl+1 has trace 1 (Evgeniou et al., 2007).
Solving ρ-Subproblem.

The ρ-subproblem is equivalent to the following optimization

problem:
minp

ρ∈R

I
X

ρ − βil+1 + θil

2
.
2

(3.11)

i=1

Similar to Problem (3.9), Problem (3.11) is also both convex and quadratic. Taking the
I
1 X l+1
(βi − θil ).
first-order condition, we obtain the optimal solution ρl+1 =
I
i=1
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Solving



θi

I
-Subproblem.
i=1

The



θi

I
-subproblem
i=1

is equivalent to the following

optimization problem:

min

θi ∈Rp , for i=1,2,...,I

λ·



θ1 , θ2 , · · · , θI

+τ ·
∗

I
X

θi − βil+1 + ρl+1

2
.
2

(3.12)

i=1

Problem (3.12) admits a closed-form solution. To construct the optimal solution, we define


the matrix B l+1 , β1l+1 − ρl+1 , β2l+1 − ρl+1 , . . . , βIl+1 − ρl+1 , and conduct a singular value
decomposition (SVD) on B l+1 . Let the SVD be B l+1 = UB · diag(σ) · VB> , where diag(σ)
is a diagonal matrix of which the diagonal vector σ consists of the singular values of B l+1 .


The optimal solution of Problem (3.12), Θl+1 , θ1l+1 , θ2l+1 , . . . , θIl+1 = UB · diag max(σ −
 >
λ
2τ , 0) · VB , where the max operator works element-wise (Cai et al., 2010; Ma et al., 2011).
The Stopping Criterion.

We terminate the BCD algorithm when the gap between the

objective values of two consecutive iterations is small. Specifically, we end the algorithm
after the L-th iteration, where L is the smallest number satisfying the following condition:

L


βiL


I
I
, β L , DL , ρL , θiL i=1
i=1 0



−L



βiL+1


I
I
, β L+1 , DL+1 , ρL+1 , θiL+1 i=1
i=1 0



< η.

In the empirical applications, we set η = 0.01.43
Selecting the Regularization Parameters
Similar to extant machine learning-based models for recovering consumer heterogeneity
(Evgeniou et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2017), we select the regularization parameters (λ, τ, γ)
using cross-validation (Vapnik, 1998; Hastie et al., 2016). To this end, we specify a grid
Λ ⊂ R3 from which the triplet (λ, τ, γ) is chosen. For each (λ, τ, γ) ∈ Λ, we evaluate its
cross-validation error, CV E(λ, τ, γ), which is defined as follows:44
43

While the choice of η = 0.01 works well in our empirical applications, we can also consider treating η as
an additional regularization parameter and selecting η endogenously using cross-validation.
44
Our operationalization of the cross-validation error follows that adopted in Evgeniou et al. (2007) and
Chen et al. (2017). Other operationalizations, which differ in how the data are divided into “calibration”
and “holdout” sets, can also be used.
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(1) Set CV E(λ, τ, γ) = 0.
(2) For j = 1 to J:
(a) Divide the conjoint data into two disjoint subsets - a “calibration” set Calibj and
a “holdout” set Holdj . Calibj contains all conjoint data except the j-th choice set
of each respondent, and Holdj contains only the j-th choice set of each respondent.
(b) Obtain the individual-level partworth estimates

 (−j)
βi

I
i=1

by solving the LDL

optimization problem on the “calibration” set Calibj given the regularization parameters (λ, τ, γ).
(−j)

(c) For each respondent i, compute the logistic error of βi

on her j-th choice set (i.e.,
(−j)

her only choice set in the “holdout” set Holdj ), − log P
the sum of the logistic errors over all I respondents.

exijh∗ βi

(−j)
H
xijh βi
h=1 e

. Let ∆(j) be

(d) Set CV E(λ, τ, γ) = CV E(λ, τ, γ) + ∆(j).
For the individual-level partworth estimates obtained by solving the LDL optimization
problem on the full data set given the regularization parameters (λ, τ, γ), the cross-validation
error CV E(λ, τ, γ) provides an effective estimate of their out-of-sample predictive accuracy
using only in-sample data, i.e., the data available to the researcher for model calibration.
Therefore, we select (λ∗ , τ ∗ , γ ∗ ) as the minimizer of CV E(λ, τ, γ) over the grid Λ, which
is expected to lead to the individual-level partworth estimates with the optimal predictive
accuracy on out-of-sample data.
The Low-Dimension Learning Model: A Summary
By solving the LDL optimization problem using the BCD algorithm and selecting the regularization parameters using cross-validation, our LDL model obtains the individual-level
partworth estimates via the following two-step approach:
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Step 1. Select the optimal regularization parameters (λ∗ , τ ∗ , γ ∗ ) = argmin CV E(λ, τ, γ).
(λ,τ,γ)∈Λ

Step 2. Solve for the optimal solution of the LDL optimization problem given (λ∗ , τ ∗ , γ ∗ );
 I
the βi i=1 -component of the optimal solution is the individual-level partworth estimates of the LDL model.

3.3. Simulation Experiments
In this section, we assess the empirical performance of our LDL model using simulation
experiments. We compared the LDL model to three extant models that have shown strong
performance in modeling consumer heterogeneity, including (1) the HB model with a normal
population distribution (Lenk et al., 1996; Rossi et al., 1996), (2) the HB normal component
mixture model (Allenby et al., 1998), and (3) the convex optimization model of Evgeniou
et al. (2007). We refer to these three models as the UHB (for unimodal HB), NCM, and
LOG-Het models, respectively. LOG-Het can be seen as a restricted version of the LDL
model, in which the information pooling mechanism of shrinking the individual-level partworths toward a low-dimensional affine subspace is shut down by setting the regularization
parameters λ and τ to 0. We also tested another restricted version of the LDL model, termed
as LDL-RV, in which we set γ = 0 and select λ and τ using cross-validation. Clearly, in
LDL-RV the individual-level partworths are not shrunk toward the population mean and
information pooling relies completely on shrinking the individual-level partworths toward a
low-dimensional affine subspace.45
3.3.1. Data
The setup of the simulation experiments, including the data-generating process and the
experimental design, largely followed the choice-based simulations in Evgeniou et al. (2007)
with one modification that we will highlight below.
45

We provide the specifications of the grid of regularization parameters for the LDL, LDL-RV, and LOGHet models and discuss the setup and implementation of the UHB and NCM models in the appendix.
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Data-Generating Process
We assumed that there were 10 binary attributes and each choice set consisted of two conjoint profiles. To generate the choice sets, we first derived a design matrix M ∈ R24×10
with 24 rows and the j-th row Mj providing the dummy coding of the j-th profile.46
We then applied the shifting method of Bunch et al. (1996) to the design matrix M
to obtain 24 choice sets, where the j-th choice set consisted of Mj and 1 − Mj .

In

each data set, we generated choice data for 100 synthetic respondents. The true partworths of each respondent were drawn from a multivariate normal distribution with the

mean vector µ = [mag, mag, . . . , mag] and the covariance matrix Σ = diag {σt2 }10
t=1 , where
σt2 = het × mag for t = 1, 2, . . . , 5 and σt2 = het × mag × ratio for t = 6, 7, . . . , 10. As
pointed out in Evgeniou et al. (2007), the parameter mag controls the amount of response
error and the parameter het controls the amount of heterogeneity. We differed from Evgeniou et al. (2007) in the introduction of the parameter ratio ∈ [0, 1], which controls the
proportion of preference variations allocated to the first 5 attributes as opposed to the last
5 attributes and hence how well the true individual-level partworths can be approximated
by a low-dimensional affine subspace. For example, when ratio = 0, all preference variations are restricted to the first 5 attributes and the true individual-level partworths actually
reside in a 5-dimensional affine subspace; on the other hand, when ratio = 1, the preference
variations are equally allocated to all 10 attributes and all directions see the same amount of
heterogeneity due to normality, and therefore the true individual-level partworths may not
have a good low-dimensional affine subspace approximation. Given the true individual-level
partworths, we simulated each respondent’s choices using the logit model. We randomly
selected J (out of the 24) choice sets for each respondent as the calibration data set, and
randomly selected another 8 choice sets for each respondent as the holdout data set.
46

The design matrix M was generated using the SAS Macro %mktex(2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2, n = 24).
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Experimental Design
We experimentally manipulated four data characteristics: (1) the number of choice sets
per respondent for calibration via the parameter J, (2) the amount of response error via
the parameter mag, (3) the amount of heterogeneity via the parameter het, and (4) the
proportion of preference variations allocated to the first 5 attributes via the parameter
ratio. Specifically, we adopted the following 23 × 3 design:
Factor 1. J: 8 or 16;
Factor 2. mag: 0.2 or 1.2;
Factor 3. het: 1 or 3;
Factor 4. ratio: 0, 0.5, or 1.
The choices of levels for the first three factors were identical to those of the choice-based
simulations in Evgeniou et al. (2007). We considered three levels for ratio: ratio = 0 and
ratio = 1 led to boundary conditions in which the preference variations were either allocated
to the first 5 attributes only or equally allocated to all attributes, whereas ratio = 0.5 led to
intermediate conditions in which the preference variations allocated to the last 5 attributes
were half of those allocated to the first 5 attributes (in terms of variance). By varying ratio,
we were interested in understanding how critical the assumption that the true individuallevel partworths can be well approximated by a low-dimensional affine subspace is for the
LDL model to be effective in modeling consumer heterogeneity. In sum, we had a total
of 24 experimental conditions; for each condition, we randomly generated 5 data sets and
estimated all five models separately on each data set (Evgeniou et al., 2007; Chen et al.,
2017).47
47
Estimating all five models on a single data set took around 7 hours when J = 8 and around 13 hours
when J = 16. As the next step, we plan to generate more data sets for each experimental condition.
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Performance Measures
We compared all five models in terms of parameter recovery and predictive accuracy. Parameter recovery was assessed using the root mean squared error between the true individuallevel partworths β̂i and the estimated individual-level partworths βi , which we denote as
RMSE (Andrews et al., 2002).48 RMSE for respondent i was defined as follows:
r
RMSE =

1
||β̂i − βi ||22 .
p

(3.13)

Following Evgeniou et al. (2007) and Chen et al. (2017), for any given model, we computed
RMSE for each respondent in each data set and report the average RMSE across respondents
and data sets for each experimental condition.
Predictive accuracy was evaluated using two performance measures, the holdout sample
log-likelihood, which we denote as Holdout-LL, and the holdout sample hit rate, which we
denote as Holdout-HIT (Andrews et al., 2002; Evgeniou et al., 2007; Iyengar and Jedidi,
2012; Chen et al., 2017). For respondent i, Holdout-LL was defined as follows:
J˜

ex̃ijh∗ βi
1X
,
log PH
Holdout-LL =
J˜
ex̃ijh βi
j=1

(3.14)

h=1

and Holdout-HIT was defined as follows:
˜

J


1X
Holdout-HIT =
1 x̃ijh∗ βi = max x̃ijh βi ,
˜
h
J j=1

(3.15)

where J˜ denotes the number of holdout choice sets for each respondent, i.e., J˜ = 8 in

H
our study, x̃ijh h=1 denotes the j-th holdout choice set for respondent i, and the indicator
function 1(·) takes value 1 when the argument is true, and 0 otherwise. Again, for any given
model, we computed Holdout-LL and Holdout-HIT for each respondent in each data set and
48

The LDL, LDL-RV, and LOG-Het models generate the point estimates βi ’s directly, whereas for the
UHB and NCM models we calculated βi ’s using the means of the posterior distributions.
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report the averages across respondents and data sets for each experimental condition.
Between Holdout-LL and Holdout-HIT, the two measures assessing predictive accuracy,
the continuous Holdout-LL is more sensitive (Iyengar and Jedidi, 2012). One important
difference between the two measures stems from the ways in which they penalize a model
for assigning a low choice probability for the chosen profile of a choice set - the logarithmic
functional form of Holdout-LL imposes a heavy penalty on such a scenario whereas the
stepwise functional form of Holdout-HIT imposes a constant penalty as long as the chosen
profile is not assigned with the highest choice probability.
3.3.2. Results
We first compare the five models with respect to RMSE. The average RMSEs of the models
are reported in Tables 36 and 37.
Insert Tables 36 and 37 here.
We make several observations from Tables 36 and 37. First, the overall best performing
models are LDL and LDL-RV, followed by UHB: LDL and LDL-RV perform best or not significantly different from best (p > 0.05) in 11 and 12 conditions, respectively, whereas UHB
performs best or not significantly different from best (p > 0.05) in 8 conditions. Specifically,
we find that LDL and LDL-RV show superior performance in conditions with high response
error (i.e., mag = 0.2) and conditions with low response error and low heterogeneity (i.e.,
mag = 1.2, het = 1); on the other hand, UHB performs very well in conditions with low
response error and high heterogeneity (i.e., mag = 1.2, het = 3). Here, the comparisons are
based on paired t-tests over the same 500 respondents in each experimental condition (i.e.,
100 respondents per data set × 5 data sets per condition).
Second, LDL-RV, the restricted version of LDL that only shrinks the individual-level partworths toward a low-dimensional affine subspace, outperforms LOG-Het, the restricted version of LDL that only shrinks the individual-level partworths toward the population mean.
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This finding suggests that in our simulation experiments the former information pooling
mechanism is more effective in recovering heterogeneous preferences than the latter. On the
other hand, the average RMSEs of LDL and LDL-RV are very close, indicating that in our
simulation experiments the incremental value of shrinking the individual-level partworths
toward the population mean is limited when we are already shrinking the individual-level
partworths toward a low-dimensional affine subspace.
Third, both LDL and LDL-RV demonstrate strong performance in conditions with ratio =
1, in which the true individual-level partworths are unlikely to be well approximated by
a low-dimensional affine subspace. This finding is very encouraging, as it suggests that
the LDL and LDL-RV models as well as the information pooling mechanism of shrinking
the individual-level partworths toward a low-dimensional affine subspace can be effective in
modeling consumer heterogeneity even when their underlying assumption does not seem to
hold.
We conduct a regression analysis to further investigate the impact of the four data characteristics on the relative performance between LDL and other models. To this end, we
consider the following regression specification:



∆t = α + β1 × 1 J = 16 t + β2 × 1 mag = 1.2 t + β3 × 1 het = 3 t


+ β4 × 1 ratio = 0.5 t + β5 × 1 ratio = 1 t + t ,

(3.16)

where the index t refers to the t-th experimental condition (t = 1, 2, . . . , 24). The dependent
variable ∆t denotes the difference between the average RMSEs of LDL and one of the other
four models (i.e., LDL-RV, LOG-Het, NCM, and UHB) in the t-th condition, and the
independent variables are appropriately defined dummy variables for the four experimental
factors.49 We estimate this linear model using ordinary least squares (OLS) and report
the results in Table 38. Note that a smaller dependent variable indicates a better relative
performance for LDL.
49

For instance, when comparing LDL and UHB, ∆t is defined as the average RMSE of LDL less that of
UHB in the t-th condition.
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Insert Table 38 here.
Table 38 shows that the experimental factors have no significant impact on the relative
performance between LDL and LDL-RV. Compared to LOG-Het, the relative performance
of LDL improves with lower response error (i.e., mag = 1.2) and lower heterogeneity (i.e.,
het = 1). The performance of LDL relative to NCM and UHB is more favorable in conditions
with fewer calibration choice sets (i.e., J = 8), higher response error (i.e., mag = 0.2), and
lower heterogeneity (i.e., het = 1); moreover, compared to UHB, the relative performance
of LDL improves when the preference variations are more concentrated on the first five
attributes (i.e., ratio = 0).
Now, we compare the predictive accuracy of the five models using Holdout-LL and HoldoutHIT. Model comparisons in terms of Holdout-LL are reported in Tables 39 and 40.
Insert Tables 39 and 40 here.
We find that LDL and LDL-RV are again the overall best performing models, being either
the best model or indistinguishable from the best model (p > 0.05) in 24 and 19 conditions, respectively. We also find that the observations regarding RMSE still hold when the
performance measure is Holdout-LL, including that LDL-RV outperforms LOG-Het and is
comparable to LDL, and that LDL and LDL-RV have strong performance in conditions with
ratio = 1. Similar to the case of RMSE, we conduct a regression analysis to understand
how the relative performance between LDL and other models with respect to Holdout-LL
varies across experimental conditions. We use the regression specification (3.16), with the
dependent variable ∆t denoting the difference between the average Holdout-LLs of LDL
and one of the other four models in the t-th condition. Results of the OLS estimation
are summarized in Table 41. Here, unlike the case of RMSE, a larger dependent variable
indicates a better relative performance for LDL.
Insert Table 41 here.
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For Holdout-LL, we find that the experimental factors have no significant impact on the
relative performance between LDL and LDL-RV. Compared to the other three models LOG-Het, NCM, and UHB - the relative performance of LDL is more favorable in conditions
with fewer calibration choice sets (i.e., J = 8). In addition, the performance of LDL relative
to LOG-Het and UHB improves with lower response error (i.e., mag = 1.2) and lower
heterogeneity (i.e., het = 1), respectively.
When the performance measure is Holdout-HIT, model comparisons are reported in Tables
42 and 43.
Insert Tables 42 and 43 here.
The performance gaps among the models in terms of Holdout-HIT are much smaller than
those in terms of Holdout-LL. Specifically, LDL, LDL-RV, LOG-Het, NCM, and UHB perform best or not significantly different from best (p > 0.05) in 24, 22, 19, 18, 18 conditions,
respectively. To investigate the impact of the experimental factors on the relative performance between LDL and other models with respect to Holdout-HIT, we conduct a regression
analysis using the specification (3.16), with the dependent variable ∆t denoting the difference between the average Holdout-HITs of LDL and one of the other four models in the
t-th condition. Results of the OLS estimation are summarized in Table 44. Here, a larger
dependent variable indicates a better relative performance for LDL.
Insert Table 44 here.
From Table 44, we find that the performance of LDL relative to LDL-RV is less favorable when the preference variations are evenly allocated to all attributes (i.e., ratio = 1).
Compared to LOG-Het, the relative performance of LDL improves with fewer calibration
choice sets (i.e., J = 8) and more even allocation of preference variations to attributes (i.e.,
ratio = 0.5 or 1). On the other hand, the experimental factors have no significant impact
on the relative performance between LDL and the two HB models, NCM and UHB.
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3.4. Field Data
In this section, we compare the predictive accuracy of the five models (i.e., LDL, LDL-RV,
LOG-Het, NCM, and UHB) using two field CBC data sets.
3.4.1. The Hospital Data
In the first data set, a total of 200 respondents participated in a CBC study on hospitals.50
Each respondent was shown 6 choice sets, and each choice set consisted of 4 profiles and
the no-choice option was not included. There were 3 attributes describing a profile, with
the first attribute having 6 levels, and the second and third attributes each having 4 levels,
respectively.51 We randomly selected 4 out of the 6 choice sets for each respondent for
model calibration, and used the remaining 2 choice sets for holdout validation.
We evaluate the predictive accuracy of the models using Holdout-LL and Holdout-HIT.
Similar to Section 3.3, for any given model, we computed Holdout-LL and Holdout-HIT for
each respondent and report the averages across all 200 respondents. Results are reported
in the upper section of Table 45.
Insert Table 45 here.
We find that LDL, LDL-RV, and UHB are the best performing models on the hospital data
set, each being either the best model or indistinguishable from the best model (p > 0.1)
both in terms of Holdout-LL and Holdout-HIT. NCM has an average Holdout-LL that is
significantly lower than the best model (p < 0.1), whereas LOG-Het performs significantly
worse than the best model for both Holdout-LL and Holdout-HIT (p < 0.1). Here, the
comparisons are based on paired t-tests over the sample of 200 respondents.52
50

We thank Rajan Sambandam from TRC Market Research for sharing the hospital data set with us.
We were agnostic about the specific attributes and levels used in this study.
52
To be more specific, when comparing two models with respect to a performance measure (i.e., either
Holdout-LL or Holdout-HIT), we calculate the measure for each of the 200 respondents and obtain 200
individual-level measures for each model. We then conduct a paired t-test on the two sets of 200 individuallevel performance measures.
51
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3.4.2. The Soft Drink Data
In the second data set, 192 respondents took part in a CBC study on soft drinks.53 Each
respondent answered 22 choice questions, each of which included 8 profiles and there was no
no-choice option. Three attributes were used in the study, including brand (with 6 levels),
size (with 7 levels), and price (with 7 levels). We randomly selected 16 out of the 22 choice
sets for each respondent for model calibration, and used the remaining 6 choice sets for
holdout validation.
We again measure the predictive accuracy of the models using Holdout-LL and HoldoutHIT. Results are reported in the lower section of Table 45. We find that this time the best
performing models include LDL, LDL-RV, and LOG-Het, each of which performs best or
not significantly different from best (p > 0.1) for both Holdout-LL and Holdout-HIT. On the
other hand, both UHB and NCM perform significantly worse than the best model in terms
of Holdout-LL (p < 0.1), and NCM also has an average Holdout-HIT that is significantly
lower than the best model (p < 0.1). We note that the comparisons are based on paired
t-tests over the sample of 192 respondents.
3.4.3. Summary
Across the two field CBC data sets, LDL and LDL-RV emerge as the overall best performing
models and the predictive accuracy of LDL and LDL-RV is very close, which are consistent
with our findings in the simulation experiments. As the next step, we plan to compare the
models using more field CBC data sets to assess the robustness of the findings based on the
hospital and soft drink data sets and explore settings in which LDL and LDL-RV are likely
to perform particularly well. We also plan to investigate whether and when the LDL and
LDL-RV models lead to more profitable pricing strategies.
53

The soft drink data have been previously analyzed in Evgeniou et al. (2007). We thank Olivier Toubia
for sharing this data set with us.
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3.5. Conclusions and Future Research
Adequate modeling of consumer heterogeneity is critical for CBC estimation since the
amount of information elicited from each consumer is limited in most CBC studies. In this
essay, we propose an innovative LDL model for recovering consumers’ heterogeneous partworths in CBC, built upon an information pooling mechanism that shrinks the individuallevel partworths toward a low-dimensional affine subspace that is also inferred from the
data. Our model implements such a low-dimension information pooling mechanism using a convex optimization framework in which both the distance between each partworth
vector and the affine subspace as well as the dimension of the affine subspace are penalized. In order to further enhance the effectiveness of the LDL model, we also incorporate
the information pooling mechanism of shrinking the individual-level partworths toward the
population mean in the LDL model.
We compare the LDL model and a restricted version of the model, LDL-RV, to benchmark
models including UHB, NCM, and LOG-Het using simulation experiments and two field
data sets. LDL and LDL-RV overall outperform the benchmark models both in terms of
parameter recovery and predictive accuracy. We find that LDL and LDL-RV demonstrate
strong performance even when their underlying assumption that the true individual-level
partworths have a good low-dimensional affine subspace approximation seems unlikely to
hold. We also find that the performance of LDL is very close to that of LDL-RV, suggesting that the incremental value of shrinking the individual-level partworths toward the
population mean can be very limited when we are already shrinking the individual-level
partworths toward a low-dimensional affine subspace.
There are a few questions that have not been answered in this essay and could serve as
starting points for future research. First, why do we find in the simulation experiments
that LDL and LDL-RV perform well even in situations where their underlying assumption
seems unlikely to hold? Is this finding an artifact of the setup of our simulation experiments
or it actually speaks to a general property of the low-dimension information pooling mecha115

nism? Second, are there scenarios in which LDL outperforms LDL-RV? That is, when does
shrinking the individual-level partworths toward the population mean noticeably enhance
the low-dimension information pooling mechanism? Third, are the findings on model comparisons based on the two field CBC data sets robust? Comparing the models using more
field CBC data sets should enhance our understanding of the relative performance of LDL
and LDL-RV. Fourth, we have empirically demonstrated the superior performance of LDL
and LDL-RV in terms of parameter recovery and predictive accuracy. Do they (and when do
they) lead to more profitable targeting strategies? Finally, are there tractable ways to couple the low-dimension information pooling mechanism and information pooling mechanisms
other than shrinking the individual-level partworths toward the population mean?

116

Table 35: The Block Coordinate Descent (BCD) Algorithm

The BCD Algorithm

I
I
, β00 , D0 , ρ0 , θi0 i=1
i=1


1: Initialization: Choose βi0

2: for l = 0, 1, · · · until the stopping criterion is satisfied do

3:

4:


βi

I
-Subproblem:
i=1

β0 -Subproblem:

 l+1
βi

I
i=1

← argmin L


βi

{βi }Ii=1


β0l+1 ← argmin L βil+1
β0

5:

D-Subproblem:

6:

ρl+1 ← argmin L

ρ-Subproblem:

ρ

7:


θi

I
-Subproblem:
i=1



θil+1

I
i=1

 I
I
, β0 , Dl , ρl , θil i=1
i=1






βil+1

 I
I
, β0l+1 , D, ρl , θil i=1
i=1


βil+1

 I
I
, β0l+1 , Dl+1 , ρ, θil i=1
i=1

Dl+1 ← argmin L
D

 I
I
, β0l , Dl , ρl , θil i=1
i=1


← argmin L βil+1
{θi }Ii=1





 I
I
, β0l+1 , Dl+1 , ρl+1 , θi i=1
i=1

8: end for

9: return



βiL+1


I
I
, β0L+1 , DL+1 , ρL+1 , θiL+1 i=1
i=1
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, where L is the last iteration
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1.0
0.0
0.5
1.0

3
3
3

1.0

3

1

0.5

3

0.5

0.0

3

1

1.0

1

0.0

0.5

1

1

0.0

ratio

1

het

1.8662

1.5499

1.2586

1.1333

1.0113

0.8475

0.6590

0.5801

0.4589

0.3990

0.3589

0.2995

LDL

1.8559

1.5687

1.2305

1.1240

1.0378

0.8231

0.6594

0.5790

0.4596

0.3987

0.3570

0.2995

LDL-RV

1.8921

1.5621

1.3012

1.2008

1.1282

0.9766

0.6981

0.5997

0.4660

0.4082

0.3717

0.3083

LOG-Het

1.8020

1.8354

1.3720

1.7050

1.4982

1.4867

1.1157

1.0769

1.0465

1.0641

1.0007

0.9035

NCM

1.6196

1.3883

1.1088

1.2247

1.2466

1.4877

0.7976

0.7868

0.7739

0.8120

0.7313

0.7371

UHB

Notes. Bold numbers in each experimental condition indicate best or not significantly different from best at the p < 0.05 level based
on paired t-tests.

1.2

0.2

8

8

mag

J

RMSE

Table 36: Model Comparisons on RMSE: Simulation Experiments
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1.0
0.0
0.5
1.0

3
3
3

1.0

3

1

0.5

3

0.5

0.0

3

1

1.0

1

0.0

0.5

1

1

0.0

ratio

1

het

1.6136

1.4670

1.1012

0.9826

0.8820

0.7661

0.5737

0.4895

0.3938

0.3646

0.3215

0.2662

LDL

1.6245

1.4696

1.0517

1.0045

0.8741

0.7768

0.5679

0.4971

0.3892

0.3696

0.3222

0.2733

LDL-RV

1.6203

1.4439

1.0996

1.0457

0.9754

0.8649

0.5667

0.4976

0.3941

0.3754

0.3243

0.2685

LOG-Het

1.5649

1.1923

1.0692

1.1701

0.9107

1.1038

0.7457

0.6898

0.6567

0.5855

0.5531

0.5934

NCM

1.3231

1.1632

0.9781

0.9108

0.8776

0.9990

0.6109

0.5788

0.5888

0.5493

0.5449

0.5442

UHB

Notes. Bold numbers in each experimental condition indicate best or not significantly different from best at the p < 0.05 level based
on paired t-tests.

1.2

0.2

16

16

mag

J

RMSE

Table 37: Model Comparisons on RMSE Continued: Simulation Experiments
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Notes. † p < .1. ∗ p < .05.

Observations

R2

∗∗

(0.0073)

(0.0091)

(0.0100)

(0.0074)

(0.0074)

(0.0074)

−0.0444

0.0090

0.0056

0.0405

−0.0431

0.0197

(0.0197)

(0.0158)

24

0.592

∗

(0.0142)

∗

(0.0189)

(0.0142)

∗∗

(0.0142)

LDL − LOG-Het

−0.7422

0.0849

0.0929

0.2322

0.2197

(0.0738)

(0.0787)

(0.0686)

(0.0597)

(0.0597)

24

0.816

∗∗

∗∗

∗∗

−0.5705

0.1962

0.1461

0.2772

0.2536

24

0.830

(0.0946)

(0.0764)

∗

∗∗

(0.0769)

(0.0541)

(0.0541)

†

∗∗

∗∗

(0.0541)

∗

0.1538

∗∗

(0.0597)

LDL − UHB

LDL − NCM
0.3226

p < .01. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

24

0.272

0.0067

−0.0126


1 ratio = 1

Intercept

−0.0167

0.0072


1 het = 3


1 ratio = 0.5

0.0038

−0.0023

LDL − LDL-RV


1 mag = 1.2


1 J = 16

Dependent Variable

Table 38: Regression Analysis on RMSE
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1.0
0.0
0.5
1.0

3
3
3

1.0

3

1

0.5

3

0.5

0.0

3

1

1.0

1

0.0

0.5

1

1

0.0

ratio

1

het

-0.5041

-0.5124

-0.4737

-0.4639

-0.4502

-0.4311

-0.6262

-0.6464

-0.6431

-0.6647

-0.6605

-0.6624

LDL

−0.9493

−0.7172
−0.7209

−1.2589
−1.2026
−1.2051
−1.0642

−0.8912
−0.9863
−0.8971
−1.2984
−1.0946

−0.6693
-0.6440
−0.6569
−0.6514
−0.4634
−0.4810
−0.4924
-0.4757
−0.5238
−0.5226

-0.6277
−0.4347
−0.4580

-0.5054

-0.5121

-0.4751

-0.4644

-0.6474

-0.6429

-0.6639

−0.8352

−1.0019

−1.3729

−0.6709

-0.6594

−0.7608

−0.8317

−0.7039

−0.7220

−0.8298

−0.9139

−0.9637

−0.9767

−1.1801

-0.6629

−0.6688

UHB

NCM

LOG-Het

LDL-RV

Notes. Bold numbers in each experimental condition indicate best or not significantly different from best at the p < 0.05 level based
on paired t-tests.

1.2

0.2

8

8

mag

J

Holdout-LL

Table 39: Model Comparisons on Holdout-LL: Simulation Experiments
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1.0
0.0
0.5
1.0

3
3
3

1.0

3

1

0.5

3

0.5

0.0

3

1

1.0

1

0.0

0.5

1

1

0.0

ratio

1

het

-0.4103

-0.3980

-0.3552

-0.4308

-0.4060

-0.3756

-0.5834

-0.6090

-0.5993

-0.6407

-0.6468

-0.6493

LDL

−0.8561
−0.8508

−0.6530
−0.6482
−0.6012

-0.6424
−0.6033

−0.5513
−0.5977

−0.5347
−0.5890
−0.7427

−0.3922
−0.4207

-0.4112

-0.3977

−0.5206

−0.6115
−0.7953

-0.4022
−0.4164

−0.5460

−0.5169
-0.3567

−0.3591

−0.5253

−0.5607

-0.4337

-0.4278

-0.4061

-0.3757

−0.6992

−0.7994

−0.5880

−0.5860

−0.7555

−0.8896
-0.6116

−0.7739

−0.8394

−0.8137

-0.6100

-0.6486

−0.8488

−0.8470

−0.8831

-0.6497

-0.6496

UHB

LOG-Het

NCM

LDL-RV

Notes. Bold numbers in each experimental condition indicate best or not significantly different from best at the p < 0.05 level based
on paired t-tests.

1.2

0.2

16

16

mag

J

Holdout-LL

Table 40: Model Comparisons on Holdout-LL Continued: Simulation Experiments
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Notes. † p < .1. ∗ p < .05.

Observations

R2

∗∗

(0.0010)

(0.0011)

(0.0015)

(0.0011)

(0.0011)

(0.0011)

∗

(0.0047)

(0.0052)

(0.0040)

24

0.511

0.0117

0.0045

0.0036

−0.0060
(0.0037)

24

0.797

0.4865

0.0656

0.0802

0.0332

−0.0121

∗∗

(0.0037)

†

0.0074

(0.0462)

(0.0436)

(0.0539)

(0.0437)

(0.0437)

(0.0437)

∗∗

−0.3083

(0.0037)

∗

−0.0094

LDL − NCM

LDL − LOG-Het

p < .01. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

24

0.066

0.0014

−0.0011


1 ratio = 1

Intercept

−0.0005

0.0004


1 het = 3


1 ratio = 0.5

0.0003

−0.0002

LDL − LDL-RV


1 mag = 1.2


1 J = 16

Dependent Variable

Table 41: Regression Analysis on Holdout-LL

∗∗

†

∗∗

24

0.868

0.3149

−0.0250

−0.0103

−0.0275

−0.0199

−0.1218

(0.0118)

(0.0159)

(0.0145)

(0.0136)

(0.0136)

(0.0136)

LDL − UHB
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1.0
0.0
0.5
1.0

3
3
3

1.0

3

1

0.5

3

0.5

0.0

3

1

1.0

1

0.0

0.5

1

1

0.0

ratio

1

het

0.7590

0.7572

0.7702

0.7702

0.7770

0.7857

0.6532

0.6305

0.6308

0.6025

0.6045

0.5952

LDL

0.7592

0.7538

0.7708

0.7710

0.7708

0.7860

0.6528

0.6335

0.6268

0.6028

0.6062

0.5913

LDL-RV

0.7435

0.7475

0.7755

0.7652

0.7768

0.7867

0.6232

0.6178

0.6235

0.6008

0.5887

0.5917

LOG-Het

0.7338

0.7355

0.7695

0.7602

0.7668

0.7823

0.6515

0.6230

0.6250

0.6018

0.5925

0.5815

NCM

0.7475

0.7540

0.7682

0.7678

0.7730

0.7845

0.6495

0.6310

0.6318

0.5975

0.5905

0.5883

UHB

Notes. Bold numbers in each experimental condition indicate best or not significantly different from best at the p < 0.05 level based
on paired t-tests.

1.2

0.2

8

8

mag

J

Holdout-HIT

Table 42: Model Comparisons on Holdout-HIT: Simulation Experiments
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1.0
0.0
0.5
1.0

3
3
3

1.0

3

1

0.5

3

0.5

0.0

3

1

1.0

1

0.0

0.5

1

1

0.0

ratio

1

het

0.8323

0.8363

0.8515

0.8143

0.8217

0.8333

0.7035

0.6865

0.6835

0.6360

0.6295

0.6215

LDL

0.8317

0.8367

0.8512

0.8153

0.8223

0.8320

0.7033

0.6823

0.6790

0.6380

0.6252

0.6175

LDL-RV

0.8275

0.8355

0.8500

0.8113

0.8207

0.8347

0.7030

0.6835

0.6857

0.6290

0.6248

0.6218

LOG-Het

0.8250

0.8337

0.8522

0.8103

0.8180

0.8303

0.7030

0.6827

0.6773

0.6345

0.6195

0.6082

NCM

0.8250

0.8327

0.8510

0.8095

0.8185

0.8287

0.7020

0.6855

0.6755

0.6358

0.6158

0.6050

UHB

Notes. Bold numbers in each experimental condition indicate best or not significantly different from best at the p < 0.05 level based
on paired t-tests.

1.2

0.2

16

16

mag

J

Holdout-HIT

Table 43: Model Comparisons on Holdout-HIT Continued: Simulation Experiments
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Notes. † p < .1. ∗ p < .05.

Observations

R2

Intercept

∗∗

(0.0012)

†

24

0.230

(0.0009)

∗∗

(0.0017)

(0.0012)

(0.0012)

(0.0012)

†

∗

∗

(0.0026)

(0.0039)

(0.0025)

(0.0028)

(0.0028)

(0.0028)

24

0.509

0.0037

0.0082

0.0057

0.0033

−0.0042

−0.0061

LDL − LOG-Het

†

(0.0040)

(0.0042)

(0.0035)

(0.0032)

(0.0032)

24

0.193

0.0076

0.0007

0.0033

−0.0003

0.0012

(0.0032)

LDL − NCM
−0.0048

p < .01. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

0.0024

−0.0025


1 ratio = 1

0.0000

−0.0009

−0.0006



0.0004

LDL − LDL-RV


1 ratio = 0.5


1 het = 3

1 mag = 1.2


1 J = 16

Dependent Variable

Table 44: Regression Analysis on Holdout-HIT

∗

(0.0029)

(0.0030)

(0.0027)

(0.0024)

(0.0024)

(0.0024)

24

0.151

0.0067

−0.0003

0.0004

−0.0030

−0.0017

0.0010

LDL − UHB
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0.6325

Holdout-HIT

0.5208

Holdout-HIT

0.5226

-1.3493

LDL-RV

0.6275

-0.9381

LDL-RV

0.5191

-1.3497

LOG-Het

The Soft Drink Data

0.5130

−1.3968

−1.4043
0.5087

UHB

0.6325

-0.9547

UHB

NCM

0.6275

−1.0231

−0.9777
0.6075

NCM

LOG-Het

Notes. Bold numbers in each row indicate best or not significantly different from best at the p < 0.1 level based on paired t-tests.

-1.3489

Holdout-LL

LDL

-0.9286

Holdout-LL

LDL

The Hospital Data

Table 45: Field Conjoint Data Sets

APPENDIX
A.1. Alternative Tests Comparing Outcome Variables
In this section, we compare the three outcome variables defined on each current customer
- the total investments of referred customers, the number of referred customers, and the
incidence of having acquired referred customers - in both experiments using alternative
test procedures. Specifically, we use a test procedure similar to the one applied to compare investments of each referred customer in the text to compare the total investments
and number of referred customers, and use the test for equal proportions to compare the
incidence of having acquired referred customers.
A.1.1. The First Experiment
We first conduct the comparisons with respect to the total investments of a current customer’s referred customers. Between the control condition and a treatment condition, we
first test whether there is a difference between the proportions of current customers whose
referred customers have made positive investments (i.e., positive observations), and then
test whether there is a difference between the two positive subsamples. We report the
findings in Table A1.
Insert Table A1 here.
We compare the proportions of positive observations across conditions using the test for
equal proportions, and find that the proportions are not significantly different between the
control condition and either of the gift and notification conditions (ps > 0.1). On the other
hand, as the Shapiro-Wilk tests indicate that the positive subsamples in all three conditions
are not normally distributed (ps < 0.001), we compare the positive subsamples across
conditions using the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. We find that the positive subsamples
in both the gift and notification conditions have a higher average total investment amount
made by referred customers than that in the control condition, and both differences are
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significant (ps < 0.05).
We then compare the number of a current customer’s referred customers across conditions.
Between the control condition and a treatment condition, we first test whether there is a
difference between the proportions of current customers who have acquired referred customers during the experiment (i.e., positive observations), and then test whether there is a
difference between the two positive subsamples. We report the findings in Table A2.
Insert Table A2 here.
Again, we compare the proportions of positive observations across conditions using the
test for equal proportions, and find that the proportions are not significantly different
between the control condition and either of the gift and notification conditions (ps > 0.1).
On the other hand, as the Shapiro-Wilk tests indicate that the positive subsamples in
all three conditions are not normally distributed (ps < 0.001), we compare the positive
subsamples across conditions using the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. We find that there is
no significant difference between the positive subsample of the control condition and those
of the gift and notification conditions (ps > 0.1).
Finally, we compare the incidence of a current customer having acquired referred customers
across conditions using the test for equal proportions. In fact, we have already conducted
the comparisons in Table A2, simply noting that current customers with a positive number
of referred customers are by definition those who have acquired referred customers. We find
that the proportions of current customers who have acquired referred customers are not
significantly different between the control condition and either of the gift and notification
conditions (ps > 0.1).
A.1.2. The Second Experiment
We first conduct the comparisons with respect to the total investments of a current customer’s referred customers and report the findings in Table A3.
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Insert Table A3 here.
Using the test for equal proportions, we find that the proportions of positive observations are
not significantly different between the control and first value-based reward conditions (p >
0.1), whereas the second value-based reward condition has a significantly higher proportion
of positive observations than the control condition (p < 0.05). As the Shapiro-Wilk tests
indicate that the positive subsamples in all three conditions are not normally distributed (ps
< 0.001), we compare the positive subsamples across conditions using the Wilcoxon-MannWhitney test. We find that the positive subsamples in both value-based reward conditions
have a higher average total investment amount made by referred customers than that in
the control condition, and the difference between the control and first value-based reward
conditions is marginally significant (p < 0.1) whereas the difference between the control and
second value-based reward conditions is significant (p < 0.05).
We then compare the number of a current customer’s referred customers across conditions
and report the findings in Table A4.
Insert Table A4 here.
We compare the proportions of positive observations across conditions using the test for
equal proportions, and find that the proportions of positive observations are not significantly
different between the control and first value-based reward conditions (p > 0.1), whereas the
second value-based reward condition has a higher proportion of positive observations than
the control condition that is marginally significant (p < 0.1). On the other hand, as the
Shapiro-Wilk tests indicate that the positive subsamples in all three conditions are not
normally distributed (ps < 0.001), we compare the positive subsamples across conditions
using the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. We find that there is no significant difference
between the positive subsample of the control condition and those of the two value-based
reward conditions (ps > 0.1).
Finally, we compare the incidence of a current customer having acquired referred customers
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across conditions using the test for equal proportions. Again, we have already conducted
the comparisons in Table A4, noting that current customers with a positive number of
referred customers are by definition those who have acquired referred customers. We find
that the proportions of current customers who have acquired referred customers are not
significantly different between the control and first value-based reward conditions (p > 0.1),
whereas the second value-based reward condition has a higher proportion than the control
condition that is marginally significant (p < 0.1).

A.2. Who Were Likely to Derive More Value from the Gift?
We empirically show in this section that, when offered the gift interest-raising coupon,
customers of higher value, operationalized as those with a higher total investment return
and those with a larger current investment amount, invested more in the fixed deposits
during the first experiment and hence were likely to derive more value from the gift coupon.
To this end, we estimate two linear models on customers in the gift condition: In the first
model, we regress customers’ fixed-deposit investments made during the experiment on
an intercept and their total investment return; in the second model, we regress the same
dependent variable on an intercept and customers’ current investment amount. We note
that this regression analysis is purely descriptive and not intended to establish a causal
relationship between the dependent and independent variables. We report the results of
the OLS estimation in Table A5. For completeness, we also estimate these two models on
customers in the control condition and those in the notification condition and report the
results in the same table.
Insert Table A5 here.
We find that in the gift condition both total investment return and current investment
amount are positively associated with fixed-deposit investments made during the experiment, indicating that, when offered the gift coupon, customers with a higher total investment return and those with a larger current investment amount invested more in the fixed
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deposits during the experiment, and hence were likely to have derived more value from the
gift coupon. Similar results are also found in the control and notification conditions.

A.3. Grids of Regularization Parameters
In the LDL, LDL-RV, and LOG-Het models, the regularization parameters are selected
from a pre-specified finite grid. We present in the following the grid used for each model.

The LDL Model.

v
• λ ∈ 10−2+ 3

12
,
v=0


v
τ ∈ 10−3+ 3

12
,
v=0


v
τ ∈ 10−3+ 3

12
.
v=0


v
γ ∈ 10−3+ 3

12
.
v=0

The LDL-RV Model.

v
• λ ∈ 10−2+ 3

12
,
v=0

The LOG-Het Model.

v
• γ ∈ 10−3+ 3

12
.
v=0

By choosing these grids, we aim to cover a wide range of values for the regularization parameters while keeping the total number of grid points moderate so that the computational
time remains reasonable.

A.4. The NCM and UHB Models
We focus on the setup and implementation of the NCM model as UHB is a special case of
NCM in which the number of normal components is set to 1. We adopted the following
specification of NCM:
Likelihood:

exijh∗ βi
Prob xijh∗ is chosen = PH
;
xijh βi
h=1 e
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First-stage prior:

βi ∼ N µIndi , ΣIndi ,
Indi ∼ Multinomial(pvec);
Second-stage prior:
pvec ∼ Dirichlet(α),

µk ∼ N µ̄, Σk ⊗ a−1
µ ,

k = 1, 2, . . . , K,

Σk ∼ IW(v, V ).

We set αk = 2, for k = 1, 2, . . . , K, µ̄ = 0, aµ = 1/8, v = p + 3, and V = vI. For any
fixed number of components K, we used the Gibbs sampler to generate draws from the
posterior distribution. We executed the Gibbs sampler for 30000 iterations, using the first
15000 iterations as the burn-in period and the last 15000 iterations to obtain parameter

estimates. We estimated the NCM model for K ∈ 1, 2, . . . , 10 and selected K using the
deviance information criterion (Spiegelhalter et al., 2002).
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134
34

46

26,521.27

31,241

0.15%

Gift

37

31,663.95

31,070

0.12%

Notification

p = 0.039

p = 0.233

C vs. G

p = 0.021

p = 0.822

C vs. N

Notes. CC denotes Current Customer, and RC denotes Referred Customer. In the section “Full Sample of All CCs”, the columns “Control”, “Gift”,
and “Notification” report the proportion of current customers whose referred customers have made positive investments in each condition, and the
columns “C vs. G” and “C vs. N” report p-values of the test for equal proportions comparing the control condition and the gift and notification
conditions. In the section “Subsample of CCs with Positive Investments from RCs”, the columns “Control”, “Gift”, and “Notification” report the
average total investments of referred customers for current customers whose referred customers have made positive investments in each condition,
and the columns “C vs. G” and “C vs. N” report p-values of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test comparing the control condition and the gift and
notification conditions.

Subsample Size

Average Total Investments of RCs (in RMB)

11,364.87

30,977

Sample Size

Subsample of CCs with Positive Investments from RCs

0.11%

Proportion of CCs with Positive Investments from RCs

Full Sample of All CCs

Control

Table A1: An Alternative Test Comparing Total Investments of Referred Customers: The First Experiment
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30,977

Sample Size

76

Subsample Size

99

1.02

31,241

0.32%

Gift

83

1.12

31,070

0.27%

Notification

p = 0.125

p = 0.108

C vs. G

p = 0.851

p = 0.647

C vs. N

Notes. CC denotes Current Customer, and RC denotes Referred Customer. In the section “Full Sample of All CCs”, the columns “Control”,
“Gift”, and “Notification” report the proportion of current customers who have acquired referred customers in each condition, and the columns
“C vs. G” and “C vs. N” report p-values of the test for equal proportions comparing the control condition and the gift and notification conditions.
In the section “Subsample of CCs with a Positive Number of RCs”, the columns “Control”, “Gift”, and “Notification” report the average number
of referred customers for current customers who have acquired referred customers in each condition, and the columns “C vs. G” and “C vs. N”
report p-values of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test comparing the control condition and the gift and notification conditions.

1.09

Average Number of RCs

Subsample of CCs with a Positive Number of RCs

0.25%

Proportion of CCs with a Positive Number of RCs

Full Sample of All CCs

Control

Table A2: An Alternative Test Comparing Number of Referred Customers: The First Experiment
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94

119

74,492.05

40,145

0.30%

First Reward

130

59,408.41

40,037

0.32%

Second Reward

p = 0.056

p = 0.102

C vs. F

p = 0.031

p = 0.019

C vs. S

Notes. CC denotes Current Customer, and RC denotes Referred Customer. In the section “Full Sample of All CCs”, the columns “Control”,
“First Reward”, and “Second Reward” report the proportion of current customers whose referred customers have made positive investments in
each condition, and the columns “C vs. F” and “C vs. S” report p-values of the test for equal proportions comparing the control condition and
the two value-based reward conditions. In the section “Subsample of CCs with Positive Investments from RCs”, the columns “Control”, “First
Reward”, and “Second Reward” report the average total investments of referred customers for current customers whose referred customers have
made positive investments in each condition, and the columns “C vs. F” and “C vs. S” report p-values of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test
comparing the control condition and the two value-based reward conditions.

Subsample Size

Average Total Investments of RCs (in RMB)

39,637.16

40,076

Sample Size

Subsample of CCs with Positive Investments from RCs

0.23%

Proportion of CCs with Positive Investments from RCs

Full Sample of All CCs

Control

Table A3: An Alternative Test Comparing Total Investments of Referred Customers: The Second Experiment
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40,076

Sample Size

241

Subsample Size

260

1.15

40,145

0.65%

First Reward

285

1.15

40,037

0.71%

Second Reward

p = 0.185

p = 0.431

C vs. F

p = 0.245

p = 0.058

C vs. S

Notes. CC denotes Current Customer, and RC denotes Referred Customer. In the section “Full Sample of All CCs”, the columns “Control”,
“First Reward”, and “Second Reward” report the proportion of current customers who have acquired referred customers in each condition, and the
columns “C vs. F” and “C vs. S” report p-values of the test for equal proportions comparing the control condition and the two value-based reward
conditions. In the section “Subsample of CCs with a Positive Number of RCs”, the columns “Control”, “First Reward”, and “Second Reward”
report the average number of referred customers for current customers who have acquired referred customers in each condition, and the columns
“C vs. F” and “C vs. S” report p-values of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test comparing the control condition and the two value-based reward
conditions.

1.09

Average Number of RCs

Subsample of CCs with a Positive Number of RCs

0.60%

Proportion of CCs with a Positive Number of RCs

Full Sample of All CCs

Control

Table A4: An Alternative Test Comparing Number of Referred Customers: The Second Experiment
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∗p

< .05.

∗∗ p

(252.84)

(0.01)

31,241

0.0695

−5.19

0.06 ∗∗

0.04 ∗∗

30,977

0.0056

(188.19)

(0.01)

30,977

0.0404

612.37 ∗∗ (71.68) −19.90

0.34 ∗∗ (0.04)

The Control Condition

31,070

0.0056

731.67 ∗∗ (80.51)

0.35 ∗∗ (0.03)

31,070

0.0416

2.10 (230.05)

0.04 ∗∗ (0.01)

The Notification Condition

< .01. Results are from linear models estimated using OLS. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

31,241

Observations

Notes. † p < .1.

0.0101

951.15 ∗∗ (78.14)

0.50 ∗∗ (0.03)

The Gift Condition

R2

Intercept

Investment Amount

Total Investment Return

DV: Fixed-Deposit Investments

Table A5: Which Current Customers Invested More in Fixed Deposits during the First Experiment?
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